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panel of reviewers, and the members of the editorial board for




It has been 15 years since anti-war protests at UH culminated in ar-
rests at Bachman Hall. Shortly thereafter, Hawaiian and land use activ-
ists were the target of arrests at Kalama Valley. That period was full of
political awakening in Hawaii, and the effect was felt within the
University, especially in the formation of the Ethnic Studies and
Women's Studies programs, and New College. Political activists tried
to become better organized, from catholic Action to the Kahoolawe
Ohana, and a small left press was born. Yet the participatory democracy
and community involvement which seemed the promise of the early
seventies has not been fulfilled, and failures in social analysis may have
contributed to the political malaise we now face, for political action in
Hawaii is overwhelmingly and narrowly issue oriented.
This is a special issue of Social Process in Hawaii and is our attempt to
promote research and discussion on the political economy of Hawaii.
Yet the concept of political economy itself has its own ambiguity in
Hawaii, an ambiguity tinged with the disparate directions of liberal,
radical, and Hawaiian politics in this state. A few years ago, political
economy became a magic touchstone for contemporary social theorists
throughout the U.S. While one might wish to claim that this paradigm
became acceptable because of its sweeping acceptance as a world view,
such is obviously not the case. Neither historical materialism,
dialectics, nor more recent realist versions of social science, informs
the majority of work passed off as popular political economy. The
reason political economy was even approached by mainstream social
scientists undoubtedly lies in the failure of liberalism (the best and the
brightest) to comprehend the wide social changes which have beset
modern corporate capitalism since 1968 (the year of the Tet offensive
in Vietnam and the Paris and Czech uprisings), and with the success of
radical theorists in gaining an audience for alternative perceptions of
social reality.
The declining social relevance of the Democratic Party in Hawaii, the
demise of a number of local environmental organizations, and the os-
sification and gentrification of much of the University of Hawaii are all
aspects of the failure of liberalism, and for that matter, radicalism as
well. Perhaps only in the native Hawaiian movement can some success
be claimed in nurturing an alternative conception of the Hawaiian herit-
age and in developing a widespread political base at the grassroots level.
Even so, the Bank of Hawaii and other corporate "sponsors" are trying
with some success to subvert this social movement for their own
purposes. Critical analysis of the social relations of modern corporate












The essence of critical political economy in the U.S. has been concen-
tration on a historical and systematic view of social and political activity
in which economic structures play important (if not determining) roles.
After all, that is the etymology of the expression. The process of politi-
cal economy is an intellectual battle, often linked to political practice,
to create a coherent picture of the social interrelationships which com-
prise the modern corporate capitalist world. As abstract as these rela-
tionships are, they are real and they have real effects. Knowledge of
these relationships does much to sort out the myriad facts and presump-
tions of everyday life. Yet it is the nature of the concrete impact of this
social system on people which presents the focus for political economy.
Political economy is not a monolithic discipline, and that is clearly
shown by the heterogeneity of points of view incorporated in these
pages. Political economy allows considerable variation in its frame of
reference, although our central orientation as we prepared this issue of
Social Process in Hawaii is certainly toward the collective interests of the
mass population of these islands, and not toward some classless social
welfare. Political economy is not, however, the politics of economics,
nor is it the economics of politics. These are merely the adaptations of
traditional social scientists to widespread objections to the standard
practice of "disinterested" research. Hawaii has had the benefit of a
large number of liberal pluralist studies of the social processes which
comprise the social fabric of this state. Many useful insights have been
derived from these studies, and many of us offer thanks to these
researchers. However the essence of modern political economy is a re-
jection of the pluralistic hopes of modern liberal social theory.
The alternative perspectives of political economy have had a hard
row to hoe in Hawaii. Traditional departments at the University have
maintained largely traditional orientations toward social research. The
Ethnic Studies and Women's Studies programs have had to fight
regularly for survival. Political periodicals, such as Modern Times and
Ka Huliau have had to fight for an audience. The most notable excep-
tion has been Noel Kent's Hawaii: Islands Under the Influence. Even
here, the UH Press rejected the work of one of its own faculty, leaving
publication to Monthly Review Press. We believe this issue of Social
Process in Hawaii should provide space for a number of arguments
which help stimulate a discussion directed toward developing a cohe-
sive alternative perspective of Hawaii's political economy. Although di-
verse in their orientation and depth, we are pleased with the directions
these articles suggest.
The essense of political economy (as a method of social
investigation) is that it should lay bare the structured relationships
which lie beneath the surface appearances of social intercourse. The
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ix
nature of Hawaii's political economy (as a social system) has been the
subject of deep controversy since the growth of multinational tourism
in Hawaii. Last year's debate between the foes and promoters of tour-
ism raised emotions about Hawaii's future to a high pitch, but the
debate also showed how weak is the defense of tourism. As Noel Kent
said of tourism's defenders, "The emperor has no clothes." Bob Stauf-
fer (Jr.) 's lead article in this issue of Social Process in Hawaii, is an ambi-
tious attempt to marshall the State's own statistics against the
"maturation" of Hawaii's economy. Stauffer's piece goes to the heart
of Hawaii's political economy and to political economy as method. His
argument is that to trace the flows of income originating from tourism
as a system of production and distribution is to trace the loss of local
control of Hawaii's political future. The data are not definitive - not
only are the concepts of value addressed by Stauffer difficult to
measure, but the techniques of national income accounting analysis are
not designed to challenge the hegemony of the multinational financial
intermediaries who operate in Hawaii. Stauffer extends Kent's
dependency argument and by doing so should help focus the issues
over local control of Hawaii's economy. Joyce Chinen makes a parallel
contribution by applying James O'Connor's seminal sectoral analysis
(from The Fiscal Crisis ofthe State) to Hawaii's industrial structure. Her
analysis examines some of the structural causes of inequality in Hawaii.
The dependency perspective offered by Kent and Stauffer has not
been universally applauded, even on the left. In our book review
section, Bob Cahill writes an imaginative review of Kent's Hawaii: Is-
lands Under the Influence. In a lengthy essay, Cahill first addresses how
the book will be received by the powers that be in Hawaii, amongst
others, and explores the state of political myth. This section indicates
the conceptual problems and practical difficulties alternative analytical
perspectives have in Hawaii. Cahill quite rightly points to the different
evaluative criteria which face political economy, and he argues that
providing an alternative "effective myth" concerning Hawaii is Kent's
most important contribution. Finally he evaluates the text as a source
of scholarship on Hawaii's history. Ed Beechert provides a counter con-
ception of political development, emphasizing the role of organized
labor in defining political and economic agendas in Hawaii. Ian Lind's
discussion of the U.S. military presence in Hawaii complements this
historical political economy.
Political economy is not limited to structural analysis of largely
economic phenomena, important though those may be in orienting
new scholarship. Aspects of political ideology are deeply implanted in
the social relations of dominance and subordination in capitalist












elite point of view, and her interpretation of haole cultural and materi-
alistic influences on Hawaiians will not assuage those views. Her piece,
more than any other in this issue, points to the polemical aspects of an
effective political economy.
In a different tone, but in the same vein, Betty Buck's discussion of
Hawaii's music industry suggests how even cultural renaissance is limit-
ed by the exigencies of private production. Dan Boylan provides a
review of Ron Takaki's oral history of labor in Hawaii, Pau Hana.
Takaki's work indicates the depth of understanding that can come from
the voices of the people of Hawaii themselves. In our commentary
section, Noel Kent makes his voice heard again, updating his argu-
ments concerning the dependency of Hawaii's economy.
Finally, an issue dedicated to the political economy of Hawaii would
be nothing without a critique of the ruling political organization of the
state: the Ariyoshi administration. Dick Pratt's insightful analysis of
the heptachlor milk case provides deep clues into the paralysis faced by
bureaucratized liberalism in Hawaii. And, for what it is worth, we think
Pratt's orientation is an example of the latitude that political economy
can accept, since his analysis is far from the structural orientation of
Stauffer, Chinen and Kent. Both perspectives provide information on
the operation of this social system, its ruling elite, and its dominant
social relationships.
Much more work needs to be done on the political economy of
Hawaii. We believe that a more explicit recognition of the structures
that bind Hawaii's capitalist social relations would provide a fertile
ground for socially and politically relevant research. Social Process in
Hawaii is a continuing journal and we hope further contributions will
be forthcoming. Comments by readers on the direction taken in this
issue, and on the arguments raised by our authors, are welcome. To the
extent possible, these will be included in a forthcoming issue. We hope
this issue of Social Process in Hawaii makes a positive contribution to
resolving the incipient crisis which faces Hawaii today.
Sam Pooley,
for the Editorial Board.
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The removal of a large share of the affected countries' previous-
ly accumulated and currently generated surplus [capital can] not
but cause a serious setback to their primary accumulation of
capital (Baran 1968:143).
This article explores the current status of Hawaii's balance of trade
and investment with the mainland U.S. and the rest of the world. It
goes on to discuss the effect of these investment patterns on the islands'
business classes and local government. The impact of Hawaii's matur-
ing economy on its people is then addressed. This article argues that we
must distinguish between growth for outside capital and true economic
development which benefits all sectors of Hawaii's population. Growth
for outside capital can occur independently, and sometimes to the
detriment, of true local development.
CURRENT BALANCE OF TRADE
When looking at the modern era in Hawaii's economy, it is notewor-
thy that a primary device used to drum up public support for Hawaii's
statehood was the old saw "taxation without representation." That is,
Hawaii's residents sent taxes to Washington before 1959 but could not
elect voting members to Congress to decide what share of that money
would come back to the islands. The implication was that the islands'
residents would get a fairer share of federal tax monies if they became a
state and opened their shores up that much more to American
investors.
What is not mentioned in the record of the struggle for statehood is
that in 1958, for every $1.00 sent to Washington as federal government
payments, Hawaii received $2.39 in government services, while in
1980 island residents received only $1.96 for every dollar sent to Wash-
ington (Department of Planning and Economic Development
1982a:162-3,172-3P Other figures show that while Hawaii had a posi-
tive net balance of trade in 1958 of$129.7 million (in 1980 dollars), by
1980 the corresponding figure was a negative $529.7 million.
The islands as a whole exported $100 million for every $144 million
imported in 1958, creating a preliminary, negative balance in the current
account of $497.6 million. (See the appendix example for an introduc-
tion to these types of balance of trade figures.) Hawaii did not need to
draw on its reserves, borrow money, or sell off its assets to balance its
trade (the standard solutions discussed in the appendix). Instead, it re-
ceived economic "aid" in the form of the above-mentioned federal
subsidies. These federal subsidies3 funneled to the islands were so sub-
stantial in 1958 that Hawaii had a final positive balance of trade of
"0'-- _
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It has a negative balance of trade equal annually to nearly a fifth of its
Gross State Product (see Figure 2). It has a growing amount of exported
funds, in the forms of profits and fees paid to non-residents, equal to
one-eighth of its annual Gross State Product (see Figure 3). And it has
a general evacuation of its remaining major locally controlled enter-
prises and reserves of capital (DPED 1982a:172-3). Judging by recent
trends, it seems likely that this decline in the status of local capital
tal stock is a deepening dependence on outside sources for investment
capital, leading to further debt. This, in turn, only leads to higher levels
of current account loss as the profits and fees exported to non-residents
($1.4 billion in 1980 alone) continue to rise. Indeed it can be argued
that these supplies of non-resident capital could have been, until only
recently, Hawaii's own. 4
Beyond these arguments, however, it remains the case that the
$529.7 million negative external balance in 1980 - to use the words of
the State's economists - "conceptually indicates a claim held by non-
residents on future production by Hawaii" (DPED 1982a:171). The
net result of the maturing of the Hawaiian economy is that local resi-
dents are, in effect, involuntarily or unknowingly mortgaging their
future surplus labor to satisfy current costs and to cover profits sent to
non-residents.
In summary, Hawaii has a net external investment account which is
negative (see Figure I).
Annual Net External Investments OWed to (or
by) Non-Residents in Millions of Current
Dollars: 1958-1980 (OPED 1982a:172-3).
19801977197419711968
(Amounts below zero are
claims held by non-residents
on future production in Hawaii)
1965
(Amounts above zero are claims
held by residents on future production
in areas outside Hawaii)



















$129.7 million. Once the Washington subsidies were included, for
every $1.00 of goods and services exported, imports were kept under
93 cents.
The current account was, therefore, balanced and the economy ap-
peared healthy. But, as the economy matured, things changed. By
1980, the preliminary balance of trade ratio - not counting federal sub-
sidies - was only slightly improved: $1.41 in imports (cf. $1.44 in
1958) for every $1.00 exported. But because of the growth of the
economy, the size of the negative balance of trade was over two billion
dollars, and there was no equivalent growth in federal subsidies to bal-
ance the current account.
As will be shown in this article, the expansion of the economy since
statehood is closely tied to the sale of local productive assets to non-
residents and the creation of new assets under non-resident ownership.
One result of this has been that the preliminary negative balance of
trade has grown to 18.3% of the Gross State Product (GSP) versus only
13.8% in 1958. Put another way, as the economy grew, so did both the
real and the relative size of the slice of the current account owned by
overseas investors (Heller & Heller, 1973).
The current account figures provide an indirect method of tracing the
proportion of overseas-owned productive assets in Hawaii. Published
by the State of Hawaii's Department of Planning and Economic Devel-
opment (DPED, 1982a), these figures show the trade of goods and ser-
vices between Hawaii and overseas locations, including the U.S.
mainland. The figures include the payment by Hawaii of interest on
loans and the payment of profits on Hawaii's assets which are owned by
overseas investors. The figures show that an increasing amount of fees
and profits has been exported since 1959, reflecting the declining local
ownership of Hawaii's productive assets.
By 1980, the federal subsidies - relatively smaller since island resi-
dents gained representation for their taxation - could not stem the
flow of local funds lost to non-residents. Instead of the positive net
$129.7 million balance of accounts posted in 1958, the total balance for
1980 was negative, and over one-half billion dollars. In effect, for every
$1.00 of goods exported in 1980, instead ofa net 93 cents in imports as
in 1958, there was now $1.08. This represents a relative decline in
Hawaii's balance of its external accounts of over 16% since 1958
(DPED 1982a:20-1,26-7,172-3).
This negative external balance is not just a matter oflosing previously
accumulated as well as currently generated surplus. It can be argued
that this loss means a decline in the local economy and a loss ofjobs be-
cause the rate of re-investment of profits in Hawaii may not be as high
as it might be if profits remained here. It can be further argued that this
loss leads to a general decline in average per capita disposable income
and wages with its corresponding drop in living standards.
Another implication of the depletion of Hawaii's locally-owned capi-
4 SOCIAL PROCESS IN HAWAII, VOL. 31,1984 The Tragic Maturing ofHawaii's Economy 5
stock and Hawaii's general standard of living will continue unless













The maturing of Hawaii's economy, at least since 1958, has produced
changes in the relative size of the slices of the economic pie (GSP).


























Figure 2: Annual Hawaiian Balance of Trade, in
Millions of Current Dollars: 1958-1980
(OPED 1982a:172-3).
Figure 4: Wage and Salaried Workers' Income
as a Percentaae of the Gross State
Product: 1958-1980 (DPED 1982a:20-1;
1983a:ll.
Annual Outflow of Local Funds via Payment
of Fees and Profits to Non-Residents, in
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and a substantial 38.3% cut to the "small business class'" share (see
Figure 5). Note the general decline in the small-business class' share of
the economy during the first third of the 1958-80 period. This was fol-
lowed by a further decline of 25.1% during the second third, and anoth-
er decline of 17.6% during the most recent period, making a total drop
of 38.3%, clearly leaving the small business class the hardest hit since
statehood. .
During the first third of the 1958-80 period, the big business class'
share of the economy's income actually declined slightly, followed by
another small (under 1%) decline in the second third. During the most
recent period, however, the big business class' slice increased in size
34.1 %, for a total gain of 33.4% (see Figure 6).
The general flow of investment into Hawaii in recent times has
coincided with three distinct changes relating to big business. First, the
relative decline in the role of the local resident big business class as
compared with the non-resident big business class. Second, the reduced
-I
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10%
Small Business Class' Income as a Percentage
of the GSP: 1958-1980 (DPED 1982a:20-1;
1983a: 1) .
that expansion is small compared with the amount of capital exported
overseas to Hawaii's true present big business class - the primarily
non-resident owners of Hawaii's productive assets. These are individual
investors and corporations based on the U.S. mainland and in Japan,
S.E. Asia, the Middle East and other overseas locations.
Hawaii's local big businesses are also on a relative decline. Of the six
large companies which formerly made up Hawaii's main corporate
structure, three have been sold outright to outside interests. The stock
of the remaining three is increasingly held by outsiders, and the present
areas of investment of these companies are away from the islands. Two
of these have announced the move of their headquarters out of Hawaii,
and the other is expected to follow.
The three local companies owned by non-residents are C. Brewer &
Company, Theo H. Davies and Dillingham Corporation. Amfac and
Castle & Cook have announced their corporate move away from the
islands, and the remaining company - Alexander & Baldwin - has
large corporate offices outside of Hawaii.
Table 1 shows the proportion of locally owned stock in major Hawaii
corporations as of December 31, 1982. In the spring of 1983 Dillingham
Corporation converted to a closely-held private corporation primarily









Big Business Class' Income as a Percentage
of the GSP: 1958~1980 (DPED 1982a:20-1;
1983a:l).
Table 1: Stockholdings (in Thousands of Shares) of
Hawaii Residents in Selected Major Hawaiian
Companies: 1982 (DPED 1983b:407).






























Alexander and Baldwin, Inc.
Amfac, Inc.
Bancorp Hawaii, Inc.
(owner of Bank of Hawaii)
Castle and Cooke, Inc.
C. Brewer & Co., Inc.
Dillingham Corp.
First Hawaiian, Inc.
(owner of First Hwn Bank)
Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc.
Hawaiian Telephone Co.
Maui Land & Pine Co., Inc.
Pacific Resources, Inc.
Theo H. Davies & Co., Inc.
1980197719741971196819651962
Figure 6:
local role of the old-line Hawaii corporations as compared with overseas
capital. And third, the decreasing portions of these local corporations
owned by residents.
Although the proportion of the GSP accounted for by the local big
business class has expanded at the expense of labor and small business,
Of the twelve major corporations listed in Table 1, only three are
listed as having majority resident control. But even this figure is
misleading. For example, in interviews with executives of the compa-
nies concerned, it was found that the 20% of Pacific Resources stock
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* * *
During the modern period when the Hawaiian economy has been un-
dergoing its particular type of development, small business proprie-
torships have been particularly hard hit. In 1958, 86.3% of them made a
profit. By the late 1970s this figure dropped to 65.8%, meaning that
over a third of the proprietorships actually were losing money (Schmitt
1977:568-9; OPED 1982b:378). In the same period, small business'
share of the GSP steadily declined (see Figure 7) .
During the first third of the 1958-80 period, the proportion of
economic activity accounted for by small business declined somewhat.
During the second third there was a further decline of 24. 8%, and in the
current period it fell another 38.8%, for a net decline to the small busi-
ness class of 54.0% (see figure 7).
19801977
, I I , I , I
1974
I , , I , I ,
19711968
(Numbers below 1.0 show the degree that
the big business class' income exceeds
the small business class' income)
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I , I I
1962
Ratio of Small to Big Business Incomes:
1958-1980 (DPED 1982a:20-1; 1983a:ll.



















Obviously, the last group of payments and some of the second group
are not all pure profits being exported. Yet, if these home offices and
transportation companies had been locally-owned, the funds would
have stayed in Hawaii and strengthened the local economy. Thirty
years ago, most of the companies operating in Hawaii, including the
Matson shipping company with its monopoly on Hawaiian - U.S.
transport, were locally owned.
The exported fees and profits have increased in size by 296.1 %, as ad-
justedj'or inflation, between 1958 and 1980 (OPED 1982a:26-7,172-3).7
This is a change from 1953, when instead of exporting profits there was
an importing of net profits to local residents. Hawaii received $26 million
income on its investments overseas that year, and only $23 million was
returned overseas on investments in Hawaii. Since then exported prof-
its have increased nearly 60 times over, and there has never been anoth-
er year of net imports of profits (Schmitt 1977:555).
held by Alexander and Baldwin is considered locally owned. But A & B
is in turn primarily owned by non-residents. Over 28% of First
Hawaiian's stock considered "locally owned" is held by the Damon
Estate and A & B. Damon's beneficiaries, in turn, are primarily
non-residents.
Maui Land and Pine, a relatively small firm concentrated on Maui
which has been experiencing losses recently due to its unsuccessful di-
versification into the tourist industry, is the only one of the 12 firms
truly locally owned (by two principal stockholding blocks).
What does this mean? Simply, that the economy had previously
been organized in a local, hierarchial system with surplus flowing to the
top. The top was made up of local residents who tended to keep the
surplus capital at home through re-investment and through maintaining
local ownership of local productive assets. But now that the top has
been largely bought out, the surplus is increasingly exported to non-
resident owners. The potential for local political or labor influence on
this outside capital is naturally slimmer than previously existed with
local capital.
But that is only half of the picture. While being bought out, the old
Big Six have also been humbled by a build-up of new productive assets
through direct outside investment (much like the Honolulu-owned
build-up of hotels on Kauai in the appendix example). This has resulted
in a further increase in the amount offunds exported as fees and profits.
The exported fees and profits represent surplus no longer available
for investment in the local economy. So large is this lost surplus that
the $1.4 billion exported in fees and profits from Hawaii in 19806 could
have paid all local sales taxes, corporate income taxes, individual
income taxes andreal estate taxes.
The money paid in fees and profits to non-residents represented
12.1% of the GSP. In effect, the first hour everyone worked every day
of that year went into the creation of wealth which was then entirely
paid to non-residents.
According to a Bank of Hawaii economist, the bulk of these payments
to non-residents are bankwired out of Hawaii the evening after they are
accumulated and deposted. These funds added up to $1,400 for every
man, woman and child in the islands, so an average family of five saw
itself short $7,000 in after-tax cash because of the fees and profits paid
to non-residents. This outflow in the current account equaled $4 mil-
lion daily or $2,500 every minute of every day.
The outflow of $1.4 billion in 1980 was not purely profits, to be sure.
It was made up of three roughly equal types of payments to non-
residents. One-third consisted of profits. Another third was payments
for "fees." Quite often, however, such fees are a form of transferring
funds to a home office for services rendered and are a form of profit-
transfer. The final third consisted of payments for things such as flights
on non-locally owned airlines.
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These adverse trends for small business have not come about by acci-
dent or oversight. The govenment of the State of Hawaii has energeti-
cally worked toward a particular type of economic development. Total
business taxes as a percentage of government revenue fell by 13.9% be-
tween 1958 and 1980, while the percentage contributed by personal
taxes paid by residents has risen 36.9% (OPED 1982a:64-5). But the
government has not favored all business equally. Government policies
have actually increased local small business taxes, while providing rela-
tive reductions in total business taxes primarily to non-resident big
business owners and speculators.
As general business taxes have been proportionately cut, the tax
burden on local small business proprietors has actually increased due to
two major factors. First, big business can purchase away from Hawaii
their wholesale goods and services which go into their final products
sold in Hawaii. Such purchases are spared much of the weight of the
state's wholesale business tax, as is the case for all transactions dealing
with local commerce consummated outside the state. Local small
business, not enjoying such a wide field of maneuver, must therefore
carry the full brunt of such taxes on purchases and sales. Secondly,
there has been a shift in the local business tax system towards
regressive, employer taxes, which hit small businesses the hardest
while completely exempting speculators.
As a result of these policies, labor-intensive small businesses which
purchase goods locally are penalized and driven out of the marketplace,
while capital-intensive big businesses which purchase goods outside
the state, or simply speculate locally, pay a much smaller percentage of
their incomes as tax.
While it is outside of the scope of this article, a preliminary analysis
of government policies regarding the taxation and subsidy of businesses
in Hawaii has uncovered the following rules:
. (1) Rewards are given to businesses with dealings outside Hawaii,
and penalties are given to those businesses making local purchases;
(2) Rewards go to investors and speculators, and penalties go to
employers;
(3) Rewards are given to capital-intensive mechanization, and penal-
ties to job-creating employers;
(4) Rewards flow to employers of part-time labor, and penalties go
to full-time employers; and
(5) Rewards are made to businesses which utilize labor not covered
by social insurance programs (through various manipulations of labor
laws) while penalties accrue to those employers who do give full social
insurance program coverage to their labor force (Stauffer 1982).
Some writers suggest that the particular type of economic growth
seen in Hawaii should be labeled dependent development (e.g. Kent,
1983). This theory holds that with expanding Gross National or State
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Products coinciding with declining real wages and a loss of local control
over local productive assets, local economies become dependent on
outside sources of capital for further economic growth. 8 In 1950 for
example, Hawaii residents had $44 million more in investments outside
Hawaii than non-residents had in the islands. By 1971 this situation was
reversed and non-residents held $763 million more in investments in
the islands than vice versa (Schmitt 1977:557).
GOVERNMENT POLICY
The State of Hawaii receives a majority of its revenue from a unique
pyramid tax (similar to a Value Added Tax or VAT) that is not charged
directly to final retail buyers but rather is a tax of varying amounts
charged to all wholesale and retail sellers. A senior state tax department
official has estimated that if the state's VAT-type tax was converted to
a normal sales tax it would need to be raised from its current limit of 4%
up to 11% or more to generate the current level of revenue. While the
tax appears low (0.5% to 4%), Hawaii actually has the de facto highest
sales tax equivalent (a regressive form of taxation) in the country.9
Primarily because county government does not pay for public educa-
tion in Hawaii, the county real estate taxes charged to landowners are
some of the lowest in the nation.
Total state tax collections for 1980 were $1.1 billion, including state
VAT, income and corporate taxes. Total tax collections for the counties
were $0.2 billion, for a total of just under $1.3 billion. If exported fees
and profits to non-residents ($1.4 billion) went towards government
services, all local taxes could have been abolished in 1980, and there
still would have been a surplus for the year of over $90 million to spend
on further public purposes (Chamber of Commerce 1983:4).
Local public debt has increased from $214.4 million in 1958 to
$925.5 million in 1971 to $2,359.5 million in 1982 (OPED 1983b:267;
Schmitt 1977:649). Local governments have primarily kept their credit
alive through their protective relationship with the federal
government. Without such easily acquired credit, a very real fiscal
crisis might have already arisen.
It is a common misconception that local government has impropor-
tionally expanded in relation to the GSP since 1958. In actualiy, local
government has simply maintained its position relative to the GSP.
However, who is paying for local government has changed.
The wealthy have seen the percentage of government revenues con-
tributed by local inheritance taxes fall by 17.5% between 1958 and
1980. Corporate income taxes have fallen a relative 23.3%. Personal
income taxes - the bulk of which is paid by average-income people -
have risen 28.2%. Non-taxes, like car registration fees, which are the
most regressive form of local government revenue because they hit the
common citizen the hardest, have risen 90.3% (OPED 1982a:66-7).
Federal government actions in Hawaii have followed a similar pattern
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over the past two and a half decades. While the size of the federal in-
volvement in Hawaii has remained about the same (or shown a slight
decrease) in relation to Hawaii's GSP, federal taxes have shifted away
from the big business class to the citizenry.
In an effort to make up the loss in revenue no longer collected from
the rich, residents have seen government, especially since 1980, raising
social security, gasoline and other regressive tax and non-tax revenue
programs aimed at the general public. Where these new taxes have not
been sufficient, public debt has been expanded which in turn increases
the amount of government expenditures paid to the debt service ac-
count (i.e. payments to primarily wealthy non-resident investors in the
public debt).
In the current State biennuim budget (1983-85), for example, the
poors' primary welfare program costs $91 million, or $45 per resident
annually in taxes, while the debt servicing program costs roughly $300
million, or $148 per resident. The welfare program is actually shrinking
as its 4.5% annual growth rate is less than the rate of inflation..
Meanwhile, the debt-servicing program, already over three times
larger, is expanding with a 10% annual growth rate (Tax Foundation of
Hawaii,1983:4-5).
While local government has remained about the same size in propor-
tion to the GSP, who pays its taxes and who gets its benefits has
changed. As a whole, it would appear that the rich, and primarily the
non-resident big business class, have benefited in both cases.
WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS
If local big and small businesses have been hurt, the effects of the
maturing Hawaiian economy have been felt most acutely by the average
residents of the islands who work for a salary or wage. Between 1970
and 1982 the average annual wage and salary payments per worker in
Hawaii declined in real terms by 22.3% (see Table 2).
One common response to these statistics is that at least Hawaii has a
relatively low rate of unemployment. But so did the antebellum
(pre-Civil War) American South. Jobs, per se, should never be the
focus of discussion. Jobs, adequate to support a family, should be (see
Table 4). Furthermore, Hawaii's level of disguised unemployment and
under-employment may also be substantial. Women, while historically
a major part of Hawaii's work force, may well be feeling the brunt of
these factors, together with certain ethnic groups (Chinen, 1984).
Another common response to these statistics was voiced by an
economist who suggested that the real wage declines shown in Table 2
should be understood in the context of similar trends in the U.S. as a
whole. Hawaii's decline in wages, however, has been notably worse
than the U.S. as a whole, as will be discussed later in this article.
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Table 2: Average Annual Wage and Salary Payments in
Constant (1970) Dollars per Worker, by




of Worker 1970 1980 1982 1981 1982
Federal $9,752 9,480 8,732 -10.5 -7.9
State 8,759 6,367 6,478 -26.0 +1.7
County 8,726 6,658 6,645 -23.8 -0.2
Private 6,849 5,694 5,339 -22.0 -6.2
Total 7,424 6,075 5,768 -22.3 -5.1
Table 3: Average Annual Wage and Salary P,ayments
per Worker as Compared to the Cost of
Living, Both in Current Dollars: 1970,




1970 1981 1982 1982 1982
Total Workers $7,424 14;471 15,367 107.0 6.2
Index (1970=100) 100.0 194.9 207.0
Family Budget $12,776 31,893 34,032 166.4 6.7
Index (1970=100) 100.0 249.6 266.4
" "Family BUdget" is the intermediate budget for an
urban family of four persons on Oahu, as estimated by the
U:8. Bureau of Labo~ Statistics. It includes consumption,
glfts and contrlbutlons, social security, disability pay-
ments and personal income taxes.
While wages have dropped in real terms in Hawaii, they have
nevertheless shown increases in current-dollar terms. The current cost
of living, however, rose during this period at a rate 55.5% faster than
the rise in wages (see Table 3). For every dollar in pay raises between
1970 and 1982, the cost of living rose $1.56.
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While this is startling enough, the fact is that wages are continuing to
fall behind the cost of supporting a family at an accelerating rate
(DPED 1982b:290, 1983b:322,372).
In 1970, two average salaries in Hawaii produced $14,848 while an
average family budget was $12,776, permitting all the bills to be paid by
two working parents, with 16% of the family's income left over. By
1982, this positive balance was replaced with a shortfall of 10% (DPED
1982b:290, 1983b:322,372).
The average local wage in 1982 was $15,367 with a moderate family
of four's budget estimated at $34,032. The recent development of
declining real wages means that both spouses working average full-time
jobs cannot even provide a moderate standard of living for their family.
This fact has long been true for workers in the high profitable (i.e., high
surplus producing) hotel industry, where an average wage of $11,004
in 1982 meant two spouses holding down three full-time jobs still could
not make ends meet for a moderate standard of living (see Table 4).
Apologists for the figures shown in Table 4 argue that the low rate of
pay for retail and hotel jobs should be understood within the context
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that a greater proportion of part-timers, students, etc., are employed in
those industries as opposed to career-oriented workers. (Indeed, most
workers in the hotel and service industries are part-time. This means
that the part-time salaries actually received by hotel and retail workers
are actually below the already low figures shown in Table 4. As such,
the 3.6 or 3.1 jobs needed by parents in these industries to support their
families may be underestimates.)
But the scarcity of even moderate-paying jobs and the expansion of
job opportunities primarily in the retail and hotel industries (and at the
above-noted wage levels) does not bring welcome news to the serious
career-oriented adult facing today's job market in Hawaii,10 In any
event, it is a fact of life that it now takes 2.2 full-time, average-paying
jobs in Hawaii to support a family of four, whereas in 1970 it took only
1.7 (DPED 1982b:290, 1983b:322,372).
Table 5: 1981 Honolulu Annual Wages and Salaries as
Compared with Average Wages in Seven Similar
Western U.S. Metropolitan Areas (Stanford
Research Institute 1982:A-21).*
Table 4: Comparison Between Cost of Living and
Wages/Salaries for Various Job Categories,
1982 (DPED 1983b:322,372l. Occupation
Percentage
Average Below West
Annual Wage Coast Average
Category
Family Budget:
Avg Pay, All Industries:
Avg Pay, Federal Jobs:




























Janitors, Porters & Cleaners































Avg Pay, County Jobs:
AV9 Pay, All Private Jobs:
Avg Pay, Ag Jobs:
Avg Pay, Light Industry,
including Mill Jobs:
Avg Pay, Retail Jobs:













* The seven Western cities are: Phoenix, Arizona1
San Diego, San Jose and Sacramento, California; Vancouver
and Seattle/Everett, Washington; and Portland, Oregon.
For many years, it was thought that high wages locally balanced off
Hawaii's cost of living. "At least wages are higher here," was a
common comment. It is surprising, therefore, to find that despite a cost
of living 32% above the mainland, the average wages and salaries paid
in Hawaii are not simply declining but are already largely behind those
paid in other states, particularly in the western U.S. In Table 5, for
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example, not a single Honolulu job classification makes more than the
average in comparison cities. Honolulu is now the most expensive U.S.
city to live in, having overtaken even Anchorage, Alaska
(Star-BUlletin, 4119/82:A5).
The decrease in wages and salaries shown in Table 4, in relation to
this rising cost of living in the last decade, means that if a family earned
$15,000 to pay its bills in 1970, those same bills would cost $39,960 in
1982. However, that family's earnings from doing the same amount of
work would have risen to only $31,050, for a shbrtfall of $8,910, re-
sulting in a decline in their standard ofliving.
Put yet another way, in 1970 two wage-earners with average incomes
could pay all the costs of a moderate standard of living with a $5,445
(I982 dollars) surplus. In 1982 the same family would have a shor(fall of
$3,298. This adds up to a total decline of $8,743, which is a drop in
income of over 22%. Such a decline places the bulk of families in
Hawaii now below even a moderate standard of living (DPED
1982b:290, 1983b:322,372; U.S. Bureau of Census, 1981:404,471).
Robert Schmitt, the state's chief statistician, recently commented on
the comparison of the local standard ofliving with that of the mainland:
Inflation has climbed at a faster rate in Hawaii in the last
decade than it did on the Mainland....
In that same period, from 1970 to 1980, Hawaii's rate of
growth in per capita income was the lowest in the nation....
Hawaii's cost-of-living rose from about 20 percent above the
national average for a four-person family in 1970 to 32 percent
in 1980.
At the same time Hawaii's per capita income, which was 18
percent above the national average, had shrunk to 3 percent
above the national average....
Our cost-of-living has increased more rapidly than the Main-
land and at the same time we ranked lowest among the 50 states
and the District of Columbia in percent of increase [of] per
capita [income], So we're losing ground rapidly. Sad isn't it?
(Star-BUlletin, 5/12/81:A6).
Put another way, in 1970, wages in Hawaii were 2% below mainland
wages, as adjusted for the cost of living. In 1980 however, local wages
were 29% below those on the mainland on average - a relative drop of
27%. This decline was on top ofa fall in mainland workers' real earnings
of over 12.9% between 1973 and 1980 (U.S. Bureau of Census,
1981:404)l
In 1979 11.5% of the total state income was paid out in profits and
fees to non-residents. At home, the poorest 43.3% of resident adults in
Hawaii individually received adjusted gross incomes of under $10,000
and altogether received just 15.0% of total adjusted gross state income.
This total was roughly equal to the income of the wealthiest 3.1% of
resident adults that year, who individually had adjusted gross incomes
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of over $50,000 and together received 13.7% of the total adjusted state
gross income. So at least some residents were profiting from the matur-
ing local economy. Four residents had adjusted annual gross incomes
of over $500,000 in the year 1970; there were 50 in 1979 (DPED
1982b: 14,37,239-40).
While unabashedly controversial, it is my conclusion from the above
data that, with the exception of the decimation of the native population
during the 18th and 19th centuries (caused primarily by the introduc-
tion of biological agents), never before in the history of Hawaii has the
standard of living of the average citizen declined to such a degree and in
such a relatively short time as statistics show for the 1970-1982 period.
SUMMARY
Before 1982, the Economics Division of the Bank of Hawaii provided
a gauge of the local economy through their "Index of Business
Acitivity." This was a composite index of eight business indicators
which were adjusted for inflation and graphed back to 1960.
The index was discontinued in April 1982 and did not go out on a
note of optimism. It showed slowed growth during the recessions of
1966, '70, '74 and '80. The best period of sustained growth was in the
60s (peaking around 1969 with an average sustained growth rate of
14.3%). This represents the benefits of outside investment. But after
that high point came an accelerated slowdown in the 70s - verified by
other economic figures discussed in this article - as the economy expe-
rienced the liabilities of outside ownership. Between 1980 and 1982
the index actually decreased at an average annual rate of 3.0%. '
The 1980-82 average decline was the only negative showing in the
index's history, and the decline had begun to accelerate. The last
annual rate available from the bank was a 5.6% decline in 1981-82, and
the final monthly figure, extropolated at an annual rate, showed a de-
cline of 7.2%. The bank's concluding statement on the index was that
it, "continued its downward course and remained below the previous
month's figure for the thirteenth consecutive month" (Bank of Hawaii
1982:4).
It was noted earlier that expanded outside trade has produced an
overall negative effect upon Hawaii. This is largely because increasing
that trade volume expands the islands' deficit and so leads to a sell-off
of local capital reserves or productive assets in an effort to balance the
trade deficit. A second factor arguing against expanded trade is that, at
least since the time of statehood, Hawaiian exports have consistently
fallen behind inflation in value, while imports have consistently risen
in value ahead of inflation. As SUCh, Hawaii faces outside trade with the
deck stacked against it because the price of exports and imports are not
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set locally and can be - and have been - set against Hawaii's best
interests. 11
It is my opinion that a further study of economic data will show the
following tending to especially occur in Hawaii during external trade-
related recessions:
(0 the big business class' share of the GSP spurts forward;
(2) the local labor class' share of the GSP declines;
(3) Hawaii's negative balance of trade increases;
(4) the islands' negative net external investment (i.e. IOU) account
owed to non-residents gets worse; and
(5) there is greater demand for more outside investment.
Two facts are plain from all of the above data. First, the economic
facts of life for the average citizen of Hawaii are bad. Second, the poli-
cies behind Hawaii's peculiar form of open-door economic develop"
ment and expanded trade over at least the past two and a half decades
are today worthy of critical review and debate.
It is non-resident big businesses, their owners, and associated
speculators who have benefitted since 1959 from the maturing of
Hawaii's economy, as have a small portion of the local populace allied
with that economic class. The vast majority of Hawaii's people, on the
other hand, have seen a deterioration in their living standards in recent
years and the data examined in this article points toward a continual
and perhaps accelerated deterioration of living standards unless local
policies are changed.
CONCLUSIONS
The criteria which have been used to characterize [Hawaii] as
an example of successful development are increasingly recog-
nized as being insufficient. GSP growth is not enough. It also be-
comes clear that the political and social implications of having
adopted an [economic] strategy such as [Hawaii's] are, indeed,
rather negative (Villamil 1979:242).
The facts of modern Hawaiian development are plain. Growth has
occurred. The size of the GSP has expanded as has the level of local
business activity (especially involving those businesses representing
non-resident capital investment). State figures (DPED 1982a:20-20
indicate that the GSP increased about nine-fold between 1958 and 1980
in current dollars, or three times in constant dollars. The Bank of
Hawaii's economic index also shows this tripling of the economy in real
terms since statehood.
Such growth, through an open-door policy towards outside
investment, serves as an objective example of the results of trickle-
down, supply-side economic policy. Despite the economy tripling
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in size, average real wages are falling. In effect, only the economic
squeeze has "trickled down," while the expanded economy has led to a
general upward redistribution of wealth.
We have seen how the maturing of the Hawaiian economy has
widened this gap between the rich and non-rich. Had the wealth created
in Hawaii in 1980 been kept at home and equally divided, for example,
the average family of four would have had an income of $49,332, over
twice the $22,750 that average families received in actuality (DPED
1983b:339,347).
This would have been more than enough to set aside capital for rein-
vestment and still provide for a more than adequate standard of living.
In short, it would also have ameliorated many current social problems
concerning housing and other shortages. It would have helped ease the
multitude of troubles stemming from the stress of inadequate incomes
and the widening gap in the distribution of wealth.
But the results of local government policy to open up Hawaii's econo-
my to outside investment has caused more than a decline in wages. It
has precipitated the rising supremacy of non-resident big businesses
(sometimes referred to as trans-national corporations or TNCs). It has
led to the takeover and break-up of the old local big business sector
(the Big Six). It has led to the general decline of local small business.
And it has squeezed the local wage and salary-earning class.
The time has come for a broad debate over an open-door economic
policy which has manifestly failed. In the marketplace of competing
social classes, it is time for change and a swing of the pendulum towards
a fairer and more equitable distribution of the control of Hawaii's pro-
ductive assets and of the islands' currently generated wealth.
APPENDIX
The types of numbers discussed in this article are difficult to work
with, even for those familiar with them. Therefore, I have prepared a
hypothetical example to illustrate the concepts involved, which is simi-
lar to the actual situation affecting Hawaii today.
Let us say that we are looking at Honolulu and Kauai a hundred years
ago. Honolulu has a capital stock of $100 million and Kauai has one of
$50 million.
What do we mean by capital stock? For an answer, let us go back in
time to the landing of the first people at these two places. These
humans found certain plants and animals available on the land and in
the sea which, with a certain amount of exertion, could be taken and
eaten. A value can be placed on that natural environment.
If humans had left this initial stock of capital in its purely natural
form, that stock would remain at a constant level. But humans did not.
After spending whatever number of hours per day needed to simply
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feed themselves, they then invested additional, surplus, labor which
created surplus stocks of capital. They created pathways and roads. Irri-
gation systems and agricultural and aquacultural complexes were built.
Structures, instruments and equipment were made. These and other
changes had effects on the capital stock, increasing it most of the time,
perhaps decreasing it at others. The sum total of productive assets is the
capital stock.
The changes in the capital stock can be viewed as part of a capital ac-
count in national income accounting terms. Additions to the capital
stock represent a positive flow of accumulated surplus in the economy,
or credit to the capital account. Decreases to the ,existing capital stock
(through depreciation, destruction or trade) represent a debit to the
capital account. Usually, capital stock will increase over time because
most people will not work extra hours - invest their surplus labor -
unless they receive some material benefit as a result. In this hypotheti-
cal example, the capital stock or accumulated surplus, rose to $100 mil-
lion for Honolulu and $50 for Kauai.
For our purposes, let's assume the capital stock of Honolulu and of
Kauai are owned by the residents of those two places. If these early set-
tlers did not practice monetized exchange of the products of labor, we
might expect either hierarchial or communal control of the capital
stock. If the humans had been money-oriented but economically
democratic, we might expect a broad, decentralized pattern of
ownership. If the humans had been oligarchic, we would see ownership
of the capital stock in the hands of a relative few - a big business class.
In foreign trade terminology, the capital account shows the changes
of capital stock in each locale, and the current account shows the trading
going on between the two. Let's say that Kauai and Honolulu's econo-
mies are capitalistic and Kauai sells raw sugar and some other agricul-
tural commodities to Honolulu for $10 million in one year. Honolulu in
turn sells Kauai $10 million in processed goods and technical services.
The result is an even balance of trade between the two places.
As long as this current account remains balanced, the only changes
in the capital stock of the two places would be internal ones. Extra
(surplus) labor might expand the capital base, raising the capital stock
of one or the other. Ill-advised changes might just as well decrease it.
Now, let us say that Honolulu managed to sell $12 million in goods
and services to Kauai in one year, while Kauai exports only $10 million
to Honolulu. Trade between the two is now unbalanced, and Kauai has
what is called a negative balance of trade. Kauai's trade deficit creates
an immediate debt to Honolulu which must somehow be paid off.
One solution to this deficit problem is to dip into Kauai's capital
stock reserves. It has, after all, amassed $50 million of capital over the
years through surplus labor. Most of this capital stock is in the form of
structures, equipment, etc. But some of it is just reserve money in the
bank, and $2 million of this reserve money could be taken out and
given to Honolulu to pay off the deficit.
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Kauai has now given Honolulu $10 million in goods and $2 million
in capital reserves, in exchange for $12 million in goods and services
from Honolulu. Trade is now balanced. The only cost is that Kauai's
capital stock has been reduced from $50 million to $48 million.
Now let's say that the following year trade is once again unbalanced,
and Kauai owes Honolulu another $2 million. This time Honolulu
offers to give a loan to Kauai. Things are balanced as far as trade goes,
but Kauai now has a capital stock of $48 million in assets and a capital
account debt of $2 million, for a net value of $46 million. The next
year, trade is again in Honolulu's favor with Kauai owing another $2
million. But now a new factor comes into play. It seems the loan from
Honolulu had pretty stiff interest terms attached to it, and Kauai now
must pay $1 million in interest for the year. To pay this total deficit off,
Kauai sells Honolulu a $3 million hotel on Kauai. Kauai's locally-
owned capital stock is, therefore, reduced to $43 million.
The year after, through tight austerity measures, Kauai agrees to buy
from Honolulu only $10 million worth of goods, for which it exports
the same value of goods to balance its trade. But Honolulu still wants
$1 million in interest for the year on its previous loan, and collects
another $1 million in the surplus (profits) created by the hotel which it
owns on Kauai. The result is that Kauai still owes $2 million to Hono-
lulu for the year, and must sell off that much more of its capital stock.
Worse some of the residents of Kauai are now starting down the
road of ~utting in surplus labor to create surplus capital (profit at the
hotel) that in no way benefits themselves ortheir local economy.
At this point Kauai's leaders might decide to try and solve their
economic problems through expanded investment and greater econom-
ic growth. Honolulu capitalists are encouraged to invest $10 million to
build new hotels on Kauai. This results in an increase in the capital
stock, but Kauai has a $10 million debt to the Honolulu investors, plus
future payments in the form of profits on the investment.
The size of Kauai's economy has now expanded, but it is not owned
by Kauai. The new hotels simply create further surplus (profits) which
are taken by the overseas investors. It is possible that the money being
borrowed by Kauai to balance its current account was previously Kauai
reserve monies paid out to Honolulu. Honolulu investors are now
beginning to collect interest and profits on loans and investments to
Kauai made up of Kauai money being loaned back to Kauai.
Kauai, therefore, is becoming economically dependent on Honolulu
as its control over its own capital-poor economy disappears through a
steady drain of capital. But these negative trade figures result from, and
point toward, the previous sell-off of ownership of the productive
assets of Kauai.
This article explores the connection between negative trade figures
and the sell-off of capital stock with regards to the current situation be-
tween Hawaii as a whole and its overseas trading partners.
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sociated with the University of Hawaii at Manoa, are acknowledged for
their editorial assistance on the article.
2. Some economists note, nevertheless, that $1.96 back on every dollar
sent to the United States is still a good deal for Hawaii because it repre-
sents an inflow of purchasing power.
tics shown in Figure 4, the first third of the 1958-80 period showed a
slight increase in its share of the GSP, and a further small (under 1%)
gain during the second third. In the most recent period, however, labor's
share was down 4.8%, for an over-all drop of 4.1%.
6. This figure excludes the cost of imports.
7. Between 1958 and 1970, exported fees and profits, in real terms, in-
creased by 140.0%. They increased another 65.0% in real terms between
1970 and 1980 for a net increase since statehood of a substantial 296.1%.
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An example of this problem is the 1973 rise in oil prices and accompan~­
ing recesson, which represented a quantum leap in non-resident big bUSI-
ness class income from Hawaii, and exacerbated the State's balance-
of-trade problems (see DPED 1982a:171-182).
Recent government proposals to encourage high technology industr~es to
locate in Hawaii do not promise much for the average worker either.
Most of the workers in California's Silicon Valley, for example, are non-
unionized and are paid less than $5 an hour.
8. Villamil (979) gives an excellent, readable introduction to the
dependency school of thought. A professor of planning in Puerto Rico,
his chapter on "Puerto Rico 1948-1976: The Limits of Dependent
Growth" (pp. 241-260), clearly shows both the promises and the tragedy
of dependent development.
Baran, Paul A.




5. The State of Hawaii's published and unpublished economic figures have
been utilized in this article as they are the best available and have the lon-
gest track record. It should be noted that while they are the best
available, many people question the credibility of even these official
statistics. One of the difficulties with the statistics is that they do not give
any direct figures relating to economic classes in the islands. The state's
wages and salaries account, for example, includes remuneration paid to
normal working people, and salaries of high corporate officials more prop-
erly considered part of the big business class. Corporate earnings include
big company revenues as well as those of small businesses. A discussion
with one of the state's economists and access to some of their raw data
has helped, but at best the three classes referred to in the text are rough
approximations and the figures given are valuable primarily because they
are constantly applied over the 1958-80 period. For the labor class statis-
tics shown in Figure 4, the first third of the 1958-80 period showed a
slight increase in its share of the GSP, and a further small (under 1%)
gain during the second third. In the most recent period, however, labor's
share was down 4.8%, for an over-all drop of 4.1%.
4. Some economists suggest that this export of funds is justified because the
original investment came from outside. I do not believe this to be the
case, however. At the end of WW II, Hawaii owned more investments
(and collected more funds on those investments) outside the islands than
vice-versa. Relative to most colonial and semi-colonial areas of the
world, Hawaii was at that time remarkably capital rich and under local au-
tonomous economic control. While certain local political forces may have
wished to humble local big business capitalists by bringing in outside
capital, Hawaii did not need that capital to sustain its economic growth.
The original investment which created the local economy was, at its
foundation, local and not outside capital. Although outside capital may
have assisted in the importing of machinery and other industrial
equipment, the major assets in Hawaii's development came from the ex-
propriation of land from native Hawaiians; from revenues raised through
Hawaii's role in trade; and through the surplus produced by the labor of
Hawaii's people.
3. The federal subsidy funds referred to in the text are technically known as
federal transfer payments and represent the gap between funds sent to
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JlUNG OF S'fJElEJL:
NO'fJES ON 'fHlE MJlJLJl'fAJlUZA'fJlON OF HAWAH
Ian Y. Lind
Oahu is to be encircled with a ring of steel, with mortar batteries
at Diamond Head, big guns at Waikiki and Pearl Harbor, and a
series of redoubts from Koko Head around the island to
Waianae.
General Macomb, U.S. Army
Commander, District of Hawaii
1911 (quoted in Addelman, 1946:9)
Every day is national defense day in Hawaii.
Governor Wallace Rider Farrington
1924
Over the last century, Hawaii has experienced a dramatic process of
militarization. Beginning as a remote island outpost serving as a coaling
station for naval vessels in transit to the Pacific Coast, Hawaii has been
transformed into a modern garrison community serving dozens of mili-
tary installations, including the headquarters of the Commander in
Chief, Pacific, the world's largest military command.
From a contemporary perspective, the military presence seems
pervasive. Defense is the state's second largest industry, and the naval
base at Pearl Harbor remains the state's single largest employer. In
1980, there were 120,417 active duty military personnel and their
dependents living in the islands, fully 12.5°;(l of the total population. On
the island of Oahu, where most of the military personnel are based,
they are nearly 16% of the population (Department of Planning and
Economic Development, 1983).
The military services also control over 259,000 acres ofland, includ-
ing public lands "set aside" by executive order for defense purposes,
lands leased from the state and from private landowners, and lands
owned in fee. Although two major land use reviews were conducted by
the Defense Department during the 1970s (Naval Facilities Engineer-
ing Command, 1973, 1979), they resulted in no significant reduction in
the total area under military control. The military's total holdings make
up 6.3% of the total land area of the islands, a larger percentage than in
any other state in the nation.
There also appears to be a close and cooperative relationship between
the military and the centers of political power in the civilian
community. For example, the Army established a "Citizens Advisory
Group" in 1956 to strengthen the Army's presence in Hawaii. When a
membership roster was published in 1980 (U.S. Army Western
"~-_.~===
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Command, 1980), it read like a "Who's Who" of island society, includ-
ing more than eighty top corporate officers, union officials, the publish-
ers of both daily newspapers, the Chief of Police, Superintendent of
Education, University president, and many more.
This overwhelming military presence has prompted some analysts
(Albertini et aI, 1980:i) to describe Hawaii as, "the most densely milita-
rized state in the nation." Given the prominent role that the military
has come to play in Hawaii, this characterization would appear to be
accurate. Hawaii would certainly fit the definitions of militarism and
militarization developed by contemporary analysts (Eide and Thee,
1980), which stress both the prominent role of military institutions and
the weight of military values and outlooks in society.
A traditional analysis of the militarization of Hawaii would place pri-
mary emphasis on the context provided by national and international
events, explaining the dynamics of island history as simply an epiphe-
nomenon of global forces. Such an approach has obvious intellectual
merit and should not be ignored. However, such global perspectives
are also inherently anti-political. Persons living, working, and attempt-
ing to sustain political activity in Hawaii, or in any other specific
location, will search in vain through discourses on international politics
or military strategy for elements capable of informing actual political
behavior. By their very terms of analysis, such approaches overempha-
size our role as victims of complex global forces and underestimate our
potential as political actors (see Lind, 1977; 1981).
This brief essay examines the militarization of Hawaii from a
different, perhaps more intimate, perspective. Moving closer to the
actual dynamics of militarism, it concentrates on civil-military relations
in Hawaii, and begins to suggest the outline of a political theory - that
is, one capable of sustaining politics in action. The local focus does not
imply a willingness to simply dismiss the import of events external to
the islands, but rather to dramatically emphasize the view that all such
events are necessarily mediated by the reactions and feelings of the
people involved. In this view, for example, the obvious fact that Ameri-
can strategy in the Pacific led to an expanded military presence in
Hawaii is simply not as important as whether this was welcomed or
resented, accepted or resisted; for it is in these reactions that one can
identify the seeds of political change.
This essay is an initial attempt to demonstrate the value of such an
approach, and suggests two major conclusions. First, militarization
cannot be adequately understood simply as a matter of military policy.
Instead, as Regehr (1980: 132) suggests, "the origins of militarism may
lie instead in the civilian population, the economy and the
governments." In his view, military institutions may be used - even
misused and exploited - by civilians. This would appear to have been
the case in Hawaii, where the military was a factor - sometimes a wild-
card - in the struggle for economic and political power. Militariam
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developed, in part, because of common interests between the military
and certain segments of the civilian community.
Further, this analysis suggests that despite surface appearances,
militarism is inherently unstable. A review of the militarization of
Hawaii reveals numerous structural sources of tension between the
military and civilian sectors which have persisted over time and which
do not appear capable ofultimate resolution. While the military seems
to have achieved a position of hegemony in island affairs, the reality is
quite different. Beneath surface appearances, the process of militariza-
tion is less than complete, more of a show - an ostentatious display,
than a fundamental reality. Civil-military alliances have changed over
time, reflecting transitory conflicts, as well as changes in economic rela-
tions within the islands. The presence of such conflicts suggests, in
turn, potential sources of social change which might ultimately lead to
reductions in the power and influence of the military.
Unfortunately, despite the fact that the military has had a major
impact on the development of Hawaii during the twentieth century, its
effects have remained largely unseen. There is little attention paid to
the military or to civil-military relations in popular accounts of Hawaii's
history. While both Fuchs (1961) and Daws (1968) include passing
references to the role of the military, neither rate such matters impor-
tant enough to deserve a chapter, and neither the Army nor the Navy
even appear in Daws' index. Recent events, such as the post-1976
opposition to continued military training on the island of Kahoolawe,
have begun to develop a literature of their own, both official and
popular, but earlier events, those which account for the roots ofmilitar-
ism in Hawaii, remain obscure. Accordingly, in the pages which follow,
events occurring prior to World War II are treated in somewhat more
detail than those of more recent vintage. Neither treatment manages to
be more than suggestive, however, and a full account of Hawaii's mili-
tary history remains to be written.
THE ROOTS OF MILiTARISM
The early development of military institutions in Hawaii was prompt-
ed by the desire to protect and extend American trade in the Pacific. Al-
though a certain amount of interest in Hawaii's potential as a military
outpost had been expressed by Navy officers in the mid-nineteenth
century, the small size and limited capabilities of the American Navy
prior to the Civil War prevented serious plans from emerging (Albion,
1980). The active pressure for an increased military presence appears
to have emerged from the civilian sector. Stevens (1945) observes that
U.S. diplomats in Hawaii began to view the islands as a vital outpost for
the defense of trade routes to Asia in the late 1860s. American sugar
planters in Hawaii quickly attempted to take advantage of this renewed
interest by linking it to the stalled talks over sugar tariffs. The Chamber
L_~=~ _
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of Commerce, in an 1873 letter signed by Charles Bishop, formally pro-
posed that Pearl Harbor be ceded to the United States in partial ex··
change for dropping of tariffs on Hawaiian sugar entering the U.S.
market. There was considerable opposition to the proposal from native
Hawaiians, and the Reciprocity Treaty of 1875 guaranteed only that no
other country would be allowed to control any island harbor. However,
when the treaty was renewed in 1887, it contained language explicitly
granting the U.S. sole access to the military potentials of Pearl Harbor.
The years following annexation in 1898 were a period of great mili-
tary expansion. The construction of the naval base at Pearl Harbor was
underway, and other bases to provide for defense of the harbor were
also being developed. Many of today's island landmarks - Fort
Shafter, Fort DeRussey, Fort Ruger, Schofield Barracks - were estab-
lished in the years prior to World War L During this period, the local
business community exerted considerable political pressure in support
of an increased military presence in the islands. In 1905, both the
Chamber of Commerce and the Merchants Association of Honolulu
urged Congress to provide additional funds for military development.
The Chamber urged that $150,000 be appropriated for "additional for-
tifications" at Honolulu and Pearl Harbor. The Merchants organization
called for "an increase in the number of men to be stationed here", and
described the military needs as among "the most pressing requirements
of the mercantile community" (U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 1905).
An important factor in the enthusiasm of the business community
for an increased military presence was the expectation that Pearl
Harbor would be available for commercial as well as military use. Just
as the Navy had maintained facilities at Honolulu Harbor without dis-
placing private shipping, it was clearly expected that Pearl Harbor
would be available for civilian shipping once dredging and other im-
provements were completed. In July 1910, a representative ofR. Back-
field & Company asked whether Pearl Harbor was prepared to accom-
modate ships of the American-Hawaiian and Matson lines. Rear-
Admiral Rees (1910), commandant of the Naval Station, wrote in
reply: "I have the honor to state as follows ... it is believed that it will be
the Government's policy to maintain the Entrance Channel at Pearl
Harbor open to commercial traffic in time of peace." Rees then suggest-
ed that company representatives confer with the Navy's civil engineers
to determine whether the length, draft, and turning radius of their
ships would allow them to maneuver in the newly dredged channel.
Following these consultations, the civil engineer (1910) updated the
commandant on matters that were discussed.
...as the deepening and straightening of the entrance channel to
Pearl Harbor progress, commercial interests are considering the
building of wharves at various points along the shores of Pearl
Harbor and of its islands with a view to making shipments of
freight by sea direct...In this connection it is recommended that
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the building of wharves of length more than 200 or 300 feet be
restricted to the shores of the three lochs, and that in the chan-
nel and narrows no wharf be permitted to extend beyond the
curve of 25 feet depth. The entrance channel must of course be
kept unobstructed, and in addition it is believed to be
imperative, in the interest of the Navy Department, that the full
width of channel around Ford (or Mokuumeume) Island be
retained ... There is little doubt but that commercial interests
will soon take steps in the matter of building wharves, as the
channel is entirely practicable; and it is therefore urged that the
Navy Department take immediate action looking toward the
preservation of such channels as are required for the proper han-
dling of its vessels in these waters.
The tantalizing prospect of major commercial shipping facilities locat-
ed much closer to the sugar plantations of leeward Oahu than Honolulu
Harbor must have been a major incentive for close civil-military coop-
eration in the years prior to world War 1.
The vast expenditures on the development of Pearl Harbor, and the
establishment of additional military bases designed to defend the
harbor, also provided a lucrative area of operations for aggressive local
businesses. For example, the Dillingham family business interests
shared in the more than $50,000,000 spent developing Pearl Harbor
(Dillingham, 1928), and even maintained their own lobbyist in Wash-
ington to seek out other government contracts.
Another common ground shared by the military and Hawaii's haole
community was a general fear of the growing influence of the Japanese
in island affairs. Even before annexation, a prominent military
strategist, AT Mahan (I 898), publicly cautioned that Hawaii might
fall under Japanese domination "if we do not hold the islands
ourselves ...." Similarly, those involved in management of the sugar
plantations feared both the growing power of Japanese-led labor organi-
zations and the potential political power of the Japanese community.
A secret report prepared by military intelligence officials in Honolulu
in 1920 seemed to express many of the common fears. The report
pointed to "the Japanese problem," which, it stated, "is in its finality a
racial problem which will not go down." Prepared by Lt. Col. George
M. Brooke, Assistant Chief of Staff, the report paints a grim picture of
racial conflict:
... No one without thorough study of and contact with the Japa-
nese problem here can form a true estimate of its seriousness.
The Japanese community here which is half the population, is a
practically impervious and self-sustaining body. Its tentacles, in
the form of economic agencies such as workers, servants,
contractors, etc., penetrate every phase of American life in this
territory from government bureaus to the homes of very poor
people. The Japanese are employed on military reservations,
i
I
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construct the barracks and other buildings, conduct stores close
to the reservations, and are not only brought in close contact
with our military establishment, but the army is dependent
upon them for the accomplishment of necessary work....There
are signs that point to an irrepressible conflict due to diametrical-
ly opposed ideals. In truth, America may be said to be the stan-
dard bearer of the occident and of the white race... (Brooke,
1920:24,26) .
In December, 1920, the Federal Bureau of Investigation dispatched
an undercover agent to Hawaii to investigate the Japanese community
and to coordinate surveillance by the bureau and local military
authorities. In a confidential report on his mission, the agent noted that
the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association (HSPA) maintained a network
of Japanese and Filipino informants (Hopkins, 1921). The agent was
able to arrange for the HSPA to enlarge the scope of its intelligence op-
erations to include Japanese activitiess of a military, political,
economic, and "radical" nature, and for copies of all HSPA intelligence
reports to be shared with the FBI and the local military command.
In testimony before a congressional committee the following year,
Royal Mead, a Washington-based lobbyist for the HSPA, underscored
the racial overtones of this particular alliance:
.. .1 believe that the great majority of the plantation owners in
Hawaii would rather see their fields dried up and turned into ab-
solutely arid areas than to have that country turned over to the
Japanese, either through their purchase of the lands or
otherwise. That is what I think of the white people of Hawaii
You must remember that the holdings of the stock of the planta-
tions in Hawaii are by people who are Americans or those who
are white American citizens, and that they are living there. They
have their homes there, and they propose to have that country a
white American country (U.S. House of Representatives, 1921).
When asked how it would be possible to keep the Japanese from gain-
ing political power in the islands, Mead suggested "[a] commission
form of government, the commission being composed largely of mili-
tary or naval men."
In less than a quarter of a century, the military had become an inte-
gral part of Hawaii. A major naval base had been established at Pearl
Harbor, and facilities to defend the port stretched from Fort Ruger, on
the slopes of Diamond Head, to Schofield Barracks on Oahu's central
plain. The military shared with some of their more influential civilian
counterparts a fear of Hawaii's ethnically diverse population, and this
common interest formed one important basis for civil-military
cooperation. When Governor Wallace Rider Farrington announced in
1924 that "every day is national defense day in Hawaii", he was proba-
bly guilty of only minimal exaggeration.
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SOURCES OF CONlFLICT: LAND
In this early period, as well as in years to come, the militarization of
Hawaii created its own sources of tension and conflict. These centered
in two major areas: competition for resources, with land being the most
important; and competition for political power and control.
By 1900, the military had taken control of 16,500 acres, a figure
which reached over 22,000 acres in 1920 (Schmitt, 1977:Table 12.6).
Conflicts emerged almost immediately. In December 1907, the Gover-
nor of Hawaii wrote to the Secretary of War requesting that a 14,400
acre area in central Oahu be returned to the Territory (Addleman,
1946). The land had originally been set aside as a rest and recuperation
center for soldiers returning from service in the Philippines during and
after the Spanish-American War. However, the Governor pointed out
that the land was not in fact used for the stated purpose: "experience
seems to show that it can not be or is not likely to be put to such use.
Soldiers who have served in the Philippines return directly to the
mainland." On the other hand, the Territory desired to utilize the land
for homesteading. "There probably is no tract in the Territory more
suitable for this purpose in soil, climate, and tranportation and market-
ing facilities than the. tract in question," the Governor argued
(Addelman, 1946:5). Despite this pressure from the Territorial
government, however, the land stayed in military hands and, in April
1909, a new Army post on the site was named Schofield Barracks in
honor of Lt. Gen. John M. Schofield (Vandergrift, 1938).
Most of the major expansions of military control over land in Hawaii
met with strong opposition as both private citizens and the Territorial
government sought to assert local use and control of the islands' vital
resources. The Territory carried out extensive negotiations with the
military, seeking to have military lands returned to public use. A War
Department memo dated April 10, 1924, noted that the Territory was
"stimulated and urged by local commercial interests which resent the
possession of land by the War Department that could be utilized to pro-
duce revenues for the Territory."
The military itself remained hostile to all attempts to reduce its land
holdings. The War Department's position was put quite bluntly in a
1928 cable (Collins, 1928): "The War Department Policy is consistent-
ly and unalterably opposed to return of any lands of military reserva-
tions to Territorial control." Even areas with no military value were
vigorously defended by local commanders and by the military bureau-
cracy in Washington. Those few cases which did lead to the return of
land to military control required the high-level intervention of the Inte-
rior Department, members of Congress, or even the President.
Suits were filed by private citizens to prevent the taking of, or to
obtain adequate compensation for, lands around Pearl Harbor, in Lua-
lualei Valley, Kaneohe, Kahoolawe, and other areas. Certain of these
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court actions lasted literally for decades. In 1912, for example, the
Navy began the process of condemning private fishing rights in and
around Pearl Harbor, an area which then yielded 10-15 tons of fish
monthly (U.S. House of Representatives, 1919). The Navy began con-
demnation proceedings, despite an opinion by the Attorney General of
the United States (Collins, 1945:712) that "no legal authority existed
for the U.S. to condemn the property in question for the purpose
intended." The first of many damage suits was filed against the Navy in
1924 by the Ii Estate. The suits dragged through the courts for decades
and the last claim was not settled until the arrival of statehood (Collins'
1945; U.S. Senate, 1959). '
It should be noted that while opposed by some, military land policies
worked in the interests of others. Governor Farrington, in a 1927 letter
to the Army's commanding general in Hawaii, expressed opposition to
t~e attemp~~ by "certain private interests" to negotiate land exchanges
with the mIlitary at the expense of the public. Farrington described one
land exchange in which the Army turned over 62 acres, including
"over a mile of the best beach in the Maile beach section of the Waianae
District", to Walter F. Dillingham. Farrington argued that "there is no
need or justification under the heading of either military necessity or
national financial economies to alienate to private holdings another
foot of land along the Waianae beach area or any other beach section of
the island of Oahu." The public, and not private interests, should be
the beneficiarie~ of land released from military control, according to
the governor's view.
SOURCES OlF CONlFUCT: POWlER
.These issues of land use and control reflect a broader pattern of con-
flict between military and civilian authorities. Prior to annexation the
military served as the representative of the United States in the isl~nds.
;\merican military officers and businessmen shared common political
mterests as well as class and ethnic backgrounds.
...Naval officers serving at Honolulu circulated in the society
created by the more wealthy American residents. They absorbed
inevitably the political views of this group, and were even in-
clined to present these views to their superiors in official
reports. The high diplomatic importance of their service over a
long period of time tended as well to give the naval officers a
sense of responsibility for supervising and reporting on the af-
fairs of the islands second only to that enjoyed by the American
minister. As representatives of a more powerful nation dealing
with a much weaker and insignificant power, they likewise de-
veloped a sense of superiority and condescension (Stevens
1945:210). '
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According to Collins 0945:14), naval officers "served as arbitrators
in business disputes, negotiators of trade agreements, and defenders of
law and order." Following annexation, however, the rapidly growing
military establishment began to chafe at the emerging opposition of the
civilian government to its poliicies and priorities. The Navy was able to
retain more direct political control in other island outposts, such as
Puerto Rico, Guam, and American Samoa, and the requirement to
recognize the nominal power of Hawaii's civil authorities caused obvi-
ous discomfort.
Military authorities kept close watch on the actions of the
government. Prior to World War 11, the Commander of the 14th Naval
District at Pearl Harbor, submitted regular intelligence reports to
Washington on island politics, legislative matters, and community
groups (Collins, 1945:42). The variety of topics covered by these Navy
reports is surprisingly wide, including such matters as the ethnic break-
down of the voting population; assessments of ethnic influence on
island politics; periodic reviews of "vice conditions", labor organiza-
tions and activities at the university; a critical examination of Japanese
schools, their personnel and community influence; and surveillance of
foreign visitors. In more recent years, military authorities have main-
tained files on groups known to hold views critical of the military, and
as late as 1969 maintained "intelligence" files on members of the State
Legislature (U.S. Senate, 1971:1461).
To further complicate matters, the different military services jealous-
ly guarded their respective prerogatives and power. Each service sought
to extend its own control over land, water, and other resources, in
competition with each other as well as the surrounding civilian
community. This led to a duplication of services and functions, which
inflated the amount of land determined to be "required" to maintain
the island's military establishment. Each service sought to obtain its
own facilities, from training areas for holding maneuvers to beach areas
for recreation centers. Inter-service rivalries continue to impede prog-
ress in release of "surplus" federal land in Hawaii. The results of a 1973
Department of Defense study of land requirements in Hawaii were
rejected by the Government Accounting Office when it was determined
that each service had attempted simply to justify the "reasonableness"
of their existing land holdings rather than to evaluate their actual needs
(U.S. GAO, 1975).
Such inter-service rivalries sometimes involved purely political
issues. Snowbarger 0950:143) notes, for example, that "another sub-
ject of hard feeling was raised in 1914, and continued for some years,
concerning the relative precedence of rear-admirals and major-
generals." By 1922, this rivalry had reached significant enough propor-
tions to be brought to the attention of the President, who was informed
of "sharp differences as to seniority" of the ranking officers of the
Army and Navy in Hawaii. Military officials in Washington apparently
I
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contributed to the confusion, and in September 1923, Governor Farr-
ington reported that the situation was "a standoff', with each military
commander "under orders to maintain the priority of his precedence."
A critical stage was reached shortly thereafter, when Admiral McDo-
nald informed the Governor that "he would not accept any position at
any function which did not recognize his precedence over Maj. Gen.
Summerall" (Farrington 1923b). The issue was still not resolved when,
in mid-1924, the approaching visit of the British Fleet to Hawaii
brought matters to a head. In May 1924, the War Department informed
the Interior Department that the Attorney General had determined
that the Admiral in fact was the ranking officer. This did not, however,
put an end to the controversy, as the Army sought to gain Congression-
al approval of a bill which would have once again given its officers
precedence over their Navy counterparts.
The debate flared anew in early 1928, when Governor Farrington
again wrote to the Secretary ofInterior:
I know that you will smile when I tell you that there will un-
doubtedly arise in connection with the incident, a question as to
whether I represent the President, or am merely a plain, garden
variety Territorial Governor. The Commandant of the Naval
Station at Pearl Harbor has developed the complex that the
Governor of Hawaii is entitled to a salute of only seventeen
guns. This, as you are doubtless aware, is a method of demoting
the representatives of the Civil Administration, so that he shall
not have more or as much recognition as an admiral of the
Navy. The salute for the Governor under the Army regulations
is the appropriate status of a State or Territorial Governor.
A count of the ceremonial guns provided only one indication of the
tensions existing between civil and military authorities. As relations
became more strained, military leaders looked toward the possibility of
establishing a form of direct military rule in the islands. As noted
above, a "commission" government made up of military leaders was
one possibility discussed, often in the context of a perceived need to
control the "alien" population of Hawaii.
Evidence of this can be seen in a secret Army memo dated July 25,
1933, which summarized a study by the War Department, and conclud-
ed that "reasonable safeguarding of our national interests demands, as
a minimum, a change in the organic law placing the Island of Oahu
under military control" (Marley, 1933). The study noted, however,
that this would be politically impossible to accomplish, and recom-
mended several alternative courses of action. One alternative was
passage of legislation eliminating a three year residency requirement
for appointment as Governor, coupled with an appeal to the President
to appoint "a general officer of the line" as Governor. The study char-
acterized American citizens of Japanese ancestry as being of "doubtful
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loyalty, ", and pointed to the resulting "dangers, from a national defense
viewpoint, of the present form of civil govenment".
Military officers also supported a commission government for
another, very different reason. Accustomed to approaching the world
from a military perspective, they were less than sympathetic to the par-
ticular needs of local residents. Their view was shaped by military
considerations, and they were accustomed to exercising their authority
within the command structure of military reservations, where obedI-
ence was a cardinal virtue. This was vastly different from the wielding
of political authority in the civilian community. According
to Snowbarger (1950:213-214),
[The military community] considered at least the island of
Oahu as first and foremost, an outpost of the national security.
Arguing that he believed in the basic principles of democratic
government, especially legislation by representatives of the
people, Admiral Stirling asked, 'but do we apply this axiom of
government to our ships of war and to our military
reservations?' The concept of Hawaii as a strategic outpost con-
trasted with the idea of an island home held by local residents...
In the aftermath of the famed Massie affair (Van Slingerland, 1966),
Admiral Yates Stirling emerged as a vocal advocate of military rule.
While Hawaii's civilian government managed to remain intact, the
basis for the future imposition of martial law was apparently set in place
at this time. The military requested that the President issue secret
orders to the Governor of Hawaii (Marley, 1933), instructing him to
"cooperate with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, in
planning for transfer of control to the military in an emergency and... to
effect such transfer upon request of the Commanding General." This is
precisely what came to pass with the imposition of martial law in
December 1941 (Anthony, 1975).
The end of martial law did not, however, stop the supporters of mili-
tary government. For example, in September of 1944, the Honolulu
Star-Bulletin editorialized against yet another plan making the rounds in
Washington to put Hawaii under Navy rule. This plan, authored by
Representative Cole of New York, was being readied for presentation
to Congress after the elections. The Star-Bulletin (September 22, 1944)
observed that "Hawaii hardly needs a detailed explanation of what navy
control and direction would mean to the people of this territory and
their affairs, their businesses, their whole lives." Referring to the ex-
periences of Guam and American Samoa, the editorial pointed to their
treatment "as subjects, as colonials, as wards of an all-powerful and
paternally authoritative government." While carefully couching their
critique within the context of praise for the Navy's role in the war
effort, it was clear that these spokesmen for Hawaii's political and social
elite were no longer enamored with the military establishment.
I[
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The underlying basis for the conflict between civil and military au-
~horities was captured succinctly by Patrick Hurley, Secretary of War,
III a letter to the Secretary of the Interior in June, 1930:
It may aid in the clarification of any further consideration of
this general subject, to point out that the War Department
necessarily must deal with this matter from the point of view of
the national interests. On the other hand, the attitude of the Ter-
ritorial authorities, as revealed in the present and earlier
correspondence, is expressive ofa purely local point of view.
This particular disjunction between civilian and military perspectives
was not unique to Hawaii. Similar problems have been identified in
Guam by Rambaud and Rambaud (1977), and by Wolf (1969) 'in
Turkey. On the basis of her survey, Wolf concluded that the tension be-
tween military and civilian perspectives in such settings is structural
and unavoidable:
The official assumption that the military community can pursue
its military mission the one hand, and yet, on the other, effec-
tively; undertake the mission of good relations with the host
community and even be an adequate representative of a
democratic country appears to me to be a contradiction in
terms. Given the military organization as it is, it seems more
likely that its response to the external community would be pre-
ponderantly that of closure; and to expect an organization which
is characterized by authoritarianism, barracks neatness, and hi-
erarchical order to represent other than just that seems danger-
ously naive and quixotic. (Wolf, 1969:259)
Hawaii's experience would certainly offer no grounds for questioning
this conclusion.
THE DAYS AFTER
World War II brought dramatic changes to Hawaii. The effects of
martial law, and of the war itself, have been discussed by Allen (1950),
Anthony (1975), MacDonald (1944), and others. The military was the
center of a "military-industrial revolution" which dramatically altered
the structure of Hawaiian society. Ratcliff (1962) identifies the broad
outlines of this war-induced social transformation. Plantation agricul-
ture lost its dominant role in the economy as military expenditures rose
more than ten-fold in the 25 years following 1930. In the decades be-
tween 1940 and 1?50, agricultural employment dropped by one half,
the urban populatIOn grew by 33%, and union membership tripled.
Military land holdings reached a peak of more than 600,000 acres in
1944, then dropped rapidly to about 250,000 in the immediate post-war
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period, a level which has remained relatively constant since.
The war also spawned a vast revolution in Hawaiian politics. The bat-
tlefields of Europe and the Pacific provided a harsh testing ground for
the young men of Japanese ancestry who volunteered for military ser-
vice in large numbers. At the war's end, these veterans realized that
after risking their lives in battle, they were not willing to return and
simply take their accustomed places in Hawaii's highly stratified
society. Daniel Inouye, now Hawaii's senior representative in the
United States Senate, described the feelings of the returning veterans:
...what I had come to believe with all my heart and soul, was
that the time had come for us to step forward. We had fought
for that right with all the furious patriotism in our bodies and
now we didn't want to go back to the plantation. Times were
changing. The old patterns were breaking down. (Inouye,
1967:191)
Quickly becoming involved in politics, these Japanese-Americans con-
firmed the long-standing fears of some by forming a political block that
swept to power in the Territorial Legislature in 1954.
Ironically, this political transformation led to a new partnership be-
tween the military and the young Democrats. These young men were
committed to ending the plantations' economic and political domina-
tion of the islands, and were well aware that there were few existing
economic options that could be relied on to reduce Hawaii's depen-
dence on the plantations. The military had demonstrated that it could
provide significant income to the islands, and the newly empowered
Democrats embraced defense spending as a welcome alternative.
One result of the new political alliance was a lessening of Territorial
efforts to regain control of military-held lands. Immediately after the
war, the military had requested that additional areas be set aside for
their use (Lind, 1983). These moves were vigorously resisted by the
Territorial government, which was successful in getting Presidential ap-
proval for a joint civil-military panel to review existing land hold~n?s
and make recommendations as to areas that could be returned to CIvil-
ian use. The Governor's Land Use Committee was formed in 1946,
and issued a secret report with recommendations in 1951 (Marks,
1951; Lind, 1983). While the Territory was not successful in obtaining
release of all parcels of disputed land, it was able to make substantial
progress despite determined resistance from military negotiators.
However, the Democrats proved unwilling to exert their newly won
political power in continuing efforts to return military lands to civilian
use. Indeed, when the administration of Republican Governor Wil1iam
Quinn brought suit against the federal government, the move was ac-
tively opposed by Hawaii Democrats at home and in Congress
(Horwitz, 1969:78-92). The Democrats' position eventual1y prevailed
due to their political power at home and a Democratic majority in
.i
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Washington, and for the next two decades, political opposition to mili-
tary land policies in the islands was effectively muted.
In one sense, it can be argued that the Democrats simply accom-:n0dated themselves to the newly emerging political economy of the
1~lands. Throughout the first five decades of this century, plantation ag-
nculture was the undisputed center of the economy. However, defense
spending became the dominant economic factor during the 1950's, and
by 1960 accounted for a larger share of the islands' income than sugar
and pineapple combined.
The Democratic political "machine" benefited directly from its asso-
ciation with the militarized economy. Local contractors, who over the
years provided the essential financial support for Democratic
~an~idates: have been among the chief beneficiaries of military spend-
mg 111 the Islands. Hundreds of milIions of dollars have been spent on
military construction projects in Hawaii in recent years, and Senator
Inouye's favored position on the Military Construction Subcommittee
of the Senate Appropriations Committee ensures that the flow of dol-
lars will continue. In turn, these interests, along with the union mem-
bers working in civilian defense jobs, have comprised a potent lobby for
continued high levels of military appropriations. It thus appears that
the military draws its principal support from those with immediate
pecuniary interests in the prevailing pattern of defense spending. The
Democratic "establishment", in turn, buttresses its own political
power by continuing to deliver defense dollars into the islands'
economy.
SPECULAnONS ON THE FUTURE
Five developments in the post-statehood period portend a significant
long-term decline in the military's role in Hawaii. First, tourism has re-
placed defense spending as the dominant force in the islands' economy.
Fueled by corporate investment from around the world, tourism over-
took defense as the state's largest industry in 1972. While the direct
income generated by defense and tourist expenditures were approxi-
mately equal in 1970, tourism grew twice as fast over the following
decade. By ~981, tourism contributed $3.2 billion to the local economy
annually, With defense expenditures accounting for less than half that
~mou~t, $1.4 billion (DPED, 1982:305). The continued growth of tour-
Ism will not only further reduce the State's dependence on defense
spending, but will inevitably create additional pressures for the transfer
oflands from military to civilian use.
Second, technological developments, including satellite
communications, computer networking, and long-range jet aircraft,
have combined to reduce the military value of Hawaii's mid-Pacific
location. While there is little public discussion of this controversial
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situation and no major installations have been closed, there have been
significa~tconsolidations of functions and transfers of military activities
to the West Coast.
As a result of these technological changes, traditional assertions con-
cerning the military importance of Hawaii's mid-Pacific location, would
appear to exaggerate the islands' contemporary military value. One im-
portant indication of this is the dramatic reduction in the number of
ships homeported at Pearl Harbor. This dropped by more than 50%
(from 80 to 38) between 1970 and 1984, indicating in graphic terms the
declining value attributed to Hawaii by military strategists (Hawaiian
Economic Development Project, 1984).
A report compiled by the state legislature reached similar
conclusions.
When reviewing the U.S. military presence in the Pacific, it
appears that Hawaii is not the center of the universe around
which the protection of the United States revolves. Like Korea,
it may be more a political benefit and a comfortable way station
than a military necessity. (Hawaii State Legislature, 1977:118)
The legislative report also noted the failure of military authorities to
produce hard data to support the view that Hawaii continues to be of
prime military importance. When requested to substantiate the "~~ed"
for continued military use of the island of Kahoolawe, the milItary
argued strenuously that it was both "convenient" and desirable.
However, the legislature concluded that "what remains questionable is
the actual need based on hard data."
Another indication of the declining strategic significance of Hawaii is
the tendency of arguments in support of maintaining current levels of
military activities to stress their economic contribution to the com-
munity rather than their contribution to national defense. An Army
review of alternative basing plans, for example, found that a transfer of
all Army facilities to the U.S. mainland, while it might cause economic
hardship for Hawaii, would not necessarily have any negative effects on
defense capabilities (US Army Support Command, 1979:151-152).
Similarly, the controversial use of the island of Kahoolawe for bombing
and other types of military training has been defended largely on
economic grounds (Hawaii State Legislature, 1977; Pearl Harbor
Association, 1978).
Finally, union and business groups, hoping to convince the Navy to
base a reconditioned battleship and supporting vessels at Pearl Harbor,
were informed by Hawaii's senior U.S. senator in May 1984 that the
military "could just as easily pick another site" (Homeport Hawaii Task
Force, 1984). In order to influence the Navy's decision, they were ad-
vised to assume a "high visibility pro-military" posture on a variety of
local issues unrelated to the actual value of the Hawaii port for national
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defense. This would clearly be unnecessary if Hawaii retained the
strategic value of an earlier era.
One Navy officer (Boyum, 1971), candidly recommended that
economic factors be stressed in order to accentuate the "feeling of sup-
port emanating 'from the left hip pocket'" of the business community.
He argued that the military could increase levels of community support
by facilitating new forms of defense spending on the neighbor islands.
Indeed, this "left hip pocket" strategy has increasingly supplanted mili-
tary or strategy factors in official and unofficial discussions of the mili-
tary's future in Hawaii.
Third, the growth of Hawaii's civilian population has exacerbated
competition for use of land at the same time that new military technolo-
gy demands increases in training activities. Areas devoted to training
activities, including Makua Valley and the Kahuku Training area on
Oahu, Barking Sands on Kauai, Kahoolawe, and Pohakuloa on the
island of Hawaii, comprise the bulk of military-controlled lands in the
State, and even military authorities admit that their use is "increasingly
incompatible with urban growth" (U.S. Army Support Command,
1979:145; also Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 1979; Kelly &
Quintal, 1977). In an international survey, Lumsden (1981; also
Lumsden, n.d.) found that tensions caused by increasingly incompati-
ble civilian and military demands for usable land are growing more
common in all parts of the world. It is, therefore, not surprising that the
training areas in Hawaii have been at the center of growing political con-
flicts between military authorities and the civilian community.
A fourth factor contributing to a lessening of the military's hold on
the island has been Hawaii's political integration into the American
mainstream. In the years prior to statehood, there were clear limitations
on political opposition to military policies. The actions of the Territorial
government were tempered by the background threat of a military-led
commission government, and by an understanding that the military
could ultimately gain Congressional approval of almost any action by
cloaking it in the mantle of national defense. The interests of the Terri-
tory would almost certainly be forced to yield to the "national" interest
if matters had to be brought to a vote. In addition, dissident opinion
within Hawaii was tightly controJJed by a closely interlocked structure
of social and economic power. Dissent was possible, but it carried costs
that few were willing or able to pay.
In the twenty-five years following statehood, however, these political
constraints have been largely removed. Admission as a state eliminated
the threat of direct military rule, and full representation in Congress
has given the State additional leverage in negotiating over matters of
military policy. Additionally, the transformation of the islands into a
more open and diverse society has encouraged political activism and
protest among previously disenfranchised sectors of the community.
The final factor has been the emergence of a Hawaiian
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"renaissance", a cultural and political movement which is reasserting
the importance of being Hawaiian. This movement has encour.aged a
resurgence of popular interest in Hawaiian religion, dance, mUSIC, and
language. The movement has also had a political dimension embodied
in the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, organized lobbying at the U.S. Con-
gress for "reparations", and a small but influentia~ network ~dvocating
sovereignty for the Hawaiian nation (see NatIve Hawallan Study
Commission, 1983; Burgess, 1981).
As Hawaiians have become more assertive culturaJJy and politicaJJy,
more attention has also been directed to the role of the United States
military in the "revolution" of 1893, which brou~~t an end to t.h.e
Hawaiian monarchy. In turn, this has served to legitImate open cntI-
cism of contemporary military policies which impact on Hawaiians. For
example testimony in opposition to the continued use of the island of
Kahoola~e and Makua VaJJey on Oahu for military training includes
numerous statements linking the emergence of ethnic awareness and
pride with criticism of Hawaii's military commands (E~vironment
Impact Study Corporation, 1979: Chapter 11; Kelly and QUllltal, 1977:
vol. II)
There are other subtle, yet perhaps more ~ervasive indications. of
civil-military conflict available to the perceptIve observer. T~ese lll-
clude crimes committed against military personnel, psychological and
social isolation of the military community, a low civilian compliance
with draft registration, and tensi?ns in schools ?etween civilians ~~,d
military dependents. Indeed, eVidence of conflict between Hawall s
civilian community and the military is to be found in many places, from
the haJJs of Congress to the beaches of rural Oahu.
Taken together, these five factors would indicate continuing difficul-
ties in civil-military relations in Hawaii, and a gradual but distinct re-
duction in the military's importance to, and presence in, the islands.
The objective importance of the military in Hawaii wiJJ decline at t.he
same time that conflicts over land and related resources grow more lll-
tense and more difficult to contain. Opportunities to facilitate the demi-
litarization of Hawaii will become more frequent, especiaJJy in the cru-
cial area of providing an economic transition as the defense sector is re-
duced to more normal proportions.
Is Hawaii a militarized state? The answer, based on this brief review,
would necessarily be positive. However, it is also apparent that militari-
zation is a dynamic and continuing process. Militarization must be con-
tinually reinforced and recreated, its rewards reasserted, ri~uals
reenacted. Sources of conflict and resistance, or, more subtly, ambival-
ence and hesitation, are properly seen as potential sources of
demilitarization. Those seeking clues to reducing the extent of global
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THE GREAT HAWAHAN MKlLK CRKSKS:
SCKENCE j POlLKCY AND ECONOMKC KNTEREST
Richard Pratt
In the spring of 1982 people living on Oahu went through what many
would readily identify as a health crisis. It occurred when the milk
supply was threatened, an event which elicited enormous controversy
over why that happened, what it meant, and how it was handled by
public officials. What began in 1982 has continued in different forms
through the present, leaving the impression that milk contamination in
Hawaii has acted as a triggering event for conflicts which before January
1982 had laid dormant.
This article considers the episode with two purposes in mind. One is
to argue for a differ'ent perspective on the issues constituting the
"crisis" and its aftermath, a perspective which might bring a different
approach to policymaking. The other purpose is to use it to elaborate on
certain characteristic features in the difficult relationship between
knowledge, the public interest, and political processes.
An event like this offers us a number of opportunities for reflection
and analysis. Some of the most important of these are how the events
were shaped by broader processes than the competences of the actors
immediately involved; whose interests those processes affect, and in
what ways; and who can, or will, be involved in specific decisions. By
dealing with these points it is more likely we may avoid the mistake of
failing to distinguish problems which are primarily individual and idi-
ocyncratic from those lodged in the social or economic structure and
emanating from politically defined relationships.
I argue here that three structural elements are significant in the crea-
tion and handling of this incident. These are the issue of proof and re-
sponsibility in health science; the function of what I label the Public
Sensor; and the political-economy of the dairy industry. My contention
is that the affect of these factors is rather predictable and exemplary of
issues attending the convergence of health science, politics and public
policy in seeking the public's health.
BACKGROUND
The island of Oahu, which has a population of about 850,000, has
nineteen dairy farms. These farms supply approximately 250,000 gal-
lons of raw milk each week to the state's two largest processors, most of
which they pasteurize, homogenize, "enrich" with vitamins, and deliv-
er to retail outlets. On the basis of protocol established by the state's
Department of Health, milk samples are drawn every six months from
the three dairy areas into which the nineteE<n milk producers have been
50 SOCIAL PROCESS IN HAWAII, VOL. 31, 1984
divided, as well as from the two processors. These samples are then
tested and evaluated against established standards in the Department
of Health's Laboratories Branch. The results are sent over to the
Department's Food and Drug Branch, which has the responsibility for
standards enforcement and any remedial reaction.
In the week of January 11, 1982 the analyses of these routinely col-
lected samples revealed the presence of heptachlor epoxide in amounts
exceeding the"action level" standard established by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA).! Heptachlor epoxide is the metabolized
form of the insecticide heptachlor, having found its way through the
cows' system and been excreted in either milk, urine or feces. Heptach-
lor is a potent substance applied in spray form and used in Hawaii by
the pineapple industry to control the ant population. The ant is a prob-
lem for pineapple production because it protects the mealy bug from
predators so it may feed on a substance the mealy bug excretes. The
mealy bug uses the protection provided by the ant to feed unrestrained
on the pineapple plants and thereby produce more food for the ant.
The insecticide represented a death sentence for the ants, but was
itself under sentence as a restricted product to be applied only with a
special use permit issued by the EPA. This was established in 1978 fol-
lowing a typically difficult and protracted series of hearings about its
health effects, and in particular its links to cancer and liver damage
(See Epstein, 1978 pp.275-280). The settlement was negotiated be-
tween the EPA and other interested parties. The parties included the
heptachlor producer, Velsicol; users; and consumer groups. The agree-
ment was that heptachlor could be used for another five years provided
there be no obvious danger to human health. This settlement was
agreed upon because the economic consequences of discontinuation
would be substantial. The five year sentence was designed to give users
an opportunity to find an alternative treatment2 while protecting the
public from harm through the monitoring and enforcement of "no
effect" standards.
In this process the EPA set a zero tolerance level for heptachlor epox-
ide residue in cow's milk and other foods. This means that milk known
to contain any residual of the insecticide must be judged unfit for
human consumption. In practice, however, the legal limit necessary for
action against a batch of milk became 0.3 milligrams per kilogram fat
(parts per million, or ppm) 3 The 0.3 "action level", adopted by the
Department of Health in the state of Hawaii, was negotiated as the
operational rule to simultaneously protect industry from the economic
consequences of a false alarm and guard the public from serious threat. 4
In Hawaii heptachlor found its way onto store shelves and into
human bodies via the mouths of an unknown number of Oahu's 20,000
Holsteins. This happened because, just as the mealy bug and ant
formed a symbiotic relationship, so too the milk producers and pineap-
ple producers had discovered some 'economic ecology'. A small opera-
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tor found it profitable to come into the pineapple fields to collect and
then shred the leafy remains of the harvested plants. This company
made money selling the resulting "green chop" to t~e dairy farms. The
farms obtained a regular source of cheap roughage for the Holsteins
while the pineapple companies obtained small payments and cleared
fields. 5
In order to insure the public's safety in this mutually accommodating
relationship, EPA rules stated heptachlor must not only be applied in a
prescribed dosage and manner, but must not be used in the fields less
than one year before harvest. These rules were established to insure
the insecticide was not taken into the fruit, but of course are relevant to
any other part of the plant directly or indirectly consumed by humans.
The responsibility for meeting these conditions rests with the pineapple
producers, since the Department of Agriculture does not have the
resources to monitor their activities on a day-to-day basis. 6
On January 22, eleven days after the first results of concern, the
Hawaii Health Department's Food and Drug Branch concurred with
the Laboratories Branch's unelaborated recommendation that the sam-
ples be sent to the Food and Drug Administration Laboratories (FDA)
in San Francisco for further testing. Approximately six weeks later, on
March 2, the FDA confirmed to the Food and Drug Branch that unac-
ceptably high levels of heptachlor epoxide had been found in the milk
samples. On March 9 the Food and Drug Branch called for further tests
of Oahu's milk, later justifying this by noting that a sample taken after
January 11 had shown no residues. In light of the high heptachlor levels
in the new samples, on March 16 the Director of Health was told that
there existed a problem with Oahu's milk. The Department of Agricul-
ture quietly ordered dairy farmers to stop using green chop.
Shortly after this the problem became a public issue, or as many
would come to say, a crisis. This change of status was attended by a se-
quence of eleven milk recalls, each recall followed by a statement that
the milk was now safe. At first the Department of Health announced
contamination was confined to whole milk, but later recalls included
skim milk, yogurt, cottage cheese and ice cream. On March 19, the
state Senate began an investigation of the incident, and on April 20 a
"Milk Action Plan" was submitted to a Joint House Committee for
Health and Agriculture. 7 At the end of March, the Director of the
Department of Health suddenly announced his decision to act on an
option for early retirement, stating that he had accumulated enough va-
cation time to leave immediately and that his decision had little if any-
thing to do with the milk issue. Shortly thereafter the Former Director
of the Department of Education, a chain smoker with a reputation as a
no-nonsense administrator, was introduced by the Governor as the
new state Health Director. In the meantime, the issue was serious
enough to raise, through the local media, questions about the Gover-
nor's chances for re-election in the fall of 1982. 8
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During this period it was clear that most people on Oahu were
concerned, with a sizable number very upset. They had every reason to
believe the supply of vital food had been endangered. In spite of news-
paper articles interviewing Department of Health employees having
milk with lunch, and declaring they continued to supply their own
children with the several gallons consumed in an average week, many
were suddenly doubtful about providing families with adequate and
safe nutrition. Moreover, there was apprehension because local news-
papers reported milk may have contained the toxin for up to eighteen
months. Thus, parents had been paying the high cost of locally pro-
duced milk, only to learn it may have been dangerous to them and their
children.
Ultimately, however, the biggest problem faced pregnant women
and nursing mothers. Some heard there was no real risk, others that
there was. A few prominent clinicians and pediatricians, photographed
in front of the Hawaii Medical Association offices, discounted the
threat by saying neither fetus nor nursing infant could absorb enough
to be threatened. Other professionals in research positions suggested
there quite possibly was a threat simply because we were witnessing the
unfolding of a classic food chain. In such a chain, the toxic substance is
"magnified" and concentrated in the reproductive system and in the
offspring. 9 Moreover, they suggested, the fetuses and infants were less
able to tolerate toxins; had poorly developed mechanisms for removing
them; and in the case of nursing infants, were relying on milk as most
or all of their diet.
As both the confusion and the shortages grew, state officials decided
against importing milk from California out of respect for the state's
Milk Control Act. 10 The dairy industry reported it's daily losses in the
thousands of dollars as sales dropped and the costs of herd replacements
were considered. When opinion polls began to show a long-term
change in attitude about milk consumption may have occurred, the
local industry announced its survival was in jeopardy and began to look
to Washington and the state government for assistance.
In September, 1982, after weeks of reports about an intense debate
within the agency, the EPA announced that the action level would be
dropped from 0.3 to 0.1. This change occurred as a response to the trou-
blesome Hawaii case, and some argued that the change was politically
feasible only because the five year grace period for heptachlor's use was
ending. In early January the Reagan administration announced it would
postpone consideration of seven million dollars in aid to the Hawaii
dairy industry until local law suits were settled, and about two months
after that a local court declined to dismiss a lawsuit against the state for
adopting and carelessly enforcing a standard which permitted a known
carcinogen in the food supply.
In the meantime the Safeway grocery chain, with numerous outlets
in Hawaii, decided the time was propitious to petition the Board of Agri-
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culture to' import mainland milk regularly. After weeks of hearings at
which the dairy industry mobilized itself to combat the arguments of
Safeway and consumer groups, the Board declared itself unable to
decide, and in January 1984 re-opened the process. On May 14, the
Board, its option to restrain the importation of milk taken away by a
Federal Court ruling, gave Safeway a one year permit to bring in milk
from California.
This development was countered by efforts in the state legislature
where bills were introduced to limit processed milk to a specified selling
period. The bills, heavily promoted by the dairy industry as a way of
protecting the consumer from "spoiled milk", were attacked by
consumer groups as nothing more than a device to protect the local in-
dustry at the expense of consumer choice. The bill finally passed by the
legislature stipulated a ten day shelflife. It was signed on June 12 by the
Governor who declared the legislation "reasonable," and denied it was
a way of undermining the market incentives for importation ("It struck
home to me that milk was a very fragile thing") (Honolulu Advertiser,
June 13, 1984). Shortly thereafter, the Fresh Milk Industry of Hawaii,
the local dairy industry's lobbying arm, was willing to run this more
than slightly ironic half-page advertisement: "Now You Have A
Choice! Milk That's Days Fresher or Days Older" (Honolulu Star-
Bulletin, June 20, 1984), and on June 29, Safeway filed a law suit argu-
ing that the shelf-life legislation is an unconstitutional restriction of in-
terstate commerce, passed for the primary purpose of giving advantage
to a local industry.
In this episode there are a great many more details concerning who
did or didn't do what at what time. My purpose is not to report those as
the relevant "facts" of the matter, but to offer an interpretation of what
they add up to. Most reportage, by its very nature, implicitly argues for
considering problems in terms of disconnected occurrences or particu-
lar actors. That approach, however subtle it's influence over how we
come to define these events, ought to be contrasted with a different ac-
counting which weighs the structural elements connecting events and
affecting what people were able or willing to do.
HEALTH SCJIENCE AND THE pouncs OF PROOF
One thing clear about the Hawaiian milk crisis is that while there was
some disagreement among technicians, researchers and Department of
Health advisors about the actual amount of heptachlor in milk and milk
products, there was much more controversy about what its presence
meant for human health. The question of amount is understandable as
primarily a technical problem. II The issue of what it means gets at the
difficulties in the relationship between health science and policy, and
tells us something about science in the role of health adviser for con-
temporary diseases originating in the environment.
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What this case, and others like it, suggests is that the distinction be-
tween the knowledge process and the introduction of its "results" into
social contexts dominated by more instrumental and self-interested
concerns, is in certain important respects not much greater in the sci-
ence of health than it is in most parts of the social sciences where
"hard data" is difficult to come by. In particular, health scientists find it
extremely difficult to be conclusive in attempts to show the causes of
many contemporary diseases, not to mention locating the "causes" of
health, about which there is a reluctance to even offer theories (c.f.
Geist, 1980; Evans, 1978). What I'll call "problems of proof' especially
attend work in the field of chronic diseases, the long term, degenerative
and generally irreversible afflictions which have replaced infectious dis-
eases at the center of health science's attention in post World War II af-
fluent societies.
The same problems of proof are a part of the milk episode and in a
form which makes it exemplary of the structural character of this issue.
The episode occurs in a context where some sort of policy recommen-
dation is called for, and is a dramatic instance of a profession, self-
defined as scientifically-based, being called upon for policy advice on a
problem of considerable social importance. The primary "effect" we're
talking about, after all, is cancer - its long term increased incidence in
the population of Oahu. 12 Those who wait for advice should understand
the difficulties in formulating it and consequently the degree to which
subsequent policy is or is not informed by something other than
bureaucratic predispositions, interest group lobbying, or someone's
best guess about what sort of action is most likely to reduce active prot-
est from affected parties (For an example of the argument for waiting
until something definite is known, see Afflect, 1978).
This point was nicely illustrated at a forum on "The Heptachlor
Problem." 13 Participants included professionals who regularly advise
the Department of Health in standards setting and enforcement and bi-
ochemists doing basic research. Much of the time was used to'present
information about the techniques of sampling and analysis; the concept
of safety margins; and descriptions of the very small amounts "we're
really talking about here" (less than one drop in ten gallons of water).
When these people began to talk back and forth to one another
however, it became evident that, in spite of years of study - includin~
the lengthy debates held by EPA prior to restricting Heptachlor's use
- it was now hard to know what to tell this audience and the general
public.
At the end of the exchanges a biochemist dramatically made this
point. "What we can definitely say is this: We don't know. After that
nothing should be said. Period. But things are said. There are various
demands for things to be said. Then you have a basic choice to make.
You can either say 'It's not known to be safe;' or you can say 'It's not
known to be unsafe.'" 14
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The context which these remarks reflect is important. Cancer is cur-
rently believed to be predominantly a disease of the environment.
There is substantial agreement that between seventy and ninety percent
of all cancers originate in some aspect of human environments (c.f.
Epstein, 1977; World Health Organization, 1979; Demopoulos and
Mehlman, 1980). Some of those environments are naturally occurring
- that is, they happen independent of the activities of human beings.
The most important, however, are man-made. What do we "know"
about them?
The answer is dramatized in Hawaii's milk case. Here scientists are
attempting to (1) make sense of highly complex sets of data (2) gath-
ered in animal experiments (3) over long periods of time (4) by many
different researchers and research designs, and then (5) trying to inter-
pret the relevance not only to human beings, but to (6) different types
of human beings (i.e., young and old, small and large, strong and weak,
average and hypersensitive) who (7) receive different dosages (8) over
differing time periods (9) in very different circumstances (10) interact-
ing with an unknown range of potential synergists.
My contention here is that Hawaii's milk episode is illustrative of a
pattern emerging to define the relationship between science, policy and
politics in the domain of chronic diseases suspected of originating in
some part of the man-made environment. The point'is not that health
science has nothing to offer or that, at least in normal science terms,
some progress is not being made in understanding the connection be-
tween environment and chronic disease. IS
But it is to acknowledge that what practitioners of normal science can
say relative to the requirements of policy formation and implementa-
tion often is very limited. 16 With a little careful listening between the
lines it is not at all hard to hear the competent and conscientious re-
searcher declaring "I don't know," while other institutional voices
argue compellingly that something else must be said. (National Acade-
my of Sciences, 1977.) The important question is what that
"something" will be, and how various interests, including that of the
general public, will be affected.
The predictable appearance of the "don't know" response raises a
number of important issues. Two of these I label the "politics of the
burden of proof' and the "politics of policy as non-action."
A basic standard for the assignment of responsibility is the convinc-
ing demonstration that one thing has led to something else. In legal dis-
putes this means showing that one party, a producer for example, is re-
sponsible for an injury to, say, the surrounding community. In general
it must be shown beyond a reasonable dOUbt, that what the producer
did is responsible for the injury. With respect to illness, such proof is
often based upon scientific evidence.
The problem is that for environmentally related chronic diseases
proof is very hard to come by. For the reasons outlined above, an in-
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jured party is faced with the requirement of having to prove what is es-
sentially unprovable. Given that unprovability seems to be built into
the nature of the problem, it is reasonable to ask who should bear its
burden. The question then is, when does it become appropriate to shift
the burden of responsibility for trying to prove what may be
unprovable? Such a shift would mean that a producer must show that
its activities did not result in injury, which in turn means that some
more pla,:sible explanation than what the injured party is arguing must
be estabh~hed. (For an example of this conflict-involving heptachlor,
see Epstelll, 1978: 276, 278: For discussion of aspects of this issue in a
legal ~etting, see Klendshoi & Burke, 1960; and Musser, 1976).
ThIS problem of responsibility may never fall out of the milk case as a
legal matter. The possible health consequences of this and incidents
like it, may be too distant in time and too difficult to c~nnect. This is
no! to say t~ere may not be such consequences, or they are
ummportant; sImply that they may not be demonstrable at a level suffi-
cient to justify the shift suggested here.
~he problem of policy as non-action is more immediately pertinent.
ThIS refers to the fact that it is common for health researchers to make
no explicit policy recommendations of any kind when the scientific
basis is .n.ot suffi~iently established. This seems an intrinsically reasona-
ble ~osltlOn untIl two things are taken into account. First, it is entirely
possIble that for many problems of this type the scientific basis will
nev.e~ be sUffi~ientJy es~ablished. Second, non-action is itself a policy
positIOn. That IS, not domg anything allows policies - or the absence of
a public policy - to continue. But this is a subtle issue and most faced
~ith _it may continue to prefer a definition of scientific integrity which
~mphes that ~H~ WORD is attainable; and that until it arrives, not talk-
mg about pohcy IS a way of avoiding policy making.
THE JP'OJL.rniCS OF THE JP'lllBUiC SENSOR
While .one structural element in this episode raises questions about
the 10catI~m ?f the public's interest in light of the difficulties of proof
for chro~lc dIseases,. ~nother directs attention to factors impinging on,
and.shapmg, t~e.deC1slOns and performance of people charged with pro-
tectmg a p~bl~c mterest defined to be threatened. Why, then, was the
heptachlor mCldent managed the way it was?
As noted above, shortly after the extent of the milk's contamination
becaI:ne public knowledge, ~he Committee on Health in the state legisla-
ture Issued a report analyzmg what had happened (Senate Committee
on Health, 1982). It focused on the Department of Health's role in the
incident and offered a number of conclusions and recommendations.
The. Report notes "failure of communication"; excessive caution
motIvated by hope that the data would soon look better; unwarranted
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assumptions about self-regulation in the industry. The report's conclu-
sion emphasized the role of individuals, and asserts that "the responsi-
bility for the Department of Health's failure to act promptly and effec-
tively can be attributed to more than one individual." (Senate Commit-
tee on Health, 1982:5). It goes on to recommend that the Governor
take prompt action against these individuals; that the state Attorney
General decide whether civil or criminal legal action is warranted; that
the legislature undertake an investigation in search of preventative
legislation; and that a loan program be developed immediately to help
out dairy farmers adversely affected by this incident.
It is possible that, as the Senate Report concludes, the main cause of
the long sequence of delays, miscommunications and contradictory -"
perhaps even illegal - decision-making, is primarily explainable in
terms of qualities of the individuals involved. Certainly the values,
skills and interests particular individuals brought to the situation are
factors. On the whole, however, other elements deserve a much stron-
ger hearing than the committee's analysis provides. This section out-
lines some of those elements, and suggests that they help to tell us why
these people acted the way they did, and that the actions are common
to contemporary institutional actors charged with the role of the
"Public Sensor."
The concept of the Public Sensor is useful because it brings insight
about the physical capabilities of human beings, together with a consid-
eration of the realities of the agents we rely upon for protection once
those capabilities are exceeded. It evolves out of three inter-related
factors.
The first is that human beings are ordinarily equipped with a re-
markable set of sensing devices which, among other things, provide
warnings about things in the environment likely to be physically
harmful. These senses of sight, hearing, touch, taste and smell are not
only extremely acute, they are adaptive. If one is impaired, the others
become more sensitive in an attempt to make up for what was lost.
The second factor leading to the Public Sensor is that in spite of
sensory acuteness and adaptability, there is a broad range of environ-
mental elements falling outside of their threshold of detection (that is,
our senses either don't detect them at all, or until damage has been
done). In fact, we ought to say that our senses are subtle and adaptable
within a rather narrow range of the possible environments we might
experience. In historical terms we have developed defensive devices
which operate extremely well within a specific evolutionary setting.
When we leave that environment, or when it is transformed around us,
our senses become much less useful in their protective function.
For contemporary man, changes in the natural environment are
often less important than changes in the man-made environment. We
"leave" the realm of our senses by eating foods with additives, carefully
designed to serve a particular cost-efficiency function without setting off
i
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our sensory alarms (Hall, 1974); by working in places which utilize sub-
t~~esh?ld ~~emicals as part of the production process (Dahl, 1973); by
hvmg m cItIes where we breathe undetectable by-products of internal
combustion engines. A fact of life in a society so reliant on technologi-
cal transformations is that it is harder and harder to live inside environ-
ments from which our own sensory apparatus can provide us reasonable
protection. 17(Toxic Substance Strategy Committee, 1980).
The third factor contributing to the notion of the Public Sensor is the
development, especially over the last two decades, of a number of agen-
cies largely justified by their purported ability to protect the public from
man-made environmental factors which are beyond individual powers
of detection. In fact it is probably accurate to argue that one of the
principal reasons there are these agencies at all is that it has become so
patently unreasonable to suggest that, in these circumstances, individu-
als can be responsible for themselves. (For an interesting example of
the strength of the individual responsibility model in accounting for dis-
e~se among Americans, see Chase, 1975). It is simply more and more
difficult for even the most committed classical liberal to argue that the
responsible individual can be expected to act in his or her own
interest. 18 Thus, the limitations of the human sensory system, the wide
range of incentives in industrial society to place human beings in envi-
ronments containing potentially harmful elements which fall above or
below their sensory thresholds, and the dramatic irrelevance given to
classical notions of individual responsibility by these developments
have together lead to what I am calling the role of the Public Sensor.
The purpose of the Public Sensor is to use its technical resources to act
authoritatively as our agent in areas where we can't protect ourselves.
Given what the Public Sensor is supposed to do the environment
~hich operates on those actors who constitute it is necessarily of
Importance. It's characteristics, apart from and in addition to the quali-
ties of particular individuals, will help to determine what it is reasonable
for people "out of their senses" to expect. What were the characteristics
of the Public Sensor's environment in the heptachlor incident?
That environment is like others in which (1) an administrative
agency is responsible for protecting a certain segment of the public
from the potentially serious consequences of industrial practices (2) in
the light of uncertainty about the impact of those practices and (3)
where there is certainty of harm to the industry from admi~istrative
action. In these circumstances the Public Sensor's activities are shaped
by three mutually reinforcing factors: bureaucratic conservatism an
identification with the concerns of those who are supposed t~ be
regulated, and ambivalence about the public vs. private nature of what
is. supposed to be regulated. These factors, together with the less pre-
dictable use value the issue might have for other political conflicts
create a context which defines how the problems of proof described i~
the previous section are interpreted and acted upon. 19
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"Bureaucratic conservatism" refers to a number of practices charac-
teristic of complex organizations charged with administrative
responsibilities, and accountable to several constituences having dif-
ferent interests in their activities. One of these practices is the separa-
tion of expertise from authority, occurring as a part of the general divi-
sionalization of tasks and responsibilities. This separation is common,
so we shouldn't be very surprised that the people who have to act on
the basis of lab reports may not know how to interpret them. ("To us,
we don't know lab lingo. 'Suspicious Peaks?' What is that?" Statement
of supervisor in Food and Drug Branch. Honolulu Star Bulletin, April
14, 1982.) Another is that there are indeed incentives to be cautious
and make very certain of being "covered" before taking any non-
routine action. ("If we had alerted the dairy and we were wrong, we
could have got in trouble for false dissemination of news." Statement
of supervisor in Food and Drug Branch. Honolulu Star Bulletin, April
14, 1982.) Part of this "cover," made possible by the divisionalization
of responsibility, is of course the ability to avoid being defined as
responsible. ("We only print the results. If there's anything screwy
down there, its for them [the Food and Drug Branch] to doubt, not
me." Statement of supervisor in Laboratories Branch. Honolulu Star
Bulletin,April 14, 1982.) Here, then, the people who have the informa-
tion aren't authorized to act on it; those who are authorized both can't
make sense of it, and have every incentive to remain in that condition.
The importance of this conservatism is exaggerated by the real uncer-
tainties of knowing described in the previous section. It is difficult
enough for people operating in a context of highly divisionalized re-
sponsibilities and skill specializations to know how to utilize this kind
of knowledge. 20 Consider then that heptachlor is, from their
perspective, just one of many economic practices which may be harmful
to the public's health at some time in the future. (For a description of
the magnitude of the problem, see Department of Agriculture, 1969,
which anticipated and sounded a warning for this kind of problem more
than a decade ago). It then doesn't take too much for the whole thing to
seem "unrealistic," "exaggerated," or perhaps even "silly," making it
easier to do what is least troublesome within or outside of the agency.
A second factor shaping what the Public Sensor does or doesn't do is
a "natural" identification with the concerns of the people being regulat-
ed - in this case dairy farmers and milk processors. The result of this
identification is the public agents coming to define their roles as pri-
marily protection of producer's interests. ("We have always tried to
protect them [the dairy industry]. If we had responded sooner, there
were a lot of other problems involved." Honolulu Star Bulletin, April
14,1982') This happens for a number of fairly well-know reasons. One
is simply familiarity. Those monitoring the milk industry know its
people and are regularly appraised of their present or potential econom-
ic problems. Because of this there was a strong inclination to minimize




the implications for the consumer of milk's contamination. For the
Public S~nsor, ~aking it "a pro?~em" would clearly harm the industry
whose difficulties and personalities are known. And just as clearly it
would upset the general public (perhaps bringing calls for accountability
as well). Both of these things would happen, while contamination itself
might be harmful to the public's health sometime in the future.
. Th~ ne~d for trust, required in day-to-day operations, also shapes
IdentificatIOn. Trust is a requirement because the state does not allocate
sufficient resources for the Department of Health to monitor without
assistance, making it necessary to rely heavily on the good faith of the
industry.21 The agricultural and milk industries must be trusted to obey
regulatIOns and report irregularities, even when it is clear such obedi-
~nce and reporting may not be in their economic interest. The problem
IS that the trust which is necessary - and institutionalized - in normal
operations has spilled over into situations where it is inappropriate.
The third factor is milk's ambivalent status as a public or private
~ommodity.. Because the legislature and the Governor agreed that milk
IS an essen.tJaI food, and developed laws and administrative procedures
~o prote~.t .It~ local producer~ while maximizing its consumption, milk
III Hawau IS III a sense a public product. 22 However, if it is reasonable to
prot~ct producers, it also seems appropriate to expect some degree of
public control. In fact, what has happened is that while the public has
been declared to have a specific interest in milk that interest is uneven-
1 1· 23 . 'y app Jed. Milk producers are guaranteed a price and protection from
com~etition. ~t the same time, they can successfully claim to be a pri-
vate Illdustry III regard to most of their practices. One practical conse-
quence of th!s is the separation of information from responsibility:
what the public needs to know to protect its interest is controlled by the
producer, who both manages access and is defined as having little re-
sponsibility for its use.
MUJK AS A POUnCAL-ECONOMKC PRODUCT
. ~he essentiality of cow's milk is an important factor shaping this
Illcldent. This was a "crisis" for the public and for various elected offi-
~ials and administrators, rather than an economic problem for the milk
Ill?us.try and an inconvenience for everyone else, precisely because
milk IS presumed necessary to the public's well-being. 24 If Maui Potato
Chips were essential and became adulterated, there would be a crisis
and not just an inconvenience. Since they're not, any adulteration of
them countenanced by a public agency would leave no question that a
"special i!1terest" was being protected at the public's expense.
The Milk Control Act was passed in Hawaii in 1967. It guarantees the
producers a profitable return by establishing minimum milk prices and
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The Board of Agriculture, in implementing the Act, declared that
"milk i~. an essential food in the daily diet and lack of such milk is injuri-
ous to the public health and welfare of our inhabitants." 25
The purpose of the Hawaii Milk Control Act is to protect an essential
product from the vicissitudes of the marketplace. The local milk indus-
try has argued successfully that there are threats to continued milk pro-
duction in Hawaii. These might leave the local population dependent
on a transoceanic connection, which in turn could be broken by ship-
ping strikes, warfare, poor weather, and so on. One threat is increased
costs for basic feed products purchased locally and on the mainland and
for transporting mainland feeds to Hawaii. Another, probably more
significant, is an uneven demand for milk during the year. These "wide
fluctuations" coincide with the schedules of the public schools. 26 The
problem, of course, is that the milk producers are unable to "shut off'
the cows when institutional consumption drops. Milk producers con-
tend that all these circumstances create an incentive for them to pro-
duce less and less mille The Milk Act interprets this as "an imminent
peril to the public health and safety," and forms a package of protection.
The contentions of the Act raise one of the most interesting aspects
of Hawaii's milk episode, and at the same time connect it to a national
pattern in which an economic interest has successfully used the state to
create and maintain a favored position. The thread which leads into that
pattern is whether milk is in fact an essential product, and indeed
whether it is even a useful one for most people. Although milk is au-
thoritatively endorsed as a necessary commodity, what is known about
it is in many respects quite different. Just how different is a matter of
dispute, although there seems little question on some points.
One is that milk is simply not an essential food per se. What it pro-
vides that is required can be derived at least equally well - in terms of
quality and cost - from other sources. Another is that many adults - ac-
tually most - may not be able to use what milk potentially has to offer
(Bayless et al., 1975 Gilat, 1979).27 The problem is that they do not
produce, after the first few years, an enzyme necessary to assimilate
and metabolize its nutrients. For these people the consumption of milk
can bring anything from a mild discomfort to more serious health prob-
lems (GHat, 1979; Oski and Bell, 1979).28 Many adults have expe-
rienced "miraculous" improvements in their health by simply eliminat-
ing mille
Related to the problems which adults have with milk are the allergic
reactions found in infants and young children. Bahna and Heiner
(1980) have shown in their extensively detailed study of milk's prob-
lems for American children, that between one and three per cent of
males and females up to the age of three develop varying degrees of al-
lergic reaction.
The third point on which there is a high degree of agreement is the
role of cow's milk in human obesity. Cow's milk is known to provide
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calves with rapid growth and weight gain. When humans use it regularly
it leads to a rapid build-up of fatty cells. This is a particular problem for
people who as infants develop an undesirable quantity offat cells, fore-
casting difficulties with adult obesity (Whittleaton, 1976; Oski, 1977).
Concerns about milk as a food product which have less agreement
suggest its role in artherosclerosis; the effects of pasteurization on the
quality of the calcium, protein and bacterial flora; and the manner in
which it acts as a "sponge" for certain chemicals used in industrial
agriculture, as in the heptachlor case. Without trying to decide the cor-
rectness of these and their counter-arguments, what we must say about
cow's milk is that its value is clearly in doubt. It can be a source of some
essential nutrients for some people and a source of mild to more serious
health problems for a good many others. The nutrients provided to
those able to utilize it can be obtained from other sources. The same
points hold for its derivative products, such as cheese and cottage
cheese.
Since a food product which is so problematic has become
institutionalized, it is safe to assume the milk industry has represented
itself well in the corridors of power. When we consider it may be not
merely unessential, but an active problem, it becomes clear milk
producers have been represented very well indeed. It is at this point the
Hawaii milk episode becomes a local manifestation of the national
political-economy of milk.
Milk is a $35 billion business in the United States. The dairy industry
is also one of the best organized for the purposes of promoting milk
consumption and using the state to protect its interests - that is, for con-
verting economic interest into political power. The industry's lobbying
and advertising organizations derive their funds from mandatory fees
assessed cooperative members, and in 1982 its 18 political-action com-
mittees (PACs) contributed "at least" $1.8 billion to various
congressmen. (Donahue, 1983:62) This amount exceeded that given
by the American Medical Association's PAC, illustrating why the milk
lobby for some time has been considered one of the most powerful in
the nation.
The result of the long-term efforts of the milk industry is that in 1983
the federal government spent about $2.4 billion buying dairy products
in order to preserve established prices. 29 As of July 1983 it owned 481.1
million pounds of butter, 932.7 million pounds of cheese, and a surplus
of milk equivalent to about 150 eight ounce glasses for every American.
All of what the government owns is worth an estimated $3 billion, and
costs over $100 million a year to ship and store. (Donahue, 1983).
While it is difficult to guess what the price of milk would be without
government supports, the added cost to consumers is frequently placed
in the billions of dollars.
Local pecularities aside, to a great degree Hawaii's Act is a reflection
of the national political-economy of milk. On the mainland, Milk Con-
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trol Boards didn't appear in producing states until the 1930's although -
as in Hawaii prior to appearance of its Board - milk was regulated for
quality before then. The Control Boards were a successful move by. the
milk producers to obtain the protection private producer c~operatlves
couldn't provide. The cooperatives failed when the depressIOn econo-
my broke member's ranks and brought "pirate" producers into the
field. 30
At the center of this process is the fact that as the American food
system evolved, milk became a resale product when it reached the
retail shelf. The second sellers, the processor and distributor came to
be accused by dairymen and then consumers of profiting at their
expense. Before organizing and gaining a~thority through th~ B~ards,
the independent producers, unable to easily regulate productIOn III re-
sponse to demand, saw themselves in a poor bargaining position. (The
consumer who by and large is still unorganized, remains in that
position, frequently accusing the processors and producers of
exploitation.)
The purpose of the Boards was to prevent (1) the affects of price wars
among distributors from being passed back to the source of supply and
(2) distributors from going outside the established "milkshed" in an at-
tempt to obtain milk at prices below those established with it. 31 (see
Mortenson 1940' and McMenamin, 1980) Since that time, woven into
both natio~al and' local legislation, a complex system of dairy price sup-
ports has developed. That system is based upon the elements of anti-
trust immunity, which let cooperatives agree on prices; regulated
pricing, which outlawed price competition; an.d support ?urcha~es,
which dealt with any decreases in demand resultlllg from pnce settillg.
(Donahue, 1983)
The relationships which have developed between industry, govern-
ment and consumer around milk provide an interesting lesson in the
structuring of an economic process into one which is patently political,
and in the continued exercise of the power which results from it. A
couple of examples illustrate the exercise of this power. In 1982 the
Reagan administration stated it would ask Congress to for~go the next
increase in dairy price supports, and then make some cuts III these sup-
ports for 1983. Shortly thereafter, Department of Agriculture Secretary
John Block appeared at a news conference drinking a glass of milk,
signaling there should be no concern about his basic commitments.
The problem is, he told us, that "we" have a glut of dairy produ~,~s
which now cost about two billion dollars a year to buy and store, and If.
more people would do this, (i.e., drink milk), we could straighten this
dairy program up overnight" (Honolulu Advertiser, May 6, 1982, p.A-3;
Donahue, 1983). (It is also noteworthy that the proposal to cut b~ck
dairy supports followed the beginning of serious talks about cut!lllg
social security payments. The structure of political economic relatIOn-
ships indicates that the elderly may lose some income, but will be able
to count on having processed cheese.)
.--~-------======~---------------::'-
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The second example is local and involves the Milk Action Plan, a set
of recommendations for action in the aftermath of the milk crisis, made
by representatives of the Departments of Health and Agriculture and
the University of Hawaii's College of Tropical Agriculture. (Milk
Action Plan, April 20, 1982). The group offered a number of proposals
involving the purification and monitoring of dairy products, as well as
indemnity payments to the industry. One of their primary missions,
however, was to "re-establish fresh milk as a vital human nutrient"
(Milk Action Plan, 1982:2,20) This would involve creating an educa-
tion plan for primary and secondary schools, since "otherwise there is
no point in re-establishing previous production levels" (Milk Action
Plan, 1982:20) But the Plan goes beyond even this commitment of
public resources and suggests the wisdom of trying to increase fluid
milk consumption, noting that Hawaii trails other states in that area.
Following the spirit of this concern for the industry's well-being, dairy
representatives lobbied the 1984 legislature for $50,000 to help
"restore confidence in milk," arguing the resources they could devote
to that purpose were exhausted.
Several consequences of importance flow from recognizing the role
of the political-economy of milk in this incident. One is that while there
has been a crisis for the local milk industry, the Health Department,
and even consumers accustomed to drinking milk, there is hardly a
"health crisis" in terms of the loss of an essential food. In all probability
many people are feeling better because they have been forced to
abstain.
Another is a situation,which is, from almost any perspective but that
of the economically vested interests, ironic and difficult to rationalize.
A food product is defined as essential; its essentiality raises the costs to
the very consumers who supposedly need it; 32 and, because public
policy rests on protection of the local industry, contamination of the
needed supply is not judged adequate reason for milk to be brought
into the state on an emergency basis. Lodged in this network of seem-
ingly contradictory actions and reactions are of course the political ar-
rangements holding together what otherwise might fall if exposed to a
different point of view.
A third consequence is that the created essentiality of milk has
helped preclude any serious discussion of alternative sources for the nu-
trients milk is supposed to provide. Although alternatives are readily
available to anyone having basic information, at no time during the epi-
sode did the Department of Health utilize its resources to provide such
information. On the contrary, most efforts were aimed at assuring the
public of the safety of the milk available while promising that a "regular
supply of pure milk" would soon be back on store shelves. This disincli-
nation is particularly surprising in a place where soybean products, an
excellent source of calcium, protein and other nutrients, are more com-
monly used and therefore easily accessible. 33
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Another manifestation of milk politics is an implicit
ethnocentricism, something made more evident in multi-ethnic
Hawaii. As noted previously, milk is not a food easily assimilated by
most people. The "normal deficiency" has been shown to vary across
ethnic groups and to be based upon ethnicity rather than geography.
Moreover m~vement from one place to another does not change this
(Gilat 19'79). What is perhaps most surprising of all, a very high pro-
portio~ of Asians are deficient in lactase, while a high proportion of
caucasians have it (Gilat, 1979; Bayless, 1975; 1972). In a state where
non-caucasians constitute most of the population, milk's public en-
dorsement is even harder to justify. Essentially an ethnic food has been
officially sanctioned without consideration for its less-than-universal
qualities. And while Hawaii's population mix shows this dramatically,
the same point applies in other parts of the United States, where blacks
are predominantly lactose intolerant.
Finally, an understanding of milk as a political phenomenon must
raise questions about agricultural policy in Hawaii. If it is clear milk is
not an essential food, protection by the state cannot be justified on that
basis. Knowing this would seem to require asking what other reasons
there are for milk's privileged position in public policy.
There are some potential justifications. It might, like sugar, be
defined as essential to the state's economy. Or it might be part of the
state's long-term goal of establishing a higher degree of independe~ce
in food production through agricultural diversification. Whatever It is
justified in terms of, it isn't defensible - and in fact is mainly ironic -
to continue relying on its essentiality. In the long run, the current
"milk crisis" may be useful if it focuses attention on the need to reas-
sess the political-economy of milk and milk policy in the light of a
better informed understanding of the public's interest. In Hawaii, the
factors most likely to maintain the milk industry as a ward of the state
are the institutionalized standing of milk, the organizational strength of
the milk lobby, and the fact that most costs of the Milk Act go directly
to the consumer as higher prices rather than appearing as an item to be
defended in anyone's budget.
CONCLUSION
Part of what constitutes this issue is the competence, or lack thereof,
of specific individuals. It is also the case that the revelation of a potent
insecticide in the milk supply is an event which has use-value. It is ex-
ploitable by the media to attract the public's attention, a capability -
we need to constantly remind ourselves - upon which the media's
well-being rests. And it is a tool to be used in electoral campaigns as
well as less public struggles for power. And of course there is the matter
of bureaucratic inefficiency in handling the unexpected.
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The point I want to emphasize in this article, however, is the signifi-
cance of certain structural factors in shaping what this incident means.
Of most importance is the likelihood that the features which shaped
thi~ incident will shape others. It is hard to imagine, given the heavy
reliance of modern agriculture on biochemical agents, that other sub-
stances will not find their way into the food supply. In fact, since the
heptachlor episode, there has been a spate of contaminations each of
which has been dominated by uncertainty of affect and conflict over
proper policy. Should - or when - pesticides or something else turn
up in still another part of the food supply, we ought to anticipate how
the problem of proof, the environment of the Public Sensor and the
political economy of the product shape its handling. How can this antic-
ipation be used to advantage?
First, what I've described as the "don't know" position of the
scientific adviser ought to be appreciated more than it is by those
"administering" public policy. This appreciation should incorporate un-
derstanding that their role necessarily involves making decisions which
cmnot be defined or defended as only, or even mainly, technical. And
it should encourage efforts to improve the quality of communications
with the scientific community in order to better receive and interpret
the advice which it gives.
Next, people who are charged with protecting the public's interest _
in health or something else - often do so under extraordinarily com-
plicated c.ircumstances. I've tried to summarize some of that complexity
by focuslllg on the extreme divisionalization of responsibility and
authority, low access to pertinent information, and inevitable uncer-
tainty about what is the "public interest". Ifwe expect officials to meet
their responsibilities, then more attention needs to be paid to both the
organizational setting they work within, and the kinds of training they
receive for dealing with both the routine and the extraordinary.
Third, what products should be given public standing? I've suggested
that the status assigned milk is rich in irony. This irony results from a
manifestation of the national political-economy of milk adapted to local
conditions. Of equal import is the point that the essentiality issue has
more general influence as a part of political and economic life. Since
producer.s have a natural interest in the likely benefits, many attempt to
have theIr products defined as essential. The basis for the presumed in-
dispensability includes the characteristics of the product (such as milk
or medicine), the importance of the industry (such as automobiles or
agriculture), or the value of a stable market (such as airlines or dairies).
All of these claims may be justifiable - that is, they may contain inter-
ests substantially beyond that of the economic actor advancing them.
That is a matter of careful analysis. But it is certain that the political-
economy of essentiality, if not analyzed, has important consequences
for both the treatment of uncertainty and the actions of the public
sensor. In the case of milk, the politically derived and authoritatively
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enforced definition of milk's essentiality has unquestionably lead to
poorer decision-making. Decision-makers were ult~mately in the po~i­
tion of evaluating whose interests would be affected III what ways. A dIf-
ferent understanding of milk's importance, simply by altering the pre-
sumed relationship between needs, risk and potential harm (i.e. why
risk anyone's health over something they don't need), would cr~a.te dif-
ferent incentives and different decisions. Changing the definItIOn of
milk's importance would, in other words, make it clearer that the public
interest doesn't lie in it.
NOTES
1. One might think that the Food and Drug Administration would
have authority in this area. It falls within the EPA's jurisdiction
because, while a food product, the milk has not yet reached the
consumer.
2. Heptachlor is itself the replacement for another banned insecti-
cide named Mirex.
3. The residues combine with the milk fat molecules.
4. The origin of the 0.3 standard is an interesting elem~nt in this
incident. There is nothing obvious about it in biochemIcal terms.
It was a negotiated agreement which balanced (1) the fact that a
five year sentence had been established, making it harder to justi-
fy requests for protracted testing, (2) the knowledge that lower
level amounts of pesticides and herbicides commonly come and
go in milk samples (a reflection of the technologies of contempo-
rary industrial agriculture), and this standard would tolerate them
without calling for "too hasty" action, and (3) possible errors of
detection. One of the side issues is the supposed increase in error
associated with trying to specify smaller and smaller ppm. The
idea of the error range has subsequently provided - as in this
incident - a rationale, and perhaps even an incentive, not to take
any single result seriously, especially if the consequences of
acting are dramatic. Many contend that, given available
technology, there is virtually no error at these levels, and men-
tioning it only creates a smokescreen for other reasons not to act.
Their position is that technology has improved since the action
standard was set and now it should be lowered to meet the inten-
tion of the zero tolerance rule. They note the World Health Or-
ganization has established 0.15 ppm as the action level. Another
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int~resting side issue is that for unknown reasons, the 0.3 ppm
actIOn standard was never published in the federal register for
public review.
5. Th~ 'econ?mic ecology' described here was facilitated by the
Ammal SCI~nces program. at the University of Hawaii. Acting
under premIses about the Importance of the milk industry in the
state (see section three), that program developed machinery for
removing and cutting up more and more of the plants' leaves.
Unwitting~y, their activities probably contributed to the problem,
becaus~ pmeapple leaves nearer the ground contain higher con-
centratIOns of heptachlor (it is sprayed onto the soil and carried
up through the plant). The higher concentration in the leaves
together with the fact that dairies have increased the percentag~
of green chop in cows' feed, is one factor accounting for its pre-
sence at the levels which paralyzed the Department of Health.
6. It is also likely that the incident resulted in part from disregarding
application rules.
7. The Senate Committee's conclusions are reviewed in the
conclusion, and the Action Plan is considered in the third section
of this article.
8. In the. 197,8 ~ampaign the Governor used the slogan "Quiet but
Effective, wIth apparent success. By May 1982 signs and t-shirts
had appeared depicting a molecule, over which were the words:
"Heptachlor, Quiet but Effective".
9. From this perspective one is led to think of diethlstilbestrol
(DES) daughters and sons.
10.The Hawaii Milk Control Act is discussed in the third section.
I1.Different labs may use different methods of analysis; samples
from t~e same source will vary from test to test, even if only a
short time has elapsed. There are the matters of adequate training
and the boredom factor in reading analyses.
12.Since other diseases are involved, the problem is naturally more
complex. Short-term toxic reactions are very unlikely at these
doses..Howe.ver, heptachlor is thought to be a contributor to long-
term l~ver dIsorders. In addition it has been suggested that con-
sumptIOn of the pesticide may contribute to behavioral (as op-
posed to morphological) disorders. (see Dubanoski 1984' Weiss
1983) , , ,
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13.School of Public Health, University of Hawaii, April 14, 1982.
14.Dr.·Prederick Greenwood, Director, Pacific Biomedical Research
Laboratory, University of Hawaii, April 14, 1982.
15. It is important to note that the problems which chronic diseases
present have placed considerable stress on the paradigm health
science has used to explain disease. This model was inherited
from laboratory work, and proved to be quite successful when ap-
plied to infectious disease. The fact that it works less well for
chronic diseases with environmental components suggests that,
given the social importance of doing something about these
diseases, the health science disciplines might see a transformation
of their paradigm. In fact it is now possible to find people in the
field treating the paradigm as problematic. (c.f. Stallone, 1980;
Marmot, 1976).
16.It is not surprising, then, to learn that, "After seven hours oftes-
timony yesterday, state Senator Cayetano had not learned to what
extent heptachlor was dangerous to adults or babies. What he did
learn is that nobody really knows." The Honolulu Advertiser, May
22, 1982.
17.There are a number of interesting aspects here. One is the degree
to which people feel it necessary or desirable to "override" the
warnings of their sensory systems. Hearing loss is now commonly
the result of an individual's decision not to respond to noise
levels associated with work. Cigarette smoking is perhaps the best
example of the consequences of these override decisions, and in
addition points to another part of the phenomenon: the attempt to
educate people out of their senses. This in turn leads to the phe-
nomenon of economic benefit deriving from the ability to alienate
people from their senses. Obesity is a good case in point. Finally,
there is a development in which sub-threshold activities have
been made illegal for some kinds of private uses, and legal for
others. Subliminal advertising in the television or radio media is
illegal, but retail stores may send unheard admonitions against
stealing through the Musak system.
18.The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 illustrates this
nicely. To oversimplify, at the turn of the twentieth century it was
possible for employers to successfully make the case to judges and
lawmakers that they should not pay damages for injury or allow
the enactment of compensation laws which would obligate pay-
ment to workers injured on the job. They argued some combina-
tion of contributory negligence, the fellow servant rule (other em-
\·;1
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ployees are responsible), or - as a last resort - assumed risk
.(the employee accepts the possibility of injury when taking the
Job). By 19:0 the technology of the work place had changed so
much that It 'Yas not only impossible to avoid the problem of
work-caused disease (as opposed to injury); but it was also un-
tenable to say that the worker or his/her peers could know
enough to avoid being harmed or doing harm. The OSH Act thus
reflects the changing relationship between man-made environ-
ments and human competence brought about by the introduction
of profit-producing technologies. The Toxic Substances Control
Act, on which the EPA is based, also reflects a recognition of this
same changing relationship.
19.Ther~ seems little question that its occurrence in a gubernatorial
el~c!lOn ~ear affected how this was handled. The incumbent ad-
mnystratlOn .was conc~rned about the issue developing in a way
whl~h ma?e It susceptible to campaign uses. This in turn created
an. mcentIve ~o "contain" the issue longer than others might
thmk appropnate. It also explains the importance given to state-
ments ~hat the problem was "not serious" once there was some
sugges~lOn of mishandling and irresponsibility. But beyond the
dynamics .of electoral politics, there is the possibility that an issue
may pr~vlde advantages for one individual or group in the multi-
tude of Issue and personality conflicts which are always around.
20.The issue of knowledge utilization is significant and separable
~rom.the problems of proof raised here. While it's not discussed
m thiS analysis, the matter of how scientists and administrators
talk to each other is an important part of this issue.
21.0n t?e !sland of Oahu eight health inspectors are charged with
~onIt.onng all local manufacture and distribution of food, includ-
mg milk.
22. This. part of the issue is elaborated in the next section. In the
speCific matter of milk's public character see Peter Mortenson
~il~ Distribution as .a Public. Utility (l940:vii), who states that
milk....because of. ItS speCial importance in protecting and
promotmg the public welfare, should become a public utility like
water, gas and electricity."
23.1.'his pattern of public protection and private control is characteris-
tic of other areas, the most notable of which is undoubtedly the
medical profession.
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24.The impact of the presumed essentiality is illustrated by an inci-
dent which occurred at the University of Hawaii, after the island's
milk supply was known to be contaminated. As part of the Uni-
versity's anniversary celebration, Food and Nutrition program
students developed a display which, among other things, purport-
ed to instruct passers by on healthful eating. A prominently
placed sign informed already anxious citizens that "Every Body
Needs Milk." Allegiance to Mark Spitz aside, it was removed
when discovered by the program's chairman.
25.Chapter 157, Hawaii Revised Statutes. See "Rules and Regula-
tions Pertaining to Minimum Prices in the Honolulu Milk Shed",
Department of Agriculture, Division of Milk Control, State of
Hawaii. 1968.
26.It may be worth noting that the passage of the 1967 Act coincided
with the loss of another institutional consumer. As part of the war
effort, thousands of troops left Schofield Barracks on Oahu for
Vietnam.
27.After a survey of the problem, Gilat points out that in the last ten
to fifteen years we have come to understand that what was seen as
a deficiency in handling milk is in fact the normal condition. The
so-called deficiency is genetically controlled as a regulatory
mechanism for adult humans, who don't need milk. As will be
suggested by points made below on the ethnic specificity of milk,
seeing the inability to use milk as abnormal probably reflects the
cultural biases of Western-based science.
28.Lactose, or milk sugar, is a dissaccharide made up of the monosac-
carides glucose and glactose. Lactase is an enzyme produced in
the small intestine which converts lactose into the simple sugars
for absorbtion through the intestinal wall into the bloodstream. It
appears that most people stop producing lactase after about the
fourth year of life, which is of course the time mothers would stop
producing milk. Some research suggests that the consumption of
cow's milk by lactose-deficient adults can reactivate production of
the enzyme, thus reducing the importance of a genetic
explanation. (See also Johnson et al. 1980 & 1981.)
29.In the fiscal year ending September 1982, the federal government
bought dairy products derived from 1.6 billion gallons of milk,
which is about ten per cent of the year's total milk production.
30. Even though they failed in other respects, by the 1930s milk had
become institutionalized thanks largely to the work of the
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cooperatives. A good example of its status is provided by Crum-
bine.and T?bey's The Most Nearly Perfect Food - The Story ofMilk,
pubhshed ill 1929. The title page is faced by the photograph of a
cow standing alone in the tall trees next to a lake
peacefully -almost contemplativ~ly-Iookingacross its grazin~
area. N,oble. Clark, from the Agncultural Experiment Station at
the UnIversity of Wisconsin, writes in a preface that "More than
any other food product milk has won recognition as ~ food vital to
the health of our people. ~ach d~y the milk must reach the hospi-
tal and the homes where httle chIldren are-in spite of storms and
regardless of strikes or other civil disturbances." In this light the
cow's contemplative stance becomes more understandable. '
31.Hawaii's Mi~k Control Act was passed in 1967, in the same year
that the NatIOnal Farmers Organization put together a politically
success~uI "milk ~ump" in twenty-five states to protest excess
productIOn and fallIng prices. (Walters, 1968.)
32.In. Ha.waii, one-half gallon of milk costs about $1.65. The current
~nce ill So~thernCalifornia is $1.05. The Hawaii manager of a na-
tI~nal retaIl foo? corporation told us that without any question
mIlk could be aut10wn to Hawaii and sold for less than what is
charged locally. It hasn't been until recently because of the Milk
Act.
33. The soybean relationship to the milk story is itself an interesting
one. ~he United States is the largest producer of soybeans, but
Amencans consume a very small percentage of them. Instead
they are .used as, among other things, the basis for producing
foods which are more expensive and in many ways less healthy.
They are, for example, used as a feed for dairy animals.
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SECTORS OF PRODUCTIVE CAPITAJL
AND INCOME INEQUAJLITY IN HAWAII, 19751
Joyce N. Chinen
Many studies of the social situation in Hawaii have noted that
income and occupational patterns seem to be related to such charac-
teristics as ethnicity, education and sex, but it is difficult to find a study
that systematically explores the social structural bases of these patterns.
Most studies have taken a socio-historical approach, and assume that
over time social conditions will tend to either improve or deteriorate
for certain populations (Lind, 1980; Fuchs, 1968; Daws, 1968; Kent,
1983). Thus, in this study of income inequality in Hawaii, a structural
approach will be used. It will begin with a brief review of some recently
used theoretical perspectives on income inequality, discuss the
rationale for using a structural approach, and then formulate some re-
search questions to guide the study. Following this section, the research
methodology, including the variables and data set to be used, will be
described. Finally, the results of the analysis will be reported and
discussed.
TJHEORJEnCAL lPERSlPJECnVJES
Studies of income inequality in the United States in recent years
have focused on wage differences, but there is not yet agreement on
which factors most affect wages. One researcher, Almquist (1979), has
noted that there are at least three schools of thought on this matter.
They are (1) the human capital and status attainment theories; (2) the
dual labor market theory and (3) the structural or radical economic
theories. 2 These theories differ in terms of their political orientations
regarding the desirability of income inequality and approaches to its
reduction. Even more important, however, the theories vary in terms
of which units are selected for analysis (e.g. individuals, labor markets,
sectors of the economy). This is an important consideration since some
ofthe units are more inclusive that others.
The human capital perspective focuses on individuals and assumes
that behavioral choices have been made by them in acquiring skills,
education, union membership, etc., which then affect their attractive-
ness to prospective employers. While the status attainment perspective
parallels the human capital perspective, it recognizes that social factors
such as family background affect the kinds of choices that individuals
make in acquiring their skills, education, etc. Both perspectives agree,
however, that individuals' motivations and/or actions are the primary
determinants of their income levels.
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The dual labor market theory represents a middle level theory. It
focuses on the conditions faced by aggregates of individuals because of
their representive positions in one of the two segments of the labor
market. The work of Doeringer and Piore (1971) suggests that jobs in
the primary labor market tend to be more stable, with higher wages and
better working conditions, while those in the secondary labor market
tend to be unstable, with low pay and undesirable working conditions.
Here the unit of analysis is the segment of the labor market, and the
focus is on aggregates of individuals whose income levels are deter-
mined by their location in one of the segments.
Finally, structural or radical theorists, such as O'Connor (1973) and
Bluestone (1973), focus on the features of advanced industrial
capitalism, class conflict, and the segmentation of the whole economy.
In this perspective, the structure of the political economy is
emphasized, and it represents the most inclusive unit of analysis be-
cause it subsumes not only aggregates of individuals in different labor
markets, but also those in different segments of the economy. While
the explanatory factors at this level are impersonal and further removed
from individuals' experiences and characteristics, they also structure
the variation among the specific aggregates of individuals.
Each theoretical approach to the study of income inequality involves
both strengths and weaknesses. Human capital and status attainment
models, which are most popular, focus on the specific characteristics of
individuals, but ignore how those characteristics are socially ordered.
The dual labor market theory focuses on the social ordering of personal
characteristics in the labor market, but ignores the structural features
of the larger economy. Only the structural theories take into account
the structure of the entire economy. For this reason, this investigation
of income inequality in Hawaii will take a structural approach and focus
on sectors of productive capital as the primary determinant of income
inequality in Hawaii. Since the study will adopt the theoretical frame-
work presented by James O'Connor, some of his ideas will now be
examined.
O'CONNOR'S THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In The Fiscal Crisis of the State (1973), James O'Connor analyzes the
troublesome condition which is increasingly facing the state in nations
with advanced capitalist economies: the condition of simultaneously ex-
panding expenditures and declining revenues. Chronic fiscal instability
and periodic crises tend to be the result, and according to O'Connor,
the reason for it can be found in the contradictory role that the state
must play in capitalist national economies. That contradictory role re-
quires that the state both assist in the process of private capital accumu-
lation and provide the conditions of social harmony in the society.
L-.---- _
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The latter function (legitimation) is essential and related to the success-
ful performance of the former function (accumulation),. but
increasingly, meeting the accumulation function produces social ~islo­
cations and overall disharmony in the society. Thus, the state contmual-
ly needs to expand to perform both functions, but it must do so with a
constricting resource base.
Essentially, O'Connor asserts that there are three sectors of produc-
tive capital: monopoly, competitive, and state. 3 The first two sectors
are engaged in economic production for private profit, while the state
sector is engaged in production presumably for the whole society's
benefit. But while monopoly and competitive sectors both produce for
private gain, they differ considerably in the particular way they produce
for private gain. These differences lie in their respective relationships
to the state, and result in differences in their respective levels of profit.
According to O'Connor, the growth in the power of both the
monopoly and the state sectors are interdependent. Monopoly sector
industries tend to use economies of scale and rely on state sector pro-
duction to socialize4 much of their pre- and post-production costs; they
can therefore reap higher levels of profit. The state sector, in turn,
relies on the monopoly sector for its legitimation, its justification for its
continuing expansion and, to some extent, its capital (taxes). Competi-
tive sector industries, by contrast, do not enjoy the same kind of rela-
tionship that monopoly sector industries have with the state sector;
thus, the benefilts and levels of profit of competitive sector industries
are much lower than those of monopoly sector industries.
Differences in benefits extend to workers in the economic sector as
well. O'Connor explains that the costs of wages, benefits and working
conditions of monopoly sector workers tend to be administered, or
simply passed on in the prices of goods and services produced by the
monopoly sector. In contrast, competition in the marketplace determines
the wages, benefits and working conditions of workers in the competi-
tive sector. And, since the state sector is tied to the monopoly sector,
the conditions of state sector workers tend to resemble those of
monopoly sector workers, although to a somewhat lesser degree. Thus,
wage levels are presumably highest in the monopoly sector, and lowest
in the competitive sector, with state sector wages in between the two,
but closely following those in the monopoly sector.
One attempt to empirically test O'Connor's ideas as they apply to the
conditions of labor was conducted by Randy Hodson (1978). Using
Current Population Survey data from March 1973 for a cross-sectional
analysis, Hodson demonstrated that sectors of productive capital seem
to structure inequality into the wage, unemployment and underemploy-
ment conditions of the U.S. labor force. However, the data also indicat-
ed patterns which did not exactly correspond to those predicted by
O'Connor's framework, particularly the proportional distribution of
the labor force across the sectors. O'Connor expected that the work-
I_r=__---_~~~ _
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force would be evenly divided among the three sectors, but Hodson
found the workforce distribution to be 24% in the monopoly sector,
43% in the competitive sector, and 17% in the state sector. 5
Both O'Connor's framework and Hodson's empirical work involved
analyses of the political economy at the level of the nation-state. This
study will attempt to extend their respective work, to see whether this
~ramework might be equally useful in understanding income inequality
III a local-level economy. There are some problems, however, in taking
this approach. First, as O'Connor has pointed out, state and local
governments' borrowing and debt are governed by different political
economic principles from those of the federal government; state and
local government debts involve limited-term private financing, whereas
federal debt is indefinite and administered (O'Connor 1973:193).
Second, state and local government operations tend to be circumscribed
by the structure and operations of the federal government. But to the
extent that O'Connor's major propositions about the dual and contra-
dictory functions of the state (to facilitate both accumulation and
legitimation) also apply to the state at state and local levels the frame-
work may also be used to study the structural basis of incom'e inequality
in Hawaii.
This study will be guided by three major research questions. The first
inquires about the proportional distribution of employment and social
characteristics across sectors. The answer to this question will permit
comparison of the sectoral distribution in the national and Hawaiian
economies. The second concern, the distribution of incomes across
sectors, will indicate whether there are indeed str~ctural bases of the
income inequality in Hawaii, just as there appear to be at the national
level. Finally, the effects of social characteristics on the sector-based
income levels, will be examined to see how these variables interact to
produce particular kinds of income patterns.
METHODOLOGY
Data
The data set to be used in this investigation is a subsample of the
1975 Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) Census Update, a
random sample survey of households for the island of Oahu. Although
other islands were included in the statewide survey, there were prob-
lems with the Kauai data, so this study will limit itself to the Oahu
sample. This should not cause any problems since 80% of the state's
resident population is located on Oahu. Also, this county incorporates
both urban and rural areas, with both corporate and entrepreneurial ag-
ricultural activities represented in rural areas. Moreover, Honolulu,
the capital and largest city in Hawaii is located on this island· Oahu, , ,
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therefore, represents quite well the social, political and economic activi-
ty for the State of Hawaii. Thus, the data set for this study consists of a
random sample of the Oahu sample survey and includes 1656 subjects,
of which 485 were employed full-time.
Variables
This study has proposed to investigate the relationship between sec-
tors of economic production and income inequality. Income level will
therefore be considered the dependent variable. Since income was
coded into income-range categories, calculations of mean income
levels will use the mid-point of income-range categories. The mid-point
of income categories will therefore be used as the indicator of a sub-
ject's income. Because income levels are affected by the type of
employment, most of the analysis will be performed on full-time em-
ployed persons.
The determination of the productive sectors represents a somewhat
more complex task. While O'Connor has provided a description of the
characteristics of each of the sectors, he has not provided precise crite-
ria for their determination. Instead, O'Connor suggests that the sectors
are composed of different types of industries, and this is why Hodson
used industries to indicate sectors. Unfortunately, however, the criteria
Hodson used to assign specific industries into the specific sectors are
also not clearly specified. Nevertheless, both authors point to the need
to view the sectors of economic production as being organized in terms
of industries. In this regard, they are not alone. Other scholars, such as
Robert Blauner, have previously noted that industries differ in their
economic structure as well as in other characteristics, and that these dif-
ferences have important implications for workers in those inductries
(1964:10).
The methodological question, then, is: on what basis should indus-
tries be distinguished? The answer depends both on theory as well as
on the kinds of information available on industry characteristics. On
the bases of both theoretical considerations and a review of two sources
of census data, two characteristics will be used to differentiate indus-
tries into the three sectors of ecoonomic production: workforce size and
amount ofsales or receipts.
Workforce size will be used because O'Connor states that monopoly
sector industries tend to utilize economies of scale. Furthermore, the
usefulness of this criterion has been empirically supported. For
example, Aldrich and Weiss (1981:283) have demonstrated that work-
force size is an important characteristic which internally differentiates
the capitalist class. Similarly, although the 1975 County Business Pat-
terns data show an average per-firm size of 15.7 employees for all
industries, there is a considerable range, from an average of 3.7 em-
ployees for the 99 dentist offices, to 750 for a single electrical service
I
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lOne missing case.
make up the Hawaiian economy. Most of Hawaii's firms are engaged in
service or retail trade areas; manufacturing, which is usually associat~d
with monopoly sector industries, represents only about 7% of economic
activity in Hawaii, and most of that is in non-durables. As a result, the
four leading industries in Hawaii are tourism, the military, sugar and
pineapple, in that order (Department of Planning and Economic
Development, 1980:233). Furthermore, Hawaii's modern social
history-its legacy of colonialism, the agency system, the use of con-
tract immigrant labor, concentration of political power in the hands of a
few and the resulting need to use external capital to fuel its recent
economic development efforts - all point to the reasonableness of
finding such distortions in these economic sectors. 8
fllonopoly State Com-petitive Total
Sample 10.4 15·4 74.2 100.0
(172) (255) (1228) (1656)1
Full-time 26.8 25·4 47.8 100.0
employed (13°) (123) (232) (485)
-~----_ ...._-- ----~------- ---._-- - - - - -
Hodson's 2
26.9 18.8 48.8 94.53findings
O'Connor's
33·3 99·9estimate 33·3 33·3
firm. Based on these considerations, the criterion of 25% or more firms
in a given three-digit industry category with fifty or more employees
will be used to distinguish monopoly sector industries from other sec~
tors' industries. 6
The second characteristic which will be used to differentiate indus-
tries into productive sectors is the average per-firm amount of sales or
receipts of industries. The use of economies of scale would also require
sizeable sales (or receipts) by monopoly sector industries. The 1972
Censuses ofManufactures, of Wholesale Trade, ofRetail Trade and a/Ser-
vices were examined for information on amount of sales or rec~ipts.
They show that average industry per-firm sales or receipts vary from
$107,624 for services to $1,236,869 for manufactures. Thus, industries
with average per-firm receipts of $1 ,000,000 or more will be considered
to be monopoly sector in this study. 7
Finally, both the distribution and effect of social characteristics such
as age, education, ethnicity, and sex across sectors will be examined.
Grouped categories will be used for age and educational level and com-
parisons will be made among the five largest ethnic groups fo~ ethnicity
(non-Protuguese Caucasian, Chinese, Filipino, Japanese and
Part-Hawaiian).
To summarize, then, income will be considered the dependent varia-
ble in this study, and the mid-point of income-range categories of em-
ployed persons will be used to measure income. Productive sectors will
b.e condidered the independent variable, and two factors, workforce
~Ize and per-firm sales or receipts, will be used to classify industries
mto monopoly, competitive and state sectors (see appendix). Lastly, in
order to examine the effects of social characteristics on the sector-
income relationship, the effects of variables such as age education sex
and ethnicity will also be considered. "
RESULTS AND mSCUSSWN
Size ofSectors
Table 1: Distribu~ion of Employment in Product~ve Sectors
(in percentages, with nl~bers in paren~heses)
Productive Sector
The first task of this study is to determine the proportional distribu-
tion of Hawaii's productive sectors. Table one presents information on
the relative size of each of these sectors, and is accompanied by O'Con-
nor's estimates and Hodson's national level findings. The figures show
that total employment in Hawaii's state sector is comparable to that
found by Hodson at the national level. The monopoly sector on the
other hand, is ext~emely small, less than half the size nationally; thus
most employment IS found in the competitive sector.
While it is possible that these figures are the result of sampling error,
the ph~nom.enon of a large competitive sector and a small monopoly
sector IS qUite understandable in light of the kinds of industries that
2Hodson's findings are based on a sUbsample of the Current PO~­
ulation Survey (CPS) of March 1973. ~t ~onsists of the exper~enced
civilian labor force (ECLF) which is compr~sed of all non-lnstltu-
ionalized civilians over four1;een years of age who worked last year.
)Hodson's also found 5.4% of the employment in the cor$truction
sector. Since construction functions as a local-level ~onopoly
sector employer. construction was kep1; separate for natlor~~-level
analysis, but subsumed under monopoly seC1;ors for the Hawal~
analysis.
49.9% and 28.8% respectively at the nationalleveI). One reason for this
difference" may be the restricted size of Hawaii's monopoly sector
which seems to have forced even those with post-secondary levels of








26-54 65·4- 84.6 60.)
55 plus 14.6 8.9 15·1
~2
49.1Females 2).8 )9.0
Males 76.2 61.0 50.9
EducatiQ.ll)
Grades 0-8 9.2 6.5 10.)
Grades 9-12 56.9 )5. 0 47.1.l-
Business/Trade ).8 5·7 I.l-.)
College 24.6 JJ.) )1.5
Graduate 1rJork ).8 19·5 5·2
Other 1.5 0.0 L)
N"" (1)0) (12)) (2)2)
1 X2 = 2).6858 with 4 d.L signif. 0.0001
" = 0.002 X2 = 22.2853 with 2 d.f. signif. = 0.00
" '" 0.00
) X2 )6.0156 with- 10 d.f. signif. = 0.001
7u = 0.00
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Distribution ofSocia1Characteristics
O'Connor's assertions regarding the properties of the sectors would
suggest that certain social characteristics should predominate in certain
sectors. Youth and old age, female, minority racial/ethnic background
and low education are all characteristics associated with lesser privilege
in this society. Thus, if sectoral location affects the levels of derivable
privilege, as O'Connor suggests, a greater proportion of persons with
the previously mentioned characteristics can be expected to be found
in the competitive sector. This is precisely what Hodson discovered in
his national level study. But, what about the situation in Hawaii?
In spite of the differences between the national and the Hawaiian
economy in terms of the size of the monopoly and competitive sectors,
the distribution of social characteristics in the sectors, for the most
part, appears to parallel Hodson's findings. However, there are also
some important differences, as Table two shows, in the sectoral distri-
bution of such factors as age, sex and education.
While the prime age group dominates in each of the sectors, their
representation is highest in the state sector (84.6%). The monopoly
sector prime age workers m(!ke up 65.4% which is not too much more
than the competitive sector (60.3%). Youth and older workers appear
to be excluded from the state sector, but appear evenly represented in
both the monopoly and competitive sectors. Thus, contrary to the theo-
retically generated expectations, the state sector appears to be the pre-
ferred sector in Hawaii, and the one from which both youth and the
aged tend to be excluded.
Sex is another ascribed characteristic which may affect sectoral
location. Table 2 also shows that women were more likely than men to
be located in the competitive sector, and less likely to be in the
monopoly sector. This finding is consistent with the expectations from
O'Connor's model and Hodson's national level findings.
Educational variation within the sectors generally seems to parallel
the age and sex distribution. Educational levels vary only slightly in the
monopoly and competitive sectors, and in both, lower educational
levels predominate. Higher (post-secondary) educational levels seem
to dominate in the state sector. This is reasonable, since civil service
and other equal employment opportunity requirements within this
sector tend to stress the use of educational credentials as "objective" in-
dicators of competence. Additionally, much of state sector work in-
volves the collection and management of information, and would re-
quire personnel with higher levels of skill and training.
These findings generally parallel those of Hodson, but with one
exception. That is that educational levels in all of Hawaii's sectors
appear to be slightly higher than those nationally (the percentages for
post-secondary schooling in the monopoly, state and competitive sec-
tors in Hawaii are 32.2°/lJ, 58.5% and 41.0% as compared to 28.7%,
Table 2:
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Age, Sex and Education of Full-Time Employed Persons
by Sector (in percentages)
Productive Sector
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Ethnicity is probably one of the most important social characteristics
in multi-ethnic Hawaii. Table three shows the distribution of ethnic
groups across productive sectors, and while there are again a few unex-
pected findings, the results generally conform to the expectations of
the sectoral theoretical framework. The most frequent location for the
bulk of most ethnic groups is the competitive sector, and this finding is
consistent with an earlier one that showed Hawaii's competitive sector
being larger than its national level counterpart. However, contrary to
expectations, a sizeable proportion of Filipinos and Part-Hawaiians
were located in the monopoly sector. Also, Japanese and Caucasians
were not as dominant in the state and monopoly sectors as expected.
Noting the dominance of tourism, sugar, pineapple and construction
etc., in the monopoly sector, it can be speculated that the relativel;
large percentage of Filipinos and Part-Hawaiians in that sector may be
due to their location in blue-collar type jobs of the monopoly sector
industries. Similarly, their low percentage in the state sector may reflect
that white-collar jobs are more likely to be occupied by Chinese, Japa-
nese and Caucasians. This is certainly consistent with the ethnic oc-
cupational patterns for civilian males found by Lind in the U.S. Census
and Hawaii Health Surveillance Program Survey data (Lind 1980:82 85
87,89). ' "
Table): Ethnic Backgrou~d of Full-time employed by Sector
Productive Sector
Monopoly State Competitive Total
Ethnicitv1
Caucasian 24.0 28.1 47.9 (121)
Chinese 1J·5 J5·1 51.4 {J7)
Filipino 30.6 10.2 59.2 (49)
Part-Hawaiian 42.4 22.0 35·6 ( 59)
Japanese 25·0 29.1 45.9 (172)
All Others 27.7 17.0 55·3 (47)
1 X2 = 21.238 with 10 d.f. signif.
i\ = 0.02 0.0195
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In Tables two and three, the sectoral distribution of four social char-
acteristics (age, sex, education and ethnicity) were examined. This was
guided by the expectation that because certain social characteristics
were more highly valued in the society, those characteristics would
tend to dominate in certain sectors. Of the four variables examined,
only the sectoral distribution of sex in Hawaii's economy was found to
conform exactly in the manner anticipated by O'Connor's framework
and Hodson's national level findings. The sectoral distribution of the
other three variables seems to suggest that the state sector appears to
be the preferred sector, and that these patterns may be related to the
small size of the monopoly sector in Hawaii. This study will now turn to
an examination of the impact of sectoral positions, and address the
major question of this study: Are income levels structurally affected by
positions in sectors of economic production? If this is so, in what ways
does the composition of sectors affect the income levels found within
them?
Income by Sectors
Mean income patterns appear to both conform to, and deviate from,
those expected by O'Connor's theory and Hodson's national level
findings. As anticipated, mean income appears to be lowest in the com-
petitive sector ($2,247). However, contrary to expectations, the mean
income in the state sector ($10,555) seems to surpass that in the
monopoly sector ($10,369). An eta value of 0.52 for income by sectors,
indicates that a moderate association exists between these two
variables, such that knowledge of sectoral location may enhance the
prediction of income values by about 26%.
How then should these sectoral income patterns be understood? It
appears that the lower mean income in the monopoly sector in Hawaii
is related to the limited size of that sector (nearly half the size of its
counterpart nationally). Size of the monopoly sector may be important
in two interrelated ways. First, O'Connor has asserted that the growth
of the state sector is tied to the growth of the monopoly sector because
the state must facilitate monopoly capital accumulation. Extending this
reasoning, it would be logical to expect that state sector activities
should support, rather than surpass, the activities of private monopoly
capital. Thus, if and when state activities extend beyond those of
monopoly capital (as is indicated here by the relative size of the
sectors), it would suggest a situation where state activities have taken
priority over the interests of monopoly capital. Under these conditions,
it would be reasonable to find mean income in the state sector to be
somewhat higher than that in the monopoly sector.
Another possibility for the larger size, and thus the higher income in
the state sector, may be found in the very nature of Hawaii's monopoly
and state sectors. As stated earlier, the monopoly sector is largely
dominated by services and non-durable manufacturing - industries
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Table 4: Mea~ I~ccmp. for FUll-time Employed Persor.s in Productive
Sec.ors. b~".Age,.Sex and Education (ir. dollars with Star.d-
ard Dev~atlcr.s In parentheses)
which are less likely to generate much capital. At the same time state
sector ac!ivities involve at least three distinct govern~ental
bureaucracies: County, State, and Federal (including the four services
of !he military). '!he acti~ities of these various bureaucracies may tend
to mcrease the size and mfluence of the state sector and to limit the
size and influence of the already small monopoly s~ctor. Under such
conditions, a disparity in mean income between the two sectors can
again be expected.
Table four shows the mean incomes in monopoly, competitive and
state sectors for the various age groups. As expected, younger members
of the workforce have the lowest mean incomes of all age groups.
Human capital theory would attribute this to their lack of work
experience. The O'Connor framework, however, would suggest that
this represents a structural pattern of discrimination which is based on
the specific characteristics of each sector. The latter contention appears
to be supported in these data, since younger members of the workforce
(18-25) not only seem to have the lowest mean incomes, but
additionally, low incomes which vary by sectoral location. Thus, those
located in the monopoly sector have the highest income ($7,864), fol-
lowed by those in the state sector ($6,214), and finally those in the
competitive sector ($5,663).
The curvilinear relationship between age and mean income anticipat-
ed by O'Connor's framework appears to hold only in the competitive
sector. This finding seems fairly reasonable since the theory asserts that
competitive market conditions tend to operate in this sector; conse-
quently the older age of workers would form a basis for discrimination
against them. By contrast, in the monopoly and state sectors, mean in-
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Sectoral Income by Social Characteristics
While the monopoly sector seems to follow the state sector in terms
of mean income, its mean income is over four times that found in the
competitive sector. Furthermore, when the ratio of monopoly to com-
petitive sector income in Hawaii is compared to the national ratio in
Hodson's sample, the monopoly to competitive income ratio in Hawaii
is much higher than it is nationally 0.64 for the civilian labor force as
compared to 4.61 for the Hawaii subsample) , This suggests that it may
be more important to be located in the monopoly sector in relative
terms rather than in absolute terms in Hawaii, and that this may be
related to the structural features of Hawaii's political economy.
The examination of sectoral incomes has found important differences
in the mean incomes of the three productive sectors. Competitive
sector income was clearly much lower than either monopoly or state
sector incomes. While this finding was anticipated by the theoretical fra-
mework used, the magnitude of this difference was much greater than
anticipated. On the other hand, the finding that the monopoly sector
mean income was be lower than that of the state sector was not antic-
ipated by the theory, but this is probably related to the size of Hawaii's
monopoly sector.
This study will now turn to an analysis of sectoral income with regard
to four social characteristics: age, sex, education and ethnic
background. Since income level is tied to the number of hours worked,
the following analysis will only examine full-time workers in the sub-
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Table 5: Mean Income for Full-time Employed Persons in Pro-
ductive Sectors by Ethnic Background
in mean incomes by ethnic background. In general, the mean incomes
of Caucasians and Japanese are higher than those of other ethnic
groups, while Filipino mean incomes are consistently lo:ver than th?se
of other ethnic backgrounds. Furthermore, some ethOlc groups, like
the Chinese and Part-Hawaiians, have considerably more variation in
their mean incomes, while others, like the Japanese, have less variation
in their mean incomes across sectors.
Mean incomes vary by productive sectors as well as by ethnicity, but
only Filipinos follow the expected pattern of having their mean income
highest in the monopoly sector and lowest in the competitive sector.
This is probably related to their concentration in blue-collar jobs within
monopoly sector industries such as sugar, pineapple, tourism and
construction, and their underrepresentation in state sector industries
(Lind, 1980:82, 106). Part-Hawaiian mean income is also highest in
the monopoly sector, but it is still much lower than the monopoly
sector mean income of Caucasians. Japanese and Chinese, whose mean
incomes are highest in the state sector, followed by the competitive
sector have their lowest mean incomes in the monopoly sector. This is





























comes tend to increase with age. Human capital and status attainment
theories would suggest that this pattern results from greater experience
and career progression. The structural framework, however, would
assert that the monopoly and state sectors' use of concepts such as seni-
ority to permit wages to be administered rather than set competitively;
the practice of administering wages thus accounts for the pattern of
higher income with age in monopoly and state sectors. Once again,
however, higher incomes seem to be associated with the state rather
than the monopoly sector. While this pattern deviates from those ex-
pected by O'Connor and Hodson's work, it is consistent with the pat-
tern found earlier in this investigation.
With regard to the characteristic of sex, Table four also shows that
the mean incomes of males are consistently higher than those of
females, and even the highest of the female mean incomes is lower
than the lowest of male mean incomes. However, there are also impor-
tant sectoral differences in these mean incomes. For both males and
females, mean income is highest in the state sector ($9,774 for females
and $14,743 for males). It is lowest for females in the competitive
sector ($6,543), whereas it is lowest in the monopoly sector for males -
$13,614).
Perhaps a more important finding was that the ratio of male-
to-female mean income appears to be considerably affected by produc-
tive sectors. In relative terms, women appear to benefit most from
being in the state sector: the male-to-female ratio for income is 1.51, as
compared to 1.94 in the monopoly sector, and 2.13 in the competitive
sector. This is consistent with the earlier findings, and also with O'Con-
nor's framework, which suggests that women and other minorities tend
to benefit most by being located in the state sector where the legitima-
tion function encourages more egalitarian treatment of minorities.
Education is one of those characteristics that human capital and
status attainment theorists seem to stress in order to account for dif-
ferences in income levels, and in Table four, it is evident that mean in-
comes vary by educational levels. However, while higher education is
generally associated with higher mean income, sectoral location also
produces considerable variation in income, even for those with the
same level of education. For example, the mean income for those with
college education is generally higher than for those with only primary
or secondary education; however, the mean income in the college-
educated category in the state sector was $14,606, or $1,606 higher
than in the monopoly sector, and $3,429 higher than in the competitive
sector. Finally, it is noteworthy that, with the exception of the graduate
educational level, mean incomes in the competitive sector are consis-
tently lower than those in the two other sectors, and this is true for all
levels. Clearly, sectoral placement makes a difference.
The relationship of ethnic background to sectoral mean income will
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sistent with the historical pattern of the post-plantation movement of
the Japanese and Chinese into the entrepreneurial or proprietary areas
of the competitive sector, as well as the movement of the second and
third generations into professional and technical areas in the state
sector described earlier by other scholars (Lind, 1980:88; Fuchs, 1968).
The examination of the variation in mean incomes by social charac-
teristics such as age, sex, education and ethnic background, has found
that the effects of these characteristics on income levels seem to be sur-
passed by the effect of location in a particular productive sector.
Overall, this study has found the same pattern of low competitive
sector income expected by the O'Connor framework. However, in
most cases, mean incomes have been found to be higher in the state
sector rather than the monopoly sector. While this deviates from the
pattern expected by O'Connor's theory, it is nevertheless consistent
with earlier patterns found in this study of a weak monopoly sector.
SUMMARY AND CONCJLUSWN
This investigation of income inequality in Hawaii utilized a structural
framework emphasizing location in productive sectors as the indepen-
dent variable. The choice of this approach, rather than a more indivi-
dualistic one emphasizing human capital or status attainment variables
was inspired by some of the propositions found in James O'Connor'~
theory ~egarding the relationship between state and private capital in
productIOn. It was also sparked by Randy Hodson's study which had uti-
lized O'Connor's theoretical framework to examine the conditions of
labor at the national level. In this study, both workforce size and sales
(or receipts) were used to classify industries into the three productive
sectors (monopoly, competitive and state). The distribution of various
social characteristics and mean incomes within each of the sectors was
then examined.
One important finding has been that the proportional distribution or
size of the sectors differs in important respects from the national
sample studied by Hodson. Specifically, the monopoly sector in Hawaii
appears to be quite small, only about half the size of the monopoly
sector at the national level. On the other hand, the state sector seems to
com~orm in size to that found by Hodson, and this means that the com-
petitIve sector in Hawaii is much larger than its national counterpart.
The examination of the distribution of four social characteristics
(age, education, sex and ethnicity) across the sectors was guided by the
expectation that individuals with highly valued social characteristics
(j.e. higher education, being male, prime age, of a particular ethnic
background) would tend to predominate in certain sectors. It appears
that those characteristics are more likely to be found in the state sector
rather than in the monopoly sector as expected by O'Connor and
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Hodson. However, in the manner predicted by O'Connor and Hodson,
the least valued characteristics seem indeed to predominate in the com-
petitive sector.
Finally, the examination of sectoral mean incomes show~ that mean
income appears to be highest in the state sector and lowest m the com-
petitive sector in Hawaii. While this finding does not conform exactly
to theoretical expectations, it is nevertheless consistent with this
study's earlier findings on size and the distribution of social characteris-
tics across productive sectors. Furthermore, while mean income pat-
terns vary by education, age, sex and ethnicity, those variations gener-
ally follow the patterns of sectoral mean incomes found earlier in this
study.
These findings also suggest that future studies of income inequality
might benefit by taking into consideration the following points. First,
while the variables emphasized by the human capital and status attain-
ment perspectives appear to be related to income levels, structural
variables such as productive sectoral location should also be
considered. This is because they seem to affect income patterns beyond
the effects of the variables suggested by the former perspectives.
Second while O'Connor's structural framework of productive sectors
appears'to be useful for studying income inequality, it is also problemat-
ic in two ways. Theoretically, the criteria for conceptualizing sectors re-
quire further clarification; otherwise, these ideas will be difficult to test
empirically. Also, the political economic functions of the state at state
and local levels require theoretical explication; otherwise the dif-
ferences in the units of analysis may block potential analyses of state
and local political economies, and thus neglect the effects of the con-
nections between these and the national political economy. The third
point that studies of income inequality need to consider, is the in-
fluence of capital external to the nation-state. As capital continues to be
internationalized, it will increasingly penetrate not only national
economies, but also state and local ones. Hawaii's political economy
seems to be a good example of the consequences of this international
capital penetration, and judging by the experience of newly industrializ-
ing nations, it may mean even greater aggravation of the condition of
income inequality in the years to come.
This paper has taken a structural approach to the study of income
inequality, and it has discovered that distortions in the structure of the
economy can have important consequences for the patterns of income
inequality in Hawaii. It is hoped that the merits of this approach will
invite other researchers to utilize the structural approach in their future
studies of other aspects of Hawaii's social patterns.
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APPENDiX
Industries considered to be monopoly sector:
The criteria for determining monopoly sector industries were: a) that
at least 25% of the establishments within a3-digit industry classification
of u.s. County Business Patterns employed 50 or more employees;
and/or b) that industries have per-firm sales of $1 ,000,000 or more per
annum according to the Census of Manufactures, Wholesale and Retail
Trade, and Services.
* E = employment (criterion 1 above)







municipal, other nation, other
U.S. states)
lumber & const. materials
metals & mineral except Petrol.
electric goods
apparel piece goods
groceries & related prod.
petroleum & petro. products
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dept. stores
new & used car dealers
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Industries considered to be in the competitive sector:
Industries considered to be in the state sector:
In order to estimate the validity of the method used to classify the in-
dustries into productive sectors, the resulting distribution of sectors
was compared with one resulting from the classification of industries by
face validity (or intuitive knowledge of the industries). The comparison
of the two which is shown in the following cross tabulation, suggests
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Productive Sectcr by 2-Factor Cri~eria
Sectors by
MonopolyFace Validity State Competitive NR Total
Monopoly 97.7 0.0 J.6 0.0 212(168) (0) (44) (0)
Sta"te 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 255 5.(0) (255) (0) (0)
Competitive 2. y 0.0 96.4 0.0 1188(4 (0) (1184) (0)
NR 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 1(0) (0) (0) (l)
~otal 172 255 1228 1 1656
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Cross tabulation of Productive Sectors by 2-Factor Criteria.
by Productive Sectors. by Face Validity
NOTES
1. I gratefull1. ackn~wledge the assistance I received from Hagen
Koo, PatrICIa Steinhoff, Herbert Barringer, George Won, Gene
Kas~ebaum, Robert B. Stauffer and the anonymous reviewers of
Soczal Process in Hawaii ?n an earlier version of this paper. They
are of course not responsIble for any errors which may remain.
2. ~lmquist (~979~ also notes that each of the four perspectives pro-
vIdes an ahIsto~lcal explanation for the current status of minority
groups; she POints to the work of Edna Bonacich (1972, 1976)
and of Donald Noel (1968) which identify historical and social fac-
tors contributing to the status of minority groups.
3. T.hese are t~e terms used by O'Connor, and his use of these terms
~Iffers conSiderably from the commonly held economic defini-
tIons of these terms. When classical economists use the term
mo:lOpoly, they mean a situation in which there is a single seller of
a gIven product or service in the marketplace. O'Connor's use of
the t~rm monopo.ly conf?rms more closely to the term oligopoly in
classIcal economIcs, WhIch denotes a situation where the market-
p~ace is dominated by a few producers/sellers of a product or ser-
VIce (Samuelson, 1970).
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4. By socialize O'Connor means that certain costs of production are
thrust upon the society and its general population rather than
being paid for by those who are actually using such services.
These include direct and indirect costs, and costs prior to, as well
as resulting from, the production process. These may include
such costs as research facilities; access to water, transportation,
and energy; industrial parks; low interest loans; pollution
cleanup; unemployment compensation; and so on.
Hodson also retained a special category for the construction
industry, which he observed" ... is similar to the monopoly sector
because of its regional monopoly power and because of the power-
ful position of both sectors in relation to the state" (Hodson,
1978:451). He found about 5% of the workforce in that sector,
with the remainder in agriculture or self-employment.
Additionally, mining, manufacturing industries (especially of
durable goods), and finance, tend to dominate among the indus-
tries of the monopoly sector.
6. The workforce size criterion was determined by dividing the
number of firms with 50 or more employees in a given industry
category by the number of firms in that category. If the resulting
quotient was 0.25 or greater, the industry was assigned to the
monopoly sector.
7. Average per-firm amount of sales and/or receipts was determined
by dividing the amount of sales and/or receipts in each industry
category by the number of firms in that category for the
manufacturers, services, wholesale trade and retail trade.
8. Two essays summarIZing Hawaii's historical and present-day
dependent development can be found in Occasional Papers in
Political Science, 1(4) published by the Department of Political
Science, University of Hawaii at Manoa. The first is by Noel
Kent, and the second by Deanne Neubauer and Sam Pooley.
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HAWAHANS 9 AMlEllUCAN COlLONKZATKON 9
AND THlE QUlEST FORKNDlEPlENDlENClE
Haunani-Kay Trask
THE COWNIAL ANALYSIS
The fact that the United States is a colonial power, as well as
imperialist, is the best kept secret in the world.
Representative, Zimbabwe National Liberation Front, 1977
Hawaii has been a colony of the United States of America since the
early 19th century. 1 First through economic domination (beginning in
1810), and later through political incorporation (annexation in 1898),
America came to control the lands and indigenous people of Hawaii.
But until recently, neither Americans nor Hawaiians have understood
this colonial status because America's ideology has represented itself as
the main force of anti-colonialism around the world. 2
The truth, of course, is that Americans have been colonizing peoples
of color for nearly four centuries. During the long span of the "age of
discovery," the Indian lands that became America were first colonized
by Indian-hating Europeans. Then, after the American Revolution, the
rest of the continent was colonized by Indian-hating Americans. Indians
accused America of inventing a nation by stealing land that was origi-
nally the Mother Earth of 10-12 million Indians (Dobyns
1966:395-416). Only white conquest and genocide brought these lands
into an expanding United States, resulting in massive depopulation and
dispossession of indigenous people through four centuries of
encroachment. Without cultural and physical genocide against Indians,
the United States would have been stillborn. But fed on the theft of
Indian lands in her infancy, America became the most powerful impe-
rialist nation in the twentieth century. 3
Despite her bloody history, however, the understanding of America
as a colonizing power has only recently taken hold. While wars oflibera-
tion in Asia, Africa, and India began to tear apart the European colonial
system in the post-World War era, America was establishing its
economic and military hegemony world-wide. Moving toward pre-
eminence as the "leader" of the so-called Free World, America as-
sumed the neo-colonial mantle in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the
Pacific. Even Europe came within the American orbit (Greene 1971).
The history of Indians, Blacks, Chicanos, and Asians revealed how
white America rose to world power on the bones of her indigenous
people, and on the backs of other people of color (Jacobs & Landau,
1971). As in every other situation, land and labor became the
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battleground. Continuing Indian wars in the twentieth century histori-
ans showed, were still being waged for natural resources o~ Indian
reservations. 4 Blacks, Chicanos, and Asians enlarged the attack reveal-
ing how their slavery, peonage, and contract labor supplied the large
work force needed to transform an agrarian America into an industrial
America. Together, these groups unmasked the fallacy of "work ethic"
America, where "rags to riches" white ethnics allegedly built a "super"
nation. White success was no longer the result of personal effort, but
rather the structured goal of a system of savage exploitation of people
of color.
Voices of dissent began to apply the Third World analysis of colonial-
ism to t~e positi~n of people of color in America. Thus, beginning in
~he 1~6~ s, colonl~l theory encompassed exploited racial groups within
Impenahst countnes and not only those in colonies geographically and
culturally separated from Europe and America. A connection was
drawn between people of color in the United States and the larger pro-
cess of European colonization throughout the world. The Third World
abroad became the Third World within, and the analysis of colonialism
was focused on America and its "internal" colonies. In the words of
sociologist Robert Blauner,
The economic, social and political subordination of Third World
group~ in America is a m!crocosm of the position of peoples of
color In the world order of stratification....Racial domination in
the. U.S. is part of the same historical drama through which
whIte Western people expanded their culture and economic
system, bringing their rule to virtually all of the world (Blauner
1972:245).
Bl~uner argued that although Asians, Blacks, Chicanos, and Indians are
umque cultural groups, they share a history of internal colonization as
people ofcolor. They came to be "Americans" under different life condi-
tio~s than white ethnics. Conquest (Indians, Alaskan natives, and many
ChIcanos), contract labor and peonage based on race (Asians and other
Chicanos), and enslavement (Blacks), characterized their historical ex-
periences which have been different in kind from those of white people
who were neither conquered nor enslaved, and whose labor was sold
under freer market conditions than those surrounding people of color.
For ~merican Indi~ns particularly, colonization has been of such long
dur.atlO.n and unrelIeved severity, they have had to struggle against
extInctIOn.
Meanwhile, for the white world, the colonial agony of the Third
'Y~rld with.in, like that of the Third World abroad, has been the precon-
dItIon for Industrial capitalism. The human and natural resources of
both the continental U.S. and her overseas colonies continue to feed
the American im~erialist machine, enabling the crime of endless,
waste~ul ~onsumptlOn and the proliferation of a vast military network
to maIntaIn and expand that consumption.
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While America's colonization pattern has been very like that of her
European forebears, there is one obvious ex~eption: A.merica has
never given up any of her possessions either withIn her contIne~talbor-
ders or beyond them. Alaska, Hawaii, Samo~, Guam, Pue:to RIC~, and
the Virgin Islands remain attached to the Umted S~ates. MIcronesIa and
the Marianas continue to suffer a neo-colomal legacy, an~ the
Philippines, allegedly independent since 1946, is so closely tIed to
America it is a de/acto colony. . . ,
This hold over its colonies is, of course, a dIrect result of Amen.ca s
world hegemony. But it is also a prod~ct of the .myt~ of Amen.can
democracy, Which, in its mythic dimenSIOns, promIses hberty a?d JUS-
tice for all - whether on small island nations or large contInental
masses. Since, within this legitimizing myth, col?nialism has no pl~ce
and colonies cannot exist, they are transformed Into self-determIn.mg
little Americas that have, allegedly, "freely chosen" to become ternto-
ries or states attached to a distant nation. When predictably count~r­
posed to the "Communist threat,." the ide~logy of ".democratI.c."
America thus works hand in hand WIth economIc penetratIOn and milI-
tary presence to ensure continue~ A,merica~ domi~an~e..The planned
effect is therefore achieved: Amenca s colomal empIre IS simultaneous-
ly expanded and obscured. . .
One of the long-term challenges to this obscured Impenum co~es
from the colonized themselves, those wretched of the earth who hve
the fallacy of American democracy. Thus, the Black Movement, the
Chicano Movement, the American Indian Movement, the Pu~:to
Rican Independence Movement, and recently, the Hawauan
Movement. ..
, Not only have these movements revealed Ameri~a's colomahsm ~t
home they have connected their struggles to liberatIon movement.s In
other 'parts of the world. Just as the internal colonialism .of ~he Umted
States is part of the larger process of European colomzatlOn of the
world so too are the liberation struggles of America's people of color
part ~f the larger picture of Third World independen~e movem~nts.
Along these lines, Stokely Carmichael & C~arles HamIlton explamed
the international significance of Black Power In 1967:
Black Power means that black people see themselves as part of a
new force, sometimes called the "Third World;" that we see
our struggle as closely related to liberation struggles around the
world.
After discussing the struggle of black South Africans against white rule,
Carmichael and Hamilton concluded:
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This is but one example of many such situations which have al-
ready arisen around the world - with more to come. There is
only one place for black ~mericans in these struggles, and that is
on th~ sIde of the Thud World (Carmichael and Hamilton
1967:xI).
DU~ing the ':'ietnam War, many American Asians identified their
colomal status Ir:t the Chinatowns and Japantowns across the United
States a~ extensIOns of America's exploitation of Southeast Asians.
~he ra~lst war that American men fought against the "gooks" and
slants overs.eas was seen, b~ many Asians in America, as part of the
war ,:"aged agamst them by whIte Americans at home. The Third World
of VIetnam was easily linked to the Third World of American Asian
ghettos (Tachiki, Wong & Odo 1971).
In the meantime, Chicanos in the southwestern part of the United
States, s!r~ggled tow~rd their own liberation. Defining their oppression
as colomalIsm, they Identified with American Indians as a conquered
peopl~. I.n 1972, Rodolfo Acufia listed some of the experiences of
colomzatlOn:
1) One.'s land is invaded by another people who use force military
or otherwIse, to take and maintain control. '
. 2) The. original inhabitants become subjects of conquerors
mvoluntanly.
3) The conquered have an alien government and culture impos~d
upon them.
4) The conquered become victims of racism and cultural genocide
and are relegated to a submerged status.
5) The conquered are rendered politically and economically
powerless.
6) .The conqu~rors feel they have a mission in occupying the area in
qu~stIOn and belIeve that they have undeniable privileges by virtue of
theIr conquest (Acufia 1972:3)
Although only indigenous people suffered the invasion of their lands
Acufia's other categories applied in common to America's people of
color.
ACUfi~ argued, with evidence from hundreds of years of Chicano
op~ressIOn, that the United States had taken Chicano land and exploit-
e? ItS people. He also concluded, like Carmichael and Hamilton before
hIm, ~ha~ a struggle for liberation was a natural response to American
colomzatIOn.
One w.orking definition of colonialism appeared in 1976. Formulated
~y a C.hI~,ano scho~ar, Mario. B~rrera, it was intended to apply in all
. colomal cases: dIrect and mdIrect, classic and "neo," external and
mternal. From the perspective of a Third World American colonialism
was seen as '
------- -- _.~-~~=~~=
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...a structured relationship of domination and subordinati?n
among groups which are defined al0l!-g ethnic an.d/o: raCIal
lines where that relationship is estabhshed or mallltallled to
serv~ the interests of all or part of the dominant group (Barrera
1976:3).
Through the lens of colonial theory, the tradi.ti~nal problem of Ameri-
can "race relations" became a variant of colomalIsm. .
With the birth of the American Indian Movement (AIM), thIS analy-
sis was applied directly to the pattern of colonialism on the
reservations. Indians argued that they were made powerless by
1) the dislocation oftraditional agriculture,
2) the transfer of common land to private ownership,
3) the development of a ruling elite, and,
4) the development of an educated elite.
The ruling elite occupied newly-created positions. of t.riba.l autho~ity
serving as "puppets" of the Bureau of India~ AffaIrs m. keepmg
"unruly" Indians under control. The educated elIte, meanwhIle, wer.e
trained in Western shcools in the hopes that they would lead theIr
people into cultural assimilation. 5 ..
While the American Government succeeded m developmg the first
elite, it failed in the creation of the second, because. educated India~s
were precisely those who returned to the reservatIons to lead theIr
people against colonial bondage. . . . \
As Indians made colonial theory speCIfIC to theIr own expenences,
they also posed a radical alternative to Western imperialism. Ameri.can
colonialism began to be criticized fro~ a unique cultural pe~spe~tIve:
that of an indigenous people who questIOned the Euro-Amencan s de-
structive relationship to the living earth. With this analysis, the moral
underpinnings of American society were brought to the forefront ofna-
tional radical consciousness. Thus AIM leader Russell Means could
state by 1982:
I do not believe that capitalism itself is really responsible for the
situation in which American Indians have been declard a nation-
al sacrifice. No it is the European tradition: European culture
itself is respon~ible. Marxism is just the latest continuation of
this tradition, not a solution to it.
The alternative, in Means' view, is the indigenous way:
... the way that knows that humans do not have the right to de-
grade Mother Earth, that there are forces beyond a~ything the
European mind has conceived, that humans must be ~n ~armony
with all relations, or the relations will eventually ehmlllate the
disharmony (Means 1982:28).
For AIM Indians, sovereignty is tied to a harmonious relationship
- -- -- --- ~~===~=~~-=-~----------------
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with the earth. The breaking of this relationship was the result of Amer-
ican colonization, a process inseparable from European consciousness
- Marxist and capitalist alike - which views the world as but a
resource for the industrial machine.
This AIM criticism, like cultural criticisms from other movements of
people of color, contains a conscious rejection of assimilation to white
American society. Obviously, this is because assimilation is based on
the assumption that Euro-American culture is superior and should be
adopted for that reason. (Ironically, white racists also reject assimilation
by people of color but for different reasons: they support segregation in
order to maintain white supremacy. Therefore, one of the purposes of
individual and institutional racism is precisely to prevent assimilation).
However, radical people of color reject assimilation simply because the
dignity of being Asian, Black, Chicano, and Indian, is not possible
under colonialism. In the colonial world, assimilation is, beyond every-
thing else, the assuming of a white mind, a white consciousness; it is
the state of being colonized. By choosing to assimilate, one chooses to
give up one's true nature - being Asian, Black, Chicano, Indian - to
be white. Since it is impossible to become white, one retains a dark skin
but adopts the white mask (Fanon 1967a; Jacobs 1971:283-309).
Thus, in choosing their own struggle, politics, culture and identity,
radical Asians, Blacks, Indians, and Chicanos repudiate the myth of as-
similation and thereby the myth of American democracy as merely the
justifying ideologies of imperialism. In their rejection of assimilation,
they take the first step toward psychological de-colonization, toward
throwing off the yoke of the colonizer. Politically, they assert their
color and culture and its agonizing history, rather then denying them,
as assimilation demands.
This assertion took the form of a cultural and not only political analy-
sis in the cauldron of protest that was the 1960s and 1970s. Within a
matter of years, vast numbers of Asians, Blacks, Chicanos, and Indians
turned their backs on the false promises of white America, and chose
their own heritage and culture. Thus Chinatown Asians identified with
China, radical American Blacks began to look to long lost homelands in
Africa, Chicanos turned towards Mexico and indigenous Indian
culture, and American Indians in the cities participated in defensive
resistance on the reservations. In a single short decade, America's
people of color mounted a frontal assault on American cultural
hegemony, asserting their own in its place. There were to be no more
black skins under white masks.
Reclamation of a people's identity through various cultural activities
appears to be a precursor of political and economic struggles for
liberation. It is as if psychological de-colonization must begin before
the actual struggle for political control. Frantz Fanon thought cultural
assertion crucial to the whole process of liberation. Amilcar Cabral,
African nationalist from Guinea-Bissau, believed this progression from
r
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cultural to political struggle was characteristic of .independe~ce
ents In America his belief has been borne out hme and .aga1~.movem., d h . on m
When Blacks, for example, began to understal! t ~lr oppressl·
I .' 1 terms they searched fora cultural past m Afnca, and not only
~~ ~:erica. Similarly, American Indians who. r~turned to the rese~v~­
tions from urban slums had reclaimed a splntual power from t e~r
Indian heritage. In these cases, cultural asserti.on was not only a rep.u.dl-
ation of subjugation to white racism and white values, but a posl~lve
statement of Black and Indian culture as preferable to Euro-Amenca~
culture. In the context of c~lonialism,cultural stfllg~~5~e~~~:~ct9~t~).
rather than peripheral to mdependence (Fanon 1 ,
The same has been true in Hawaii.
HAWAU AS A COLONY
The foreign songs have only er.oticism, no .spiritual ~eaning.
The dances are lascivious; there IS no sacre.d mterpretatlOn. The
land is ravaged by concrete monst.ers; ~elther th~ sea nor the
sky is safe from destruction. There IS racism - which our ancel~-
knew And neither the young nor the old can Ietors never . d Th
down by the wayside in safety as Kameh~meha I decree. ere




The cultural and political assertions of movements on the American
mainland have been echoed in several nationalist struggles th~ough?ut
the Pacific. While the French and B~itish are confronted by liberatIOn
t 'n Tahiti New Caledoma and New Zealand, the recentlymovemen s l· , d .. th estion of a
independent nation ·of Vanuatu ~as helpe to lOCUS. e qu
nuclear-free and independent PaCific. . . f
This push for independence has been fra.medwlthm the context 0
other anti-colonial movements. On the opemn(g day o)f~he ~983 ~uc1~~~
Free and Independent Pacific Conference N~I~ m anua u,
Honorable Sethy Reganvanu, Deputy Prime Munster ,of Vanuatu, as-
serted the following:
This century has seen spontaneous, massi:,e .and bloody reisi-
tance against the iniquitous system of col.omalism. In these clos-
ing years of the century, it is absolutely mtolerable to allow. the
freedom, independence, and cultural heritage of small natIOns
and cultural minorities to be denigrated a~d destroyed by t~~
racial and cultural arrogance of larg~r r:atJ~ns....I?d~pe~den
for the peoples of these Pacific tentones IS their malienable
right as it is the inalienable right of all the peoples of all the
world. That right is not negotiable. (Report of Nuc1ear Free and
Independent Pacific Conference 1983:25-26).
r
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The NFIP conference was attended by a voting delegation from
Hawaii. They willingly joined in the assertion of independence for Pacif-
ic peoples, including themselves. They spoke about their own struggles
against American colonialism: for example, against the large American
military presence in the islands; against the penetration of American
and foreign multinational corporations; against tourism and nuclear
weapon storage in Hawaii. 6
But while an understanding of colonialism is growing among some
Hawaiians, the process of psychological de-colonization has been
slower in Hawaii than in other Pacific nations. Part of the explanation
for this is political. Hawaii, like Alaska, has entered the category of
other states within America. Because of the myth of American
democracy, Hawaii's statehood has become an explanation of why it
cannot be a colony (since it is the equal of other states) and instead why
it must be an integral part of America rather than a territorial possession
geographically and culturally distinct from America.
But the primary reason for the Hawaiians' lack of a critical
consciousness, is simply that colonization has taken its toll. For almost
two hundred years, American values and economics have undermined
and transformed Hawaiian culture. After nearly a century of economic
colonization by Americans in the 1800s, Hawaii was annexed to the
U.S. in 1898. With increasing capitalist penetration in the 20th century
has come increasing racial oppression and exploitation of Hawaiians:
first, under the missionary-descended, haole ruling class who governed
Hawaii with an iron hand from 1893 to 1954; and later, under the politi-
cal power of descendants of Japanese immigrants who have dominated
Hawaii since 1954. One result of this haole-Japanese condominium,
has been a pervasive feeling of cultural and racial inferiority among
Hawaiians. This attitude had kept them psychologically ensnared and
politically crippled until the rise of the Hawaiian Movement in 1970.
At that point, community struggles to preserve rural, agricultural
ways of life pitted oppressed Hawaiians against haole and Japanese
capitalists anxious to develop Hawaiian lands for resorts and upper-
income subdivisions. As they lost their homes and farms to
development, Hawaiians experienced what generations of Hawaiians
had suffered throughout the 19th century: exploitation of their sacred
aina (land) and their culture for the benefit of rapacious foreigners.
During the 19th century, Western penetration in the form of Christi-
anity and capitalism nearly destroyed Hawaiian cultural practices such
as stewardship rather than ownership of the land, sharing of work and
its products, the primacy of the extended family rather than the
individual, and the sacred inter-relationship of all life. As the century
advanced, ever increasing numbers of haole and Asian immigrants to
Hawaii demanded more land, a larger socio-economic slice of the
capitalist pie, and finally, political control. To most of these non-
indigenous people who had arrogantly come to think of Hawaii as
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"rightfully" theirs, Hawaii~ns and thei,~ cultura~, ways were but
backward-yearning obstacles III the path of progress. . ., .
Thus, Hawaiian powerlessness in the 20th century has I~~, O~lglll~ III
the.18th and 19th centuries. Fifteen hundred years of Hawan s Isolatl?n
from the West was shattered by European adventurers wh? brought dIS-
ease and death to a "primitive" people in 1778. The massive depopula-
tion of Hawaiians which predictably followed made the~ easy targe~s
for the next and possibly most destructive group of foreigners: Amen-
can missionaries. ."
To missionaries as to many of the traders and buslllessm~n, Hawan
was one of the "heathen" places "destined" for the Amencans' god,
and their system of profit. Thus, in 1850, the Rev. R.S..Storrs.s~oke
before the American Board of Commissioners for ~ore.lgn Mlssl?ns
(ABCFM), and linked the Manifest Destiny of terntonal expan~lOn
with the crucial role of the missionary in paving the way for the capital-
ist economy.
If the manufactures of our country find their :-vay .to ~frica ~nd
China to the Sandwich Islands and India, III Illcreasmg
abund~nce, and produce correspondingly remu.nerative r~turns,
it is because the herald of salvation has gone. thlthe~, seek1l1g ~he
welfare of the people, changing their habits of life, breakmg
down their prejudices and creating demands for comforts and
wealth before unknown (quoted in Schlesinger, 1974:345).
American diplomats, like Charles Denby in China, concurred with
Storrs:
Missionaries are the pioneers of trade and commerce The
missionary, inspired by holy zeal, goes everywhere, and ~y
degrees, foreign commerce and trade follow (quoted 111
Schlesinger, 1974:345).
By the 1890s, the decade when Hawaii would become a possessio~ of
the U.S., Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massach~~ettscould p~bhclY
confirm America's policy regarding the role Hawan was to play III the
advance of "civilization:"
In the interests of our commerce...we should build the Nicara-
gua canal, and for the protection of th~t canal and for the sake of
our commercial supremacy in the PaCIfic we should control the
Hawaiian Islands and maintain our influence in Samoa a~d
when the Nicaragua canal is built, the islaI;td of Cub~ wIli
become a necessity... .The great nations are rapIdly absorblllg for
their future expansion and their present defense all !h.e. wa.ste
places of the earth. It is a movement which makes forcIvIl~zatlOn
and the advancement of the race. As one of the great natI?nS of
the world the United States must not fall out of the lille of
march (quoted in Zinn, 1980:291).
'~i'..,~.,....•. ':"_"c'-
rr"!
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America's colonization of Hawaii meant, at one level, a transforma-
tion of the traditional economic system from subsistence production to
a plantation economy and later, with tourism, a service society. Always
a peripheral part of the larger world system of capitalism, Hawaii was
never self-sufficient after European contact. Throughout the 19th
century, Hawaii became increasingly dependent on the core capitalist
countries, and remains so today (Kent 1983).
At another level, however, colonization also demanded that
Hawaiians either be removed from their lands or conveniently succumb
to disease. Syphilis, introduced by the original "tourist" Capt. James
Cook in 1778, was but the first of a European scourge of bewildering,
incurable diseases that maimed and killed Hawaiians by the tens of
thousands. Because of these haole diseases (among them influenza,
measles, whooping cough, and cholera), Hawaiians suffered enormous
depopulation. From an estimated 500,000 people at contact, less than
45,000 remained in 1878, a decline by a ratio of more than 10 to 1. 7
With the demise of the people came the rapid demise of their culture.
The kinship system of chiefly stewardship was replaced by a monarchy
soon after contact and as a direct result of the introduction of Western
firearms. With political centralization came other kinds of exploitation:
heavy taxation, a large administrative structure, and finally, a Western
legal system aimed at the establishment of private property land tenure
as a replacement for traditional land use where no one owned the land
and everyone had rights of use and access to both land and sea. Para-
mount among these legal modifications was the Great JvIahele of 1848
and the Kuleana Act of 1850. These acts comprised a major land
redistribution forced onto the monarchy by Westerners
(ex-missionaries and businessmen) who needed security in land tenure
for large plantations. 8
Hailed as bringing fee simple ownership to Hawaiians, these land di-
visions actually alienated the land from them. The Mahele and the
Kuleana Act divided the lands thus: 1.6 million acres, about 39% of the
land, went to 248 Chiefs; 1 million acres, about 24% of the land, went
to the king; 1.5 million acres, about 36% of the land, went to the
Crown; and only 28,600 acres, less than 1% of the land, went to the
common people who worked the land, the Makaainana. This last group
of Hawaiians made up about 99% of the population (Kelly 1980:65-66).
While the Mahele divided the lands between the chiefs, king and
government, the Kuleana Act supposedly guaranteed to the makaaina-
na fee simple title to small plots of land. But these lands could only in-
clude that which the tenant "really cultivated." It did not include
common pasturage or lands cultivated with others. Since taro
CUltivation, like fishing, was a group endeavor, separation of the indi-
vidual from the group - a Western value - meant starvation for most
of the people. Apart from the fact that few makaainana received any
land at all (only 30% of the adult male population), the plots which they
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did receive were often too small to cultivate successfully. As a result,
Hawaiians either sold their lands or were prohibited from subsisting on
them (Kelly 1980:65-66).
The ostensible justification for these land acts was that they would
preserve the rights of the people while satisfying the needs of foreigners
for land. This, of course, did not happen.
In the first place, the needs of foreigners for land could not be
satisfied, since their economic system depended for its success on the
continual expansion of profits. Thus foreign desire for land might be
temporarily abated by the Mahele but it would never be quenched, as
the subsequent history of 20th century Hawaii shows. The enormous
economic power of Americans was on the rise and it was essential that
land become a spur to profits rather than an obstacle.
In the second place, traditional land rights had been successfully pro-
tected through the use of these rights by hundreds of thousands of
Hawaiians over numerous centuries. The sudden division of the lands
with a new alternative of private property could not possibly have had
the beneficial effect on Hawaiians claimed for it. According to Marion
Kelly, student of the Mahele period:
It was the Americans, Rev. William Richards and Dr. Gerrit P.
Judd, who drew up the plan called the Mahele. They convinced
the Hawaiian king and the chiefs of the Privy council to accept
it. They told the Hawaiians that if they didn't convert to private
ownership of land, any foreign invader that annexed the
Hawaiian Islands would not recognize Hawaiian land rights.
They said a foreign invader would take over everything, leaving
the king, chiefs, and Hawaiian people landless. (Native
Hawaiians Study Commission Report, Vol. I. 1983:712).9
Of course, the history of the Mahele shows that private property land
tenure was the death knell of the makaainana. They received less than
1% of the land. The chiefs and the king did better but, under increased
pressure to sell these lands as well, the bulk of the aina (land) found its
way into the plantation economy.
The haole (whites) triumphed. They were enabled to buy vast
acreages, either from the makaainana who were starving, or from the
chiefs and the government who were heavily indebted to Western
merchants. In both cases, the results were the same. The great bulk of
the land came under Western ownership. Kelly judges the role of the
haole and the purpose of the land division in the following way:
It was the American missionaries who changed the Hawaiian
land tenure system into the American system of private own-
ership of land. This was done to provide land for American en-
terprise and safe investment schemes for American
money.(Native Hawaiians Study Commission Report, Vol. I,
1983:712).10
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Such an imperialist design, with such devastating effects on the
common people, can hardly be called the birth of democracy. It is more
~ccuratelydescribe~as a triumph of colonial policy: the power of Amer-
Ican f?relgners to dIspossess and subjugate an indigenous people - the
HawaIIans.
.Th~ victory of th~ white settlers meant, in the words of political
sc~enttst Noel Kent, cultural debasement, economic destitution, and a
third-rate status for Hawaiians in their own homeland." Meanwhile
"the .?ivision of the lands continued the policy of appropriating
HawaIIan resources to further the ends of capitalist accumulation and
had th,e u1ti~.ate effect ~~ undermining once and for all, the viability of
the HawaIIan way. For the white entrepeneurial class
" ...dispossession of the Hawaiians was an essential precondition for th~
flourishing of capitalist export agriculture" (Kent 1983:32).
This export was to be sugar, grown on vast acreages of what was once
the land base of the Hawaiian people. Thanks to a host of Americans
Tissior;t.~ry and businessmen alike, foreign power had changed
HawaII s laws and customs to reflect those in the United States and
land legislation and agricultural practices [were] brought in line'with
foreign notions" (Kent 1983:29).
It is important to point out the role of Western law in this land
seizure. The imposition of Western concepts through the Great Mahele
and the Kuleana Act was crucial to the taking of the lands. Legal
scholar; Neil Levy:
...Western property concepts were imposed on the legal struc-
ture and would facilitate the rapid, steady takeover of Hawaiian
owned lands during the next several decades. Moreover, the
government's commitment to selling its remaining land put
Westerners, with their access to capital, in a position to take
Hawa!ian land through the legal procedures. they had
establtshed. Western imperialism had been accomplished without
the usual bothersome wars and costly colonial administration(Levy
1975:857, emphasis added).
As tra.de wa~ introduced throughout the 19th century, Hawaiians
became mc~easmgly.e~broiled in the needs of expanding European
and Amencan capltahsm for various commodities: provisions,
sandalwood, w~~le products, and, into the 20th century, sugar and
resort lands. Bnttsh, French, and American military forces guaranteed
access to these resources for their respective entrepreneurial
~ountrymen, whil~ the.alii (chiefly class), enamored of Western luxury
~tems, att~mpted III vam to control trade. Like their elite counterparts
m the ThIrd World, the alii became unknowing conduits for Western
imperialism .
. It is crucial. to note here not only that Western economic expansion
dIrectly contnbuted to the destruction of Hawaiian society, but that
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America, among others, pressed its commercial interests wit~ military
power. Even the dean of Western historians of HawaII, Ralph
Kuykendall, admitted that
The traders brought their difficulties to the attention of the
United States Government, with the result that in 1826 two
American warships visited the islands, their commanders in-
structed to investigate the situation and render all proper aid to
American commerce....Herein we see the genesis of the national
debt in Hawaii (Kuykendall 1938:9I).
The practice of supplementing verbal demands with warships was
used by nations other than the United States. For example, 1836 saw
British, French, and American gunboats in Honolulu within a period of
two months. In 1839, the captain of a French gunboat forced the
Hawaiian king to sign a treaty. And in 1842, the French man-of-war
that had taken over the Marquesas Islands and established a French
protectorate in Tahiti, arrived in Honolulu amidst fear that the French
would take Hawaii. In 1843, Lord George Paulet of England confiscated
the islands and ruled them for five months. Another foreigner, Rear
Admiral Richard Thomas, restored the kingdom to the Hawaiians later
that year. But in 1849, the French took possession of the Hawaiian fort,
again over a dispute involving debts, and forced an unequal treaty on
Hawaiians (Kelly 1980:59).
Throughout the 19th century, Hawaiians were at the mercy of foreign
traders and warships. They were increasingly disadvantaged by forced
treaties and agreements, and they were pressured into finding allies
among the foreigners themselves. The pattern which emerges here is a
classic one of colonization: the more powerful country dictates the
economic direction of the less powerful nation, which in turn becomes
increasingly dependent and helpless in the face of the colonizer's supe-
rior military strength.
Simultaneous with these military pressures had come missionary
pressures for religious conversion, and, as we have seen, for a change
in land tenure. When Kaahumanu, astute and politically ambitious wife
of Kamehameha I, broke the religious kapu affecting eating, the people
were cut adrift in a confusing world. Their fellows were dying in record
numbers while their alii were dismantling rather than upholding the
traditional way of life. The breaking of the kapu was, like other major
changes in the 19th century, the result offoreign impingement.
The example of the foreigners, their disregard of the kapu, and
their occasional efforts to convince the Hawaiians by argument
that their system was wrong, were the most potent forces under-
mining the beliefs of the people (Kuykendall 1938:67).
This judgement is confirmed by Marshall Sahlins in his recent work,
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ofw.estern contact in Hawaii, Sahlins' analysis supports the general con-
clUSIO!1 that foreign i!Dpact was directly, rather than indirectly, re-
sponsIble for the breakmg of the kapu (Sahlins 1981).
When the mis.sionaries arrived from Boston in 1820, the population
had already declIned by more than 50%. There was a religious vacuum
because the kapu had been abrogated the year before. Once the alii
converted, especially Kaahumanu, the people willingly followed. In
1824, Kan:ehameha II died in England, and his brother, Kauikeaouli,
became kmg. Because he was a minor, Kaahumanu assumed the
Regency. Under her leadership, Hawaii was officially a Christian nation
by 1840 (Bradley 1968:168-213).
More than the merchants, the missionaries were powerful agents of
~ultu:al destruction. While the traders came expressly for profit, leav-
mg dIsease and alcohol in their wake, the missionaries came to settle.
Boring from within, they spread throughout the islands with churches
in Waimea and Hilo, Lahaina, Honolulu, and Kauai.' Convinced of
their duty to "Christianize" and "civilize," the missionaries insisted
that Hawaiians had lived miserable lives before the coming of the West.
Unde~ missi~nary eyes, the ancient Hawaiians had been ruled by
bloodthIrsty pnests and despotic chiefs. Peopled by promiscuous
women who murdered their own children, Hawaii was kept in vile dark-
ness through the reign ofa cannibalistic religion.
Without any evidence to support these malicious statements the
missionaries. ,:",ere nevertheless content to repeat them for post~rity.
The most VICIO~S .of the lot was haughty Hiram Bingham, self-styled
le~der of the mISSIOn. He began the memoirs of his sojourn in Hawaii
WIth a characteristic description of Hawaiian culture during the 1400
years prior to his visit.
Lookin~ back into the obscurity of Hawaiian history, to inquire
respectmg the character of the unknown islanders who have
passed over the stage of earthly existence in preceding
generations, we may estimate their corruption and debasement
by the principles and religious practices in which they trained
and left their children, and by the vile songs, and sports, the
creeds and usages prevailing among them, and by the received
narrative of the lives of their leaders. Their religion their
politics, their amusements, and the examples of rulers, ;riests,
and parents, all tended to sanction and to foster lust and
malevolence. The national history, so far as it was preserved
and known by the people, must have continued, without the
counteracting influence of a better religion than was known to
th.em, to be debasing, instead of producing or promoting virtue.
VIOlence, fraud, lust, and pollution pervade the whole history
from the oldest traditions of the origin of their race, and of their
system of religion; and whether that history be true or false, its
effects upon the moral sense, so far as it was relied on, were
deadly. Even the story that cannibalism was once practiced in
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the mountains of Oahu, does not show, as tradition relates it,
that any king or chief cared to protect the people from the sup-
posed devourers of men; or that any public sentiment, at the
time, was expressed against it, any more than against human sa-
crifices to the gods,which it was believed the king and priests
might offer and did offer at their pleasure (Bingham
1848:23-24).
While other members of the mission were generally less vituperative
than Bingham, they nevertheless shared his sentiments: Hawaiian cul-
ture and people were descended from a pagan, inferior race whose en-
lightenment it was the missionaries' burden to ensure (Bradley 1968;
Dibble 1909).
With this view of Hawaiians, Bingham and his brethren were deter-
mined to replace the Hawaiian way of life with Western practices. To-
wards this end, Bingham continually pressed the alii for work-free
Sabbaths, the abolition of the hula, the adoption of Western dress, the
construction of Western houses, even the practice of Western burial.
As the "most trusted counselor of Kaahumanu," Bingham relentlessly
instructed her in the necessity of "moral reform" through legislation.
Thus, in 1824, Kaahumanu ordered her people to cease work on the
Sabbath which in some cases, created real hardships for a people
depend~nt on ~ork in the fields and oceans for sustenance (Bradley
1968:173-174).
The missionaries also wrought cultural havoc through the establish-
ment of a Western-style educational system. Aided by the newly-
converted alii the missionaries succeeded in opening some 900 schools,
by the late 1820s, to teach reading and writing. Once again, Kaahumanu
had paved the way, when, in 1824, she required her subjects to receive
a haole, i.e. missionary education. II
Predictably, the first textbook was the Bible. From that small
volume Hawaiians were indoctrinated with a foreign morality based in
original'sin and the evil of man. And they were taught this frightening
moral and philosophical system in their own native tongue.
Beyond the technical changes made by the missionaries in their re-
duction of the language to written form, the most critical change was in
the use of the language as a tool of colonization. Where the language
had once been inseparable from the people and their history, commu-
nicating their heritage between and among generations, it now came to
be used as the very vehicle of alienation from their habits of life. The
missionaries used the language to inculcate in Hawaiians a yearning to
be Western, and a sense of inferiority regarding the Hawaiians' own
culture, including their dance, habits of dress, their laws and rituals,
even their matings and affections. Thus, as Frantz Fanon has remarked
about missionaries in general, they did "not call the native to God's
ways, but to the ways of the white man, of the master, of the oppressor"
(Fanon 1965:32).
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Hymns that t~l~ of a suffering Jesus and a sinful humanity replaced
chants of the ongms of the universe, the evolution of life forms and
the. geneology of an entire people. No longer was an ancient hi~tory
reclte~, no longer were new chants composed. A repressive sexual
morahty re?uced the fecund, sensual imagery of the Hawaiians to con-
c~pts of ~vll a~d filth. For example, where the Hawaiians once eroti-
~Ized theIr envlfonment ,,:ith sexual names, they were, under Christian
mf1u~nce, to rename theIr natural world, as their children, with safe
Enghsh-language referents. Indeed, an 1860 law required Hawaiians to
have two names? ,,:,here before they had had only one, and to call them-
selves by.~ ChnstIan first name (Kimura 1983:173-197). This is how
the HawaIIan people came to have so many Ruths and Davids Miriams
and Johns among them. '
Meanw~ile, a foreign tale about a foreign god was daily recited and
the HawaIIan r:uma~ua (family gods) were gradually neglected for the
~tory of a JewIsh chIld from a far-away land. Hawaiians were unknow-
mgly removed from the spiritual strength of their own time and place
apd refocused .on another p~ople. - a white people - from a strang~
tIme and an ahen place. NatIve hIstory and native culture were all but
lost along the way.
Fanon and others, like Albert Memmi and Vine Deloria Jr have
analyz~d how colon~zation is, .above all, a process of decultur~tionof
the natI~e people. It IS a pervasIve totality which seeks "the liquidation"
?f a natIve people'~,"systel1!s of reference" as well as the "collapse of
ItS cultural pa!tern~ (Delona 1973; Memmi 1967; Fanon 1967:38-39).
Because ml~slOnanes focused on transforming habits of thought (e.g.
through t~elr schools), styles of behavior (e.g. through their imposition
of r.ep~esslv~.sexual morality), and customs of governing (e.g. through
theIr ImpOSltI~~ of Western la~), they were engaged in the breaking
~own of Hawa~lan culture. ~helr efforts were directed at uprooting na-
tIves from theIr customary Itfe, and then enslaving them with the arti-
facts of Western culture, which ranged from Mother Hubbard dresses
and the .Sabbath, to Constitutions, private property and the notion of
sexu~l sm. What many Westerners call acculturation to their "civilized"
ways IS r~ally deculturatio.n, in ~hich, as that defender of colonization O.
Mannom long ago descnbed, the personality of the native is first de-
stroyed through uprooting, enslavement, and the collapse of the social
system" (Mannoni 1956:40).
Nowher~ was this deculturation more in evidence than in the school
syst~m whIch was, according to historian Ralph Kuykendall, "in all es-
sentIal respects an outgrowth of the work of American Protestant and
to .a. much lesser. extent, of Roman Catholic missionaries; its form and
SPlflt ,:"ere Amencan..." (Kuykendall 1966: 106).
.W~tle t.he ABCFM. had explicitly forbidden political activity by the
mlsslOnane~, the.y nevertheless formed an alliance with the ruling alii.
By 1826, thIS alltance was so thorough, missionary historian Sheldon
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Dibble acknowledged that a union between church and state existed
"to a very considerable extent" (Dibble 1909:78). Although vehement-
ly protested by the merchant class who saw clearly that missionary
dominance over the government meant temperance and anti-
prostitution laws, the church-state union in the early years of the mis-
sion set a dangerous precedent for reliance on the missionaries which
was to reach its tragic peak during the reign of Kamehameha III. Then,
under the tutelage of missionaries, the lands were officially alienated
from the people.
While the missionaries preached the superiority of Western
civilization, the Hawaiian population continued to decline. Ostensibly
concerned with the increasing death toll from Western diseases, the
missionaries' real concern was that the Hawaiians die as Christians
rather than as pagans. As for the survival of the Hawaiian culture, the
missionaries were determined that it pass from the earth as quickly as
possible. In their own words, they wanted "to produce an entire change
in the former state of things in these islands and to aim at nothing short
of raising up the whole people to an elevated state of Christian civiliza-
tion" (Quoted in Bradley, 1968:180). This "Christian civilization" en-
tailed the dominance of American values, religion, language,
economics, politics, even habits of dress and domestic behavior. The
missionary domain was to be secular and cultural, not merely religious.
Thus, not only did American businessmen and missionaries invade
Hawaii in the 19th century, bringing disease and death, but they suc-
cessfully penetrated Hawaiian society at the religious, economic, and
political levels, creating a settler colony, a mini-America. Anxious for
incorporation into the United States, these white settlers overthrew the
Hawaiian monarchy in 1893 with the willing aid of American military
forces. Over a hundred years of American economic and ideological
power in Hawaii was then secured by annexation in 1898 (Kent 1983).
The racism surrounding the controversy over annexation deserves
some comment. What historian Christopher Lasch has pointed out
regarding the 1898 Congressional debates over cession of the Philip-
pines was equally true about the controversy over the annexation of
Hawaii. Both sides "accepted the inequality of man - or, to be more
precise, of races - as an established fact" (Lasch 1973:71). Thus, the
substance of the debate focused on whether the Constitution should be
applied in the colonies, and whether the American empire should be
hemispheric or global. The question of whether Hawaiians should be
consulted about annexation was answered by the likes of Senator Hoar,
who argued that asking what the Hawaiians wanted was "as reasonable
to take the vote of children in an orphan asylum or an idiot school"
(Quoted in Drinnon, 1980:311) .
Meanwhile, in Hawaii, annexation mania had characterized the
1890s. The haole planters' newspaper, the Advertiser, had warned its
readers, "It is the white race against the yellow. Nothing but annexation
can save these islands" (Quoted in Kent, 1983:60-61).
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As for the missionary element, C.M. Hyde, of the North Pacific Mis-
sionary Institute, reiterated what his predecessor Hiram Bingham had
a!ways believe~.: the Hawaiians were not fit to govern themselves, espe-
clal~r.as. Ha.waI~ was, by th~ end of the 19th century, "mainly Ameri-
can m mstItutlOns and busmess. Hyde reasoned after the overthrow in
1893:
.. .1 see nothing better than immediate annexation... .1 think that
intelligent Hawaiians, who have at heart the best interests of the
country and the people, are very generally of that opinion. Give
us annexation, and plans will be at once pushed for such devel-
opment of the country as can not be even thought of under any
other circumstances. Talk aout a protectorate is idle. We have
had enough oflegal fictions. The institutions and connections of
the country are mainly American. Let us have the name, as well
as the appearance; the real power as well as the nominal
a~quiescence, and the Hawaiians will accept the situation. They
will have to make the best of it, whatever may be decided upon
for them (quoted in Blount, 1895:827-828).
While Hyde was perfectly willing to dictate the future of Hawaiians he
~as incorrect about the "intelligent Hawaiians." According to Com~is­
slOner Blount, sent by President Cleveland to investigate the
overthrow, Hawaiians were against annexation by a margin of five to
one. This is the main reason why the haole leaders of the Republic of
Hawaii 0894-1898) conspired with the haole elite in America to pre-
vent Hawaiians from voting on annexation altogether. 12
Finally, Hyde could not resist linking the overthrow of a lawfully em-
powered go,:ernm~nt to the triumph of Christianity and prosperity. He
concluded hiS testimony to Blount by stating that "the overthrow of an
obstructive and ruinous social and political system [i.e. the Hawaiian
Go~ernment], is t~e best preparation for the spread of the Gospel of
Chnst, and the enjoyments of its privileges and blessings" (quoted in
Blount, 1895:827-828).
~s a result of these actions, Hawaiians became a conquered people,
their lands and culture subordinated to another nation. They were
made to !eel and survive as inferiors when their sovereignty as a nation
was forcibly. ended by American military power. Rendered politically
apd economically powerless by the turn of the century, Hawaiians con-
tmue to suffer the effects of American colonization: land alienation;
?nem~loyment and empl?yment ghettoization; the worst health profile
m the Islands; the lowest mcome level; a deep psychological oppression
manifested in crime, suicide, and aimlessness; and, finally, the grossest
commodification of their culture for the international market of
t?~rism. This latest affliction of colonialism has meant a particularly in-
SidIOUS form of cultural prostitution. The hula, for example, has been
made ornamental, a form of exotica for the gaping tourist. Far from en-
couraging a cultural revival, as tourist industry apologists contend,
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tourism has appropriated and cheapened the accomplishment~ of a
resurgent interest in things Hawaiian (eg. the current use of replicas of
Hawaiian artifacts like fishing and food implements, capes, helmets
and other symbols of ancient power to decorate hotels) ..13 Hawaiian
women meanwhile are marketed on posters from Pans to Tokyo
promisi'ng an unfettered, "primitive" sex~ality while Hawaiian men
bare their bodies for sexaully repressed tounsts.
This transformation of cultural value into monetary value has been
called "commodification" - the process of objectifying a person or a
cultural attribute for the purposes of profit-making. While capitalist
society commodifies nearly everything, the Hawa!ian peopl~ suffer par-
ticularly because, in addition to all their econOllllC and social burdens,
their culture is plasticized for the world market.
But while tourism has grown to monstrous proportions in Hawaii, a
protest movement of increasing magnitude has ac~ompa~ied it. Similar
to the indigenous Indian Movement on the Amencan mamland, and to
other indigenous movements in the South Pacific, the Hawaiian Move-
ment can be seen as one radical response to American colonization.
THE HAWAHAN MOVEMENT AND THE QUEST JFOJll
JINDEPENDENCE
Kau Iii makou
Nui ke aloha no ka aina
We are few in number
But our love for the land is great
from Mele 0 Kahoolawe
by Harry Kunihi Mitchell
Like the American Indian Movement, the Hawaiian Movement has
evolved from a series of protests against land abuses through various
demonstrations and occupations to dramatize the oppressed conditions
of Hawaiians to assertions of native sovereignty based on indigenous
birthrights t~ the land. Occurring in the decade of the seventie~ and
continuing into the eighties, this progression marked a ~ew conscIOus-
ness among modern Hawaiians about their history? th.elr cUI~ure, ~nd
their subjugation to Western values and institutIOns, mcludmg
capitalism, formal education, and Christianity.. ...
One result of this consciousness was a growmg activism m rural
Hawaiian communities to preserve the remnants of their life-ways
against encroaching urbanization and military us~. Resistance. to
evictions to commercial development of sacred sites and farmmg
areas, to'suppression and commercialization of H~waiian culture, and
to military occupation of Hawaiian land, charactenzed one part of the
Hawaiian Movement. In the meantime, the new consciousness also
gave rise to a revival of artistic interest in things Hawaiian: hula kahiko
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(ancient hula); olelo Hawaii (Hawaiian language), and various forms of
arts and crafts, including canoe-building and lei-making.
Along with this artistic flowering came a serious search for the spi-
ritual source of Hawaiian culture. As many young people journeyed
back through a century and a half of colonial repression to the pre-
European sources of their culture, they discovered, with the help of
their elders, that Hawaiian religion was rooted in a profound relation-
ship to the land. Because Hawaiians took their sustenance from the
land, their daily activities - planting, fishing, building, even eating -
expressed spiritual as well as physical aspects of being. This understand-
ing of life as a relationship between the spirit of the land and the people
of the land, between material survival and cultural expression, between
work and a respect for the wondrous and varied bounty of nature - all
this shaped Hawaiian philosophy, music, art, dance, language, and,
indeed, structured the core of Hawaiian kinship, the extended family or
ohana (Handy, et al., 1972; Handy & Pukui 1950; Charlot 1983; Trask
1983). The gradual re-learning of this cultural heritage led activist
Hawaiians to demand what their nineteenth century counterparts had
demanded: a land base for the practice and transmission of their
culture, especially taro cultivation and religious observances.
The Movement's growth from community struggle and cultural
resurgence to collective assertions of Hawaiian claims for religious
freedom, political power and finally, independence as a sovereign
nation, was preceded by a fundamental transformation in Hawaii's
economy. From dependence on cash crops of sugar and pineapple, and
on military expenditures in the first half of the 20th century, Hawaii's
economy shifted to an increasing dependence on tourism and land
speculation with rising investment by multi-national corporations in
the second half of the century.
After statehood in 1959, burgeoning tourism led to an overnight
boom in hotels, high cost condominium and subdivision
developments, and luxury resort complexes which necessitated ever-
growing demands for land. Concentrated land ownership, a problem
since the onslaught of plantation agriculture in the 1800s, had actually
increased in the 20th century. Small landowners controlled less than
10% of the land. The military, the State and large private estates, and
foreign and American developers owned the remainder. As a result,
large landlords drove up the price of land, capitalizing on the post-
Statehood rush toward commercial development (Kelly 1980; Kent
1983).
Already economically exploited and culturally suppressed, rural
Hawaiian communities, which had been relatively untouched during
the plantation period, were beseiged by rapid development of their agri-
cultural areas beginning in the late 1960s.I4 These areas - among
them, Hana, East Molokai, Keaukaha, Nanakuli, Waianae,
Waimanalo, Hauula - had managed to retain many traditional practices
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such as taro farming, fishing, and the spoken H.aw~iia~ language.
Given the effects of educational and religious colomzatIon m the l?th
century, and the great decline in the native populat~on,. t~~se !!awanan
communities, although remnants of a once dynaml~ cIvIhzatlOn, wer.e
nevertheless crucial to the perpetuation of Hawanan culture. TheIr
threatened extinction by urbanization and other ~?rms of development
was correctly perceived by many oppressed Hawanans as a fi~al attempt
to rid Hawaii of Hawaiians and their culture. In J?any ways, .It ,,:as pre-
dictable that the Hawaiian Movement would begm and flounsh m rural
areas where the call for a land base would be the loudest. ..
While proceeding out of historical abuses. o~ H~wanan land and
people, the Hawaiian Movement should be dIstmgUlsh.ed from other
protest struggles in Hawaii by t~e deJ?and fo~ a native land b~.se.
("Other struggles" include those mvolvmg th~ nght.s of n.on-Hawanan
residents - e.g. Filipinos in Ota Camp, the Chmese m Chmatown; and
those involving preservation of the environment - e.g. the fi~ht to
stop the H-3 freeway, and the Save Our Surf (SOS) stru~gle). T~IS call
for land arises out of an understanding of the native claIms of
Hawaiians as the indigenous people 0/Hawaii.
Many community struggles - e.g. against ~vi~tions and development
_ raised the issue of land rights. At the begmmng of the decade, com-
munities often took a stand in terms of the righ~~of "local'.' peopl~. The
term "local" included Hawaiian and non-Hawanan, long-time reSIdents
of Hawaii. The assertion of their rights to live on the land was opp.osed
to the rights of property owners like the State, developers, and pnvate
estates. ., H"
But as the decade wore on, the assertion of mdigenous awana~
rights as historically unique from t~e rights of immigrants to Hawa.n
began to characterize more commumty struggles. Independent of theIr
"local" supporters, Hawaiians began to protest development by occupy-
ing lands, or by refusing to be evicted from land sche.duled for
development. They also protested through mass demonstra~lOns, legal
actions, and through cultural assertions such as the co~~tru~tlOnof fish-
ing villages. These forms of protest plac~d the Hawanans demand to
live and transmit their culture on a speCIfied land base at the front of
the movement. The rights of "locals" were not thereby opposed. ~u.t
Hawaiians' historic and cultural claims to the land as the first and ongl-
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nal claimants were increasingly seen, at least by Hawaiians, as primary.
Struggles at Kukailimoku Village in Kona; at Sand Island, Mokauea
Island, Waimanalo, Kahana Valley, Waianae and Nanakuli on Oahu'
on the east end of Molokai; in Hana, Maui; and the struggle to stop th~
bombing of Kahoolawe all illustrated concerns for a land base for cul-
tural purposes. Emphasis was given to fishing, taro cultivation
Hawaiian religious worship and various aspects of Hawaiian culture'
such as dance an~. language. Unlike other, non-Hawaiian struggles:
these rural, Hawallan struggles were specifically concerned with the
practice of Hawaiian culture. Because neither the people nor their cul-
tur~ can flourish without some kind of land base, Hawaiians organized
theIr protests around a crucial common demand: land.
Claims to this.land base were presented in several forms: as an argu-
ment for reparatIOns from the U.S. for its involvement in the overthrow
of the Hawaiian government in (1893) and the subsequent loss of
Hawaiian nationhood and sovereignty; as a legal claim to special trust
lands abused by the State and Federal governments (200 000 acres
within the Hawaiians Homes Act and another 1.5 million are~s of ceded
lands ~~ the Ad.missions Act) and by large estates (e.g. Bishop Estate
~n~ Llhuokalam Trust); and finally, as a right of residence by virtue of
mdlgenous status, sometimes called aboriginal rights. 15
~egin~ing in. 1970, Hawaiian political organizations began to push
thelf natIve claIms at the same time that beseiged communities orga-
nized against eviction and urban development. 16 "The Hawaiians" a
State-wide, grass-roots political organization, was formed in 1970 td re-
dress abuses in the administration of Hawaiian Home lands.
~eanwhile? Ha'Yai.ian and non-Hawaiian farmers in Kalama Valley
tned to resIst eVIctIOn that same year by the Bishop Estate and Kaiser-
Aetna, who sought upper-income residential development on agricul-
tural lands. "Kokua Kalama", a militant Hawaiian organization, was
formed to help the residents resist eviction. Later, as "Kokua Hawaii"
this organization expanded to address the needs of Hawaiian~
State-wide.
The following year the "Congress of the Hawaiian People" was creat-
ed as a watchdog over the Bishop Estate, while another State-wide or-
ganization was formed in 1972 to lobby for reparations from the U.S.
government. Called ALOHA (Aboriginal Lands of Hawaiian
Ancestry), this organization's efforts eventually led to the establish-
ment (in 1980) of a Presidential Commission to study the needs and
concerns of the Hawaiian people, including reparations.
By 1973, several organizations and struggles had appeared around
the State. Tenants at Nawiliwili-Niumalu on Kauai struggled against
their eviction and against resort development· kuleana land owners on
Windward Oahu organized as "Hui Malam~ Aina 0 Koolau" (The
Associ~tion to Protect the Lands of the Koolau) to stop development
of theIr agricultural lands; the "Homerule Movement" formed as a
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poli'tical lobbying group for Hawaiians; and the "Waimanalo People's
Organization" fought eviction by the State.
In 1974 the first nationalist organization of the Movement, Ghana 0
Hawaii (F~mily of Hawaii) appeared under the leadership of Peggy ~ao
Ross who has taken her case for the re-establishment of the Hawal1an
Nati~n to various world forums, including the United Nations.
Meanwhile, grass-roots Hawaiians in Kona occupied a shor.eline a~ea,
and constructed a traditional fishing village as a cultural actIon agamst
planned resort development. On Oahu, a major struggle erupted be-
tween farmers and land owners regarding urban sprawl into Waiahole
and Waikane Valleys.
In 1975 the island of Molokai witnessed the birth of "Hui Ala Loa"
(the Asso~iation of the Long Trails). As a political group representing a
large Hawaiian constituency on Molokai, "Hui Ala Loa" organized
around naive issues from beach and forest access, to water use and
homestead land, to preservation of taro cultivation and fishing areas, to
a moratorium on resort development. Meanwhile, on OahU, two com-
munity struggles took place: a successful fight by fishermen on
Mokauea Island against their eviction by the State, and a less successful
struggle against eviction by residents of Heeia Kea on the windward
side of the island.
The "Protect Kahoolawe Ohana" was formed in 1976 to stop U.S.
military bombing of the island of Kahoolawe. As a State-wide
organization the Ohana served to link various land struggles on each
island. It als'o asserted a Hawaiian cultural alternative - Aloha Aina,
love of the land - to Western practices of exploitation of both people
and land. A non-profit corporation of Waianae homesteaders, "Hoala
Kanawai," was founded to lay claim of the ceded lands trust.
In 1977, leprosy patients at Hale Mohalu began a long fight to prevent
their relocation to Leahi Hospital. Their issue was abuse of both the pa-
tients (most of whom are Hawaiian) and the land, which had been en-
trusted to the State by the Federal government expressly for the care of
the patients.
In 1978, Kahoolawe Ghana members, Hawaiian homesteaders and
other supporters, demonstrated at Hilo Airport against abuses of tr~st
lands (part of the airport is built on Homestead land) and the bomb~ng
of Kahoolawe. Meanwhile, the Hawaii State Constitutional ConventIon
passed a bundle of ammendments concerni~g.Hawaiians ,:"hich calle?
for reforms in the Hawaiian Homes CommISSIOn; protectIon of tradi-
tional Hawaiian access rights to the land and sea for religious and cultur-
al purposes and for economic subsistence; the promotion of the study
of Hawaiian language, history and culture; the aboliti~n of adverse
possession of more than five acres of land; and the establishment of an
Office of Hawaiian Affairs administered by trustees elected by
I~------------====================--=================================~~~~=
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history books. They also discovered that the U.S., long described as the
saviour of Hawaii, had actively participated in the overthrow of the
Hawaiian government, and in the extinguishment of the Hawaiian
nation. Pride in things Hawaiian led to a critical look at things haole,
and to a growing understanding that the "Americanization" of Hawaii
had meant the repression of Hawaiian people and the decline of their
culture.
Through study, political action and cultural return, Hawaiians began
to experience what indigenous people had experienced in the de-
colonization period after World War II: a rejection of Western ways,
and a re-education in the ways of their ancestors. For Hawaiians, as for
other Third World people, this process of mental decolonization led to
cultural revival and political organizing. As Fanon and Cabral had
predicted, the freeing of indigenous minds from the vise of the coloni-
zers gave birth to a liberation struggle. American ideological hegemony
in Hawaii was threatened by the very presence of the movement.
If charted against Western values, the indigenous values that radical
Hawaiians asserted, as well as the threat that they posed, are immedi-
ately clear. 17
Hawaiians, and charged with the care of the land, resources, and
revenues from the State and Federal governments specially earmarked
for Hawaiians.
In 1980, Hawaiian residents of Sand Island, Oahu, sought a live-in
cultural park but were evicted and arrested by the State. In 1983
~awaiian .residents of Makua Beach, Oahu, asserted their aboriginal
nghts to live on the shoreline in a traditional way. They were evicted,
and several arrests were made.
For over thirteen years - from 1970 to 1983 - Hawaiian discontent
erupted in mass protests against land alienation and cultural destruction
around the State. But where community struggles originally stressed
the rights of "local" people, the political organizations began with a
specific focus on the abuses of Hawaiian lands and Hawaiian people.
With the birth of the Kahoolawe Ohana in 1976, the discourse of prot-
est expanded from a focus on land abuse to an argument for a positive
alternative. Phrased in Hawaiian, this alternative of Aloha Aina sig-
nalled the merging of political protest with cultural assertion. Thus,
Hawaiian communities did more than struggle against land
development. They also argued for a preferred alternative to capitalism:
Hawaiian land use ethics of preservation, conservation and respect for
the sacredness of nature; and harmony between people, their culture
and their environment. These ethics were taken directly from Hawaiian
culture.
This alternative was increasingly enunciated through the Hawaiian
language, evincing another example of the merging of the political and
t~e cultural aspects of the movement. But use of the language also in-
dIcated a profound evolution in the movement itself:
1) Western terms and English language referents were eschewed in
favor of Hawaiian terms and Hawaiian language;
2) this was clear evidence that psychological de-colonization had
begun;
3) this shift signalled a growing move towards indigenous Hawaiian
values;
4) these values gave Hawaiians pride and purpose beyond the activi-
ty of struggle; and
5) increased commitment to these cultural values became a source
of increased demands culminating in the ultimate demand for sover-
eignty and independence.
While the Hawaiian cultural revival focused attention on Hawaiian
dance, language and history, Hawaiians active in native claims struggles
began to feel a sense of righteousness about their cause. This righteous-
ness and pride were mixed with anger at the discovery that Hawaiians
had been kept ignorant of their history by the colonizers. For example,
many Hawallans learned for the first time that they were fighting for a
land base originally taken away by sugar planters and missionaries _
two colonizing groups who had been praised in standard
Hawaiian Values: A.loha Aina
(Love of the people for the land)
Sacredness of nature




Respect for the inherent value
of each living object
Use and sharing among people
ofall resources
Ohana (extended family, the
collective) as central
Laulima: cooperation among




(Primacy of the self; reproduc-
tion of profit)
Instrumental view of nature
Domination of humans over
nature
Exploitation of nature
Endless consumption of natural
resources
Commodification of people





- Class against class; individu-
al against individual
Conflict, class antagonism
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To Hawaiians in rural communities who wanted to preserve taro
patches, fish ponds, and other bountiful wild areas of nature to feed
their families and to perpetuate their culture, urban and resort
development, freeways, gas stations and the rest, were clear signs of a
rapacious, exploitative value system that placed gain over welfare,
waste and consumption over the needs of the common people.
In stark contrast to Western culture, Hawaiian values revealed a cul-
ture whose religion, politics and economics were grounded in a funda-
mental love for the land and its people. This culture presented an ad-
mirable - and to many Hawaiians - a preferred alternative to the
haole or Western way of life. More than this, such an alternative, if
adopted by Hawaiian communities, would ensure not only the preserva-
tion of the aina but also the perpetuation of Hawaiian people as
Hawaiians, rather than as colonized Americans. In desiring to be what
their ancestry had bequeathed to them, Hawaiians followed a path
taken earlier by other people of color: rejection of the white mask and
its values.
The return to their culture thus gave to Hawaiians a sense of cultural
pride and creative identity denied them by colonization. In addition,
the more Hawaiians came to understand their culture through its actual
practice, the more they came to understand the need for land. Political
direction grew from that need until, by the end of the seventies there
was a unified call for a land base. '
The de-colonization of Hawaiians was aided by connections with
other people of color early on in the movement. For example, in 1971,
Hawanan representatives of the Kalama Valley struggle were sent to
Black Panther meetings on the American mainland. Upon their return,
the Kalama Valley support group, "Kokua Hawaii", was re-organized
along the lines of the Black Panther Party, including the creation of a
Minister of Defense. This re-organization had been preceded by the
visit of Panther Eldridge Cleaver to Hawaii. He had spoken about the
commonalities between Hawaiians and Blacks as colonized people.
Indeed, an exchange of militants between struggles formed one part
of the outreach effort throughout the Movement. In 1973, for
example, Russell Means and Dennis Banks visited Hawaii. They
brought the message of a common oppression as indigenous people.
Hawaiians active in Welfare Rights struggles attended conferences with
Blacks and Chicanos in Los Angeles in the early seventies. After the
occupation of Kahoolawe by Hawaiian activists in 1976, several trips to
the mainland were made to link up with Indian activists and other sup-
portive groups. In 1982, Hawaiian activists spoke at the First Interna-
tional American Indian Tribunal, alongside Banks and Means, as well
as representatives from Third World countries in Asia, the Middle
East, the Pacific, Africa, and the Americas.
Visits from South Pacific islanders have also occured. For example,
radical Maori, Tahitian and Micronesian delegates to the 1980 Nuclear
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Free Pacific Conference held in Hawaii, contributed enormously to the
Hawaiians' consciousness regarding their sovereign rights. And the
return visits of Hawaiian activists to the South Pacific have guaranteed
an additonal infusion of radical analysis into the Movement.
These connections have deepened the Hawaiians' understanding of
their oppressed conditions as well as their sense of solidarity with Third
World struggles. In particular, contacts with American Indians and
Pacific Islanders have given movement Hawaiians a heightened con-
sciousness about their status as indigenous people. This consciousness
has had a direct impact on political organizing both in Hawaii and
internationally.
The effects of international networking have increased the political
sense Hawaiians have gained from community struggle and cultural
revival. Both sets of forces have shaped the Hawaiians' demand for
sovereignty. This demand has appeared in several forms: as a call for a
completely independent Hawaii under the exclusive or predominating
control of Hawaiians; as a call for 'limited sovereignty' on a specified
land base administered by a single Hawaiian council, but subject to U.S.
Federal regulations; as a call for legally-incorporated, land-based units
within existing Hawaiian communities linked by a common, elective
council; as a call for a "nation-within-a-nation," on the model of Amer-
ican Indian nations; as a call for the return to a constitutional Hawaiian
monarchy.
While these forms are debated by Hawaiians in the movement, ques-
tions about socialist/communist parties and their role, including their
positions on Hawaiian sovereignty, have also received attention. From
the beginning of the movement in 1970, the Left and its socialist goals
have been the source of intense controversy. For many radical
Hawaiians, criticisms of the Left begin from the simple observation
that Left parties do not, as a rule, have a substantial Hawaiian
memership. Thus, Left participation in the Hawaiian movement is au-
tomatically suspect. Indeed, some Hawaiians resent the Left as much as
Black radicals resented white liberals who sought to direct other peo-
ples' struggles in the sixties and seventies.
But membership is only the most obvious problem. More troubling
to radical Hawaiians is the fact that the Left tends to adhere quite closely
to a standard Marxist-Leninist view of history and thus tends to concen-
trate organizing efforts in urban areas where the working classes live.
Now while most Hawaiians live in urban areas, they are not the activists
calling for an independent land base and a cultural revival. It is the rural
Hawaiians who have carried the movement and it is to them that the
Left's ideology is abrasive, appearing "too haole" (i.e. Western), anti-
cultural, and, in specific, strategic instances, against the interests and
rights of the Hawaiian people. This last concern is especially crucial, be-
cause rural Hawaiians are most impacted by the continued development
of land.
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To these Hawaiians, the Left ignores a central Hawaiian focus:
culture. Driven by a certain kind of historical analysis and ideology,
many Leftists view Hawaiians as regressive, in the sense of historical
evolution, because they insist on preserving a spiritual and material
relationship to the land. In a movement grounded in the indigenous
people's land and culture, such a position of neglect or outright hostility
by the Left is bound to alienate Hawaiians.
Beyond this blindness is the deeper problem which it suggests to
Hawaiians: that Leftists have no geneological connection to the land
no lo~e of its .history, no profound attachments, either culturally 0;
matenall.y, to Its great, everlasting presence. Because they have no
bonds WIth the land, Leftists are often perceived as no different from
other interlopers: they are not of the aina, Hawaii. Rather, they are, as
Fanon says of the colonizers, "the others."
. The Hawaiian emphasis on land and culture also raises serious ques-
tIOns about industrialization - a key element in the achievement of
socialist designs. From the perspective of Hawaiian nationalists, the
Left cannot answer the criticism that industrialization destroys the spi-
ritual relationship between humans and nature. For urban dwellers and
other Westernized people, this destruction is almost incidental an arti-
fact of modern life. To the Left, it is a historical necessity. But t~ indige-
nous. p.eople whose heritage is defined by such a relationship, the loss
of spmtual and material ties to the land signals an end to their way of
life. The Left's often dismissive attitude regarding this concern has fur-
ther divided them from Hawiian nationalists. Unfortunately, this divi-
sion can be so extreme that, in some cases, Hawaiians perceive the
Left, rather than the capitalist Establishment, as the enemy of the
Hawaiian people and their indigenous rights.
These problems between the Left and radical movement Hawaiians
will not be resolved, because the disagreements are fundamental ones
of first importance. As in other movements such as the American
Indian m~~ement, some members of the Left'will continue to support
the HawaIIan movement, despite their disagreements. Other Leftists
will not offer support and will, indeed, join the forces of opposition. But
the H~.waiianmovement will continue, whether or not the Left supports
HawaIIan goals.
While members of the Hawaiian community discuss various paths
toward self-determination, the question of whether Hawaiians should
be working for ~ l<;1nd base recedes into the background. The presence
of nearly two millIon acres (half the State) as Hawaiian trust lands -
however abused by the State and Federal governments - fairly guaran-
tees that such a question is no longer at issue. The problem for national-
ist Hawaiians, therefore, is howto proceed politically to achieve an inde-
pendent land base.
Several suggestions have been put forward by various movement
leaders and organizations which can be grouped under the following
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strategies: active education of Hawaiians about their history and native
rights, and about the need for a land base; litigation against the State
and Federal governments for abuses of trust lands and for reparations;
offensive political demonstrations such as land seizures, illegal protests
at restricted places, and disruptions of institutional activity; offensivce
cultural actions such as religious worship on sacred sites closed to such
worship, the construction of fishing villages and taro patches on lands
scheduled for other economic activity, and the disruption of tourist at-
tractions which commodify and degrade Hawaiian culture. The pur-
poses of offensive actions are threefold: they awaken both Hawaiians
and the general public to Hawaiian problems; they assert rights through
direct moves against abuse, or in support of cultural practices; they ad-
vance the movement forward towards independence rather than hold-
ing it within the parameters of civil rights actions.
Such strategies have been used throughout the movement and will
continue for the foreseeable future. With these events, it is clear that
the Hawaiian Movement has matured into a full-blown nationalist
struggle. Whether the quest for independence will lead to the establish-
ment of a sovereign land base for Hawaiians depends on the force of
the movement, and the strategies of its members, particularly network-
ing with international groups. But the desire for independence burns
on.
NOTES
1. Editor's note: Dr. Trask submitted this article with the proper dia-
critical marks on Hawaiian words. However, because of technical
limitations of the equipment we use to produce Social Process in
Hawaii, we were unable to include them.
2. For the purposes of this article, the term Hawaiian includes both
full and part Hawaiians, defined as those individuals whose ances-
tors were natives of the Hawaiian Islands prior to 1778.
3. For a discussion of Indian-hating as ideology and as practice, see
Drinnon's exhaustive, monumental study Facing West: The
Metaphysics ofEmpire-Building and Indian-Hating (1980). Drinnon
brilliantly argues that American attitudes and policy against In-
dians serve as a model for American imperialism overseas. He il-
lustrates his argument with rich examples from the Puritan era
through the Vietnam period.
4. The best account of the continued rape of Indian lands by the
American government and by multi-national corporations is
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Johansen & Maestas (1979). For personal testimony from Indians
about their current plight on the reservations, see Roxanne
Dunbar-Ortiz (1977).
5. See this analysis in Oyate Wicaho (Voice of the People), the news-
paper of the South Dakota American Indian Movement.
6. The delegation from Hawaii was composed of five voting dele-
gates (four indigenous, one non-indigenous), two non-voting
Hawaiian elders (kupuna), and non-voting staff people from the
Pacific Concerns Resource Center in Honolulu.
7. For demographic information on Hawaiians see Schmitt (1968).
For a general discussion of Hawaiian health in pre-contact and
post-contact times, see Dr. Kekuni Blaisdell's report on native
health in the Native Hawaiians Study Commission Report (1983). It
should be kept in mind that the estimates for the pre-contact
population are guesses by Europeans who knew nothing about the
culture or the inland settlements of the Hawaiians. My feeling is
that the Hawaiian population estimate at contact will be revised
upward, as the Indian population estimate has been, as a result of
better archaeological work and statistical estimations based on it.
To my knowledge, no such work has been completed to date.
Given my general understanding of Hawaii at the time of contact,
I have chosen the highest recorded estimate by a European be-
cause my sense is that the actual population was considerably
higher.
8. Kelly (1956) gives a good description of the process of encroach-
ment of Euro-American private property land tenure on Hawaiian
caretaking land tenure. Also see William Davenport (1969), for
an analysis of the impact of the West on Hawaiian politics.
9. This quote is from a response written by Marion Kelly, Mililani
Trask, and Haunani-Kay Trask to the Draft Report of the Native
Hawaiians Study Commission which is reprinted in the Final
Report of the Commission. Ms. Kelly wrote the section of the re-
sponse that is reproduced here (1983).
10.Kelly's judgment is based on research on the Mahele conducted
over a period of some thirty years while she has been an associate
of the Bishop Museum.
I1.For a good general discussion of the effect of missionaries on
Hawaiian language and the school system, see Kimura (1983).
For a more detailed analysis see Tagupa (1979).
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12.Hawaii was annexed by Congressional Resolution. Hawaiians had
no part of this vote. The estimate of Hawaiian feeling about an-
nexation if it were to be put to a vote was made by Blount at the end
of his report to President Cleveland. This knowledge was, of
course, a fact of political life to the local haole elite and the Ameri-
can elite, whose enemies would have defeated annexation if it had
been presented on other procedural terms. But the question
never was presented to Hawaiians in terms of a vote, and thus,
America annexed Hawaii without the consent of Hawaiians.
13.For one example, among hundreds ifnot thousands, of tourist in-
dustry apologists and their justification in terms of furthering the
Hawaiian cultural revival, see the editorial by A.A. Smyser on
"Hawaiian Problems" (1982), and my response in "A Hawaiian
View of Hawaiian Problems" (1982).
14.For statistics on Hawaiians, see the Native Hawaiians Study Com-
mission Report, Vol. 1, 1983. By 1970, tourists had increased five-
fold, while Hawaiians suffered the worst fate of the five major
ethnic groups (the haole, Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, and
Hawaiian): higher unemployment; occupational ghettoization in
low-paying, non-professional jobs; high drop-out rate for school;
lowest income levels; overrepresentation in prison and drug treat-
ment facilities; worst health profile.
15.For a thorough example of the reparation/restitution case see
Mackenzie (1982). For a critique of the ceded lands trust see
Trask (1978). For a critique of the Hawaiian Homes trust see
Hawaii Advisory Committee to U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
(1980), and the report of the Federal-State Task Force on the
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (1983).
16.The analysis in this section is based on my own research through
oral histories and primary documents regarding the Hawaiian
Movement. The only other analysis readily available is an article
by Davianna McGregor-Alegado (1980), but her article fails to
distinguish Hawaiian struggles from other ethnic struggles.
McGregor-Alegado gives scant treatment to the trend towards na-
tionalism either from a cultural or a political perspective, and pro-
vides little in the way of a theoretical context through which to ap-
preciate Hawaiian conditions. There is no treatment at all of prob-
lems with the Left.
17.The indigenous values that contemporary Hawaiians assert are
often taken to be fabrications of young and idealistic radicals.
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However, knowledge of Hawaiian culture, Hawaiian land tenure,
Hawaiian songs and chant, and Hawaiian religion, all reveal the
great respect Hawaiians had for the land and their relationship to
it. The disbelieving should consult the work of Marion Kelly
(1956), Craighill Handy (1972), Mary Kawena Pukui (1950),
John Charlot (1983), and that masterful rendition of the
Hawaiians themselves, the Kumulipo (1981). Given the preval-
ence ofWestern culture and its values, these need no citing.
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THlE HAWAH MUSKC KNDUSTRY
Elizabeth Bentzel Buck
Hawaiian music and dance is perhaps the most vital element of a cul-
ture that has undergone tremendous change over the last two-hundred
years. Ancient and modern hula and chant are avidly studied and
performed; the beautiful music of the King Kalakaua period is still
appreciated, sung, restyled and recorded; much of the hapa-haole
music of the territorial period is still popular; and in the last fifteen
years Hawaii has experienced what has been called a "cultural
renaissance," one of its strongest manifestations being a resurgence of
interest in Hawaiian music.
Throughout Hawaii's history its music has reflected the social,
economic and political changes taking place in the islands. While musi-
cal change has been an ongoing process since the early 1800s, the rate of
change increased rapidly with the introduction of new communication
technologies and their related industries, and the emergence of tourism
in the early 1900s. Radio broadcasting and record-making made it possi-
ble for music to transcend space and time in ways that changed the
traditional relationships of artist and audience, as well as the functions
of music. More importantly, with these new technologies, operating as
privately owned channels of communication, came the commoditiza-
tion of music and a whole new set of values related to music. In effect,
Hawaiian music was reconstituted as something that could be
marketed, sold to and consumed by mass audiences. Concurrent with
the early development of broadcasting and recording enterprises (in
part as a result of it), the Hawaii tourist industry was beginning to be
felt as an important social and economic force within the islands. The
combined forces of technology, the radio and record industries, and
tourism have had a major impact on the styles and functions of
Hawaii's music.
The focus of this paper is the Hawaii music industry and the role it
has played in the creation, production and performance of music in
Hawaii. The local music industry comprises all of the people, organiza-
tions and communication channels that are involved in producing and
selling music - local music composers and performers; record
producers; music publishers; music distributors, retailers and
promoters; radio and television broadcasters; music critics; hotels and
nightclubs that are venues for music; as well as music consumers.
While we are primarily concerned with the local music industry (that
which is locally owned and operated), we must keep in mind that it
operates within the broader context of the national and international
music industry which, while now only marginally involved in the actual
production and distribution of local music, still sets the professional
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norms for the local industry and the legal framework within which it
must operate. The "hits" of the nationallinternationalmusic industry,
at any point in time, influence local music styles. And the ultimate in
musical "success" for many local musicians is to break into the main-
land market.
The local music industry is organized to exploit two primary markets
- the more than four million tourists (approximately 4.8 million in
1984) that come to Hawaii each year, and the permanent residents of
the state which in 1984 numbered approximately one million. While
many local residents are enthusiasts of Hawaiian music and some tour-
ists share this interest, the large majority of people making up the tour-
ist market and the local market have only a limited interest in and ap-
preciation of the Hawaiian music heritage. Only a small proportion of
local residents are active consumers of Hawaiian music in terms of
being record purchasers or paying customers at local performances. A
larger share of the local resident population are passive consumers who
watch the occasional Hawaiian music program on television, such as
the annual Kamehameha School Song Contest or the Merrie Monarch
Hula Festival, or tune in from time to time to KCCN, the Hawaiian
radio station.
Because this is a paper on the music indu~try of Hawaii, its musical
term of reference will be the "music of Hawaii" - the all-inclusive term
that the industry uses. This includes all the sheet music, tapes and
records that are sold in local record stores in bins or on racks with the
label "Hawaiian Music";"the music considered for awards in the annual
local music industry competition (the Na Hoku Hanohano Awards);
the music played by KCeN, the only all-Hawaiian radio station; and
the music that tourists and local residents pay to see and hear with the
expectation that the performers will sing, play and dance Hawaiian
music. When I do use the term "Hawaiian music" it is to distinguish
music which has some characteristic that people generally identify with
Hawaii from locally produced music that is indistinguishable from
mainland popular music. I recognize that such crude labelling will satis-
fy few readers, nor does it satisfy me, since it includes as "Hawaiian
music," music whose only claim on our attention is to exemplify how
badly traditional Hawaiian culture has been distorted by tourism and
the mainland music industry (e.g. The Hawaiian War Chant which is a
commercialized version of a love song written by Prince Leleiohoku in
the 1860s).
PERSPEcnVES ON HAWAH'S MUSIC INDUS'fRY AND 'IHE PRO-
DUC'fION OlF MUSIC
Several theoretical orientations provide useful frames of reference
for understanding the processes and dynamics of musical development
in Hawaii, and particularly the role played by the music industry in this
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process of cultural change. Roland Ba~thes' concept of text and
intertext, Raymond Williams' neo-Marxlst approach to culture, and
the body of writings on cultural imperialism are three.
Music as Text
The first is Barthes' (1981) view of text as something woven ~ut of
the past and the present, something f?und. in all si~nifying pra~tI.ces -
literature, painting, music, film. T~xt, m this sense.' IS a p~?ductIVlty ~:
continuous significance, not a fimshed product with an embalmed
signification waiting to be uncovered. Text i.s where c.reator, Other, and
social context interact, creating and recreatmg meanmg through space
and time. In and through texts, language is redistributed, deconstructed
and reconstructed, producing intertexts.
The music of Hawaii can be read as such an intertext. As the cultural,
social, economic and political contexts of the isl~nds have chang~d a~d
continue to change, so too does the musIc change. - m 00 ItS
instrumentation, its style, its content, its definition of w?at IS J:Iawall.an
music, and (very importantly) in its motivations for bemg. It IS a J?IX-
ture of traditional and modern music (hula and chant, hymns, Jazz,
rock and roll); of religious beliefs (Hawaiian and Christia~); of different
cultural values and experiences (Hawaiian, Western, ASian); of myths
(precontact and ad-agency created); of eco,nomic ~on~traints and
incentives; and of political ideologies (feudalism, capitalism a~d .the
new Hawaiian political consciousness). In other words, the. musIc IS a
productivity that has been evolving since before recor~ed time, some-
thing that is still evolving as each new wave of outside cultural and
social influence reaches tne islands (Buck and Feltz, 1983).
Materialism and Culture
In this paper we are particulary interested in reading those threads of
the musical text that have been shaped by the political economy of the
islands - in other words, reading the text from a dialectical materialis-
tic (Marxist/neo-Marxist) orientation. This leads us to Marxist c~ltural
theory as another theory useful in understanding the productIOn of
music in Hawaii.
Raymond Williams' (1980, 1981) approach to Marxist cultural theory
complements Barthes' conceptualization of text and intertext. :,-ccor~­
ing to Williams, a Marxist approach to culture n:tust l?ok at ~pecIfi~ actI-
vites in existing social and economic relationships Wlt~ the mten~lOn of
seeing how economic base and superstructure interact m a dynamiC pro-
cess of reinforcement. Incorporating Lukacs' (1971) concept of the
totality of social practices and Gramsci's (1978) concept of the hegem.o-
ny of the dominant class, Williams sees writing, visual arts and mUSIC,
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film and broadcasting as parts of the cultural processes that contribute
to the domination of an ideology, as well as central articulations which
express and ratify the dominant culture in ways that deeply saturate the
consciousness ofsociety.
One contribution of Marxist cultural theory has been to highlight the
interaction between cultural production and market forces. According
to Williams, within market relations there are new kinds of controls
that did not exist in pre-market cultural production. When works
become commodities, produced to be sold at a profit, there is
evident pressure, at or before the point of production, to reduce
costs: either by improving the technical means of production, or
by altering the nature of the work or by pressing it into other
forms. It is here ...that manifest commercial modes of control
and selection become, in effect, cultural modes....The contrast
between market-originated and producer-originated work
cannot be made absolute, once market conditions have been
generalized. For procucers often internalize known or possible
market relationships, and this is a very complex process indeed,
ranging from obvious production for the market...through all
the possible compromises between the market demand and the
producer's intention, to those cases in which the practical
determination of the market are acknowledged but the original
work is still substantially done (Williams, 1981:104).
Another related Marxist concept is cultural hegemony. An effectively
dominant culture is always changing, adjusting to and accommodating
alternative and even oppositional meanings, values, opinions and
practices. These alternatives are tolerated, either because they do not
go beyond the limits of the central corporate definitions, or because
they do not threaten the hegemony of the dominant culture.
Williams divides alternative/oppositional cultures into residual and
emergent cultures. The residual cultures are lived and practiced on the
basis of the residue of some previous social formation (for instance,
Hawaii's preterritorial society), while emergent cultures are newly
created. While residual and emergent cultures may be coercively elim-
inated if they are too threatening to the system, more frequently they
are incorporated into the dominant system [i.e., what has happened to
the rock music that was oppositional to the status-quo in the sixties and
is now marketed by the international music industry (Chapple, 1977) l.
Sometimes, however, alternative/oppositional cultures may be simply
tolerated as marginal cultures since an effective dominant culture does
not have to completely eliminate or incorporate such cultures.
Hawaii's history and development illustrates how a dominant culture
interacts with alternative and oppositional cultures. For instance, those
aspects of Hawaii that were obstacles to the political and economic
goals of the dominant system were coercively eliminated and structural-
ly reshaped with the overthrow of the monarchy and the imposition of
I'
(,~
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an American political, legal and economic system. Other aspects of the
culture have been incorporated into the dominant culture, as can be
seen in the tourist industry's use and adaptation of traditional Hawaiian
music and art for entertainment or image making. However, not all of
Hawaiian culture has been eliminated or incorporated. There are still
residual elements that persist on the margin, as well as recent amalga-
mations of residual and emergent cultures that are evident in tne politi-
cal demands and cultural expressions of certain segments of the
Hawaiian community.
Cultural Domination
The third theoretical perspective that is useful in understanding the
music industry of Hawaii and its music, is the theoretical perspective
that has been called "cultural imperialism" (Galtung, 1971; Hamelink,
1983; McPhail, 1981; Nordenstreng and Schiller, 1979; Tunstall, 1977).
This body of theory recognizes the dependent relationships that exist
between the cultures of the developed world and the Third World or,
more broadly, the relationships that exist between the large exporters
of culture (U.S.A., Britain, Japan) and the cultures of "small coun-
tries" (countries such as Denmark and Sweden, as well as Third World
countries) (Wallis & Maim, 1984). In many ways Hawaii's political,
economic and cultural experience parallels the experiences of develop-
ing countries that have gone tnrough periods of colonialism and neo-
colonialism. The major difference is that for Hawaii imperialism pro-
ceeded to territorial annexation and, finally, to statehood.
Wallis and Maim (1984), in their study of music in "small
countries," delineate different types of cultural interaction between
countries: cultural exchange, cultural dominance, and cultural
imperialism. All three patterns of interaction have been part of the
textual productivity of Hawaiian music. The least threatening is cultural
exchange. This describes the process wherein two or more cultures or
subcultures interact and exchange cultural styles on more or less equal
terms. Examples of this in Hawaii are the adoption, adaptation and in-
corporation of the guitar and the ukulele into Hawaiian music. With the
guitar, which was introduced by cowboys (the paniala) who came in the
first half of the 1800s from Mexico and California, the Hawaiians devel-
oped their own unique style of playing - slack key. The ukulele was
brought to Hawaii by the Portuguese in the 1870s (Kanahele, 1979).
Both instruments were creatively integrated into the text of Hawaiian
music in ways that were not simply imitative of another culture. An
example of Hawaii as contributor to cultural exchange is the steel
guitar, originally a mechanical modification of the guitar which
Hawaiians pioneered in the late 1800s, and which has become a familiar
sound in country-western music.
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The second type of cultural interaction, cultural dominance, occurs
when a more powerful culture is imposed on another in a more or less
systematic fashion. During the 1800s, cultural dominance was evident
in the missionaries discouragement of hula and later Gn the 1800s and
throughout most of the 1900s) in the curriculum of Hawaii's schools
where Western culture was taught while Hawaiian language and culture
were neglected or even, in some schools, discouraged. Since the early
1900s the mass media have been instrumental in maintaining the cultur-
al dominance of the mainland.
The third pattern of cultural interaction is cultural imperialism. Here
dominance is augmented by the transfer of money and/or resources
from the dominated to dominating culture. This type of cultural interac-
tion was most evident through the first half of the 1900s when Hawaiian
music was very popular on the mainland, and mainland record compa-
nies garnered considerable profits with very little of that money ever
coming back to local composers and musicians.
TOURISM AND HAWAIIAN MUSIC
One of the major forces in the political economy of Hawaii is tourism
which currently employs approximately one-fourth of the state's labor
force (Hawaii Department of Planning and Economic Development,
1983). Since the 1920s tourism has played a major role in shaping the
culture and music of Hawaii. A type of symbiotic relationship exists be-
tween tourism and local music with tourism providing jobs for local
musicians and a market for the local recording industry, and music, in
its turn, providing a resource that enhances the lure of Hawaii as a tour-
ist destination and entertains tourists when they're in Hawaii. Within
the context of the tourist market, the basic effect of music commoditi-
zation is compounded by the unequal, essentially imperialistic, rela-
tionship that exists between the owners/managers of the tourist
industry, which is dominated by multinational corporations (Kent,
1983), and local musicians/performers.
Culturally, tourism has played a major role in redefining Hawaiian
values and practices. The perceptions that outsiders have of Hawaiians,
and to some extent the self-perceptions that Hawaiians have of
themselves, have been affected by stereotypes created by the tourist in-
dustry and further disseminated by media throughout the world. The
more "positive" stereotypes of Hawaiians have been exploited by the
tourist industry and the state to promote Hawaii. These are the ste-
reotypes of beautiful, exotic hula maidens; friendly beach boys; happy
lei makers; large, lazy, happy-go-lucky Hawaiians sleeping under coco-
nut palms; ukulele-strumming musicians; and funny tour guides-not
the images of people to be taken very seriously (Brown, 1982;
Maretzki, 1974). The following song, popular in the 1950s, expresses
the Hawaiian stereotype:
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Mama don't scold me, I no go work today
Down there in Iwilei in the pineapple cannery.
Mama don't scold me, I bring a lei for you,
I sing all day for you, the songs of Hawaii.
Fish and poi, fish and poi,
All I need is fish and poi.
Sunshine free, Waikiki, no care tomorrow.
Sister Bell, dress up swell,
Dance the hula in the big hotel.
Shake this way, shake that way, no care tomorrow.
Mama don't scold her, someday she catch a boy
She bring him fish and poi at the pineapple cannery.
Mama no feel bad, someday I sure make good.
Hawaii get Statehood, make President maybe.
Fish and poi, fish and poi,
All I need is fish and poi.
Need no more from the store, no care tomorrow.
Fish and poi, fish and poi,
All day long eat fish and poi.
Big opu [stomach), no huhu [worry), no care Tomorrow.
Pitman/Magoon (49th State)
During the territorial period, when tourists came by boat and re-
mained for relatively long periods of time, they stayed in a few big
hotels such as the Royal Hawaiian, the Moana, and the Halekulani.
These hotels had their big bands, such as the Royal Hawaiians under
the direction of Harry Owens and the Moana Orchestra under Johnny
Noble, which played a combination of the big band swing music of that
era along with hapa-haole music that tourists could relate to. A lot of
the hapa-haole music was written by these musicians; for instance,
Harry Owens wrote Sweet Leilani, and Johnny Noble wrote My Little
Grass Shack and Hula Blues.
With the advent of statehood in 1959, the introduction of jet travel to
and from the islands, and the rapid construction of hotels in Waikiki
and on the neighbor islands, tourism became big business and, like
other large industries, began to adopt techniques for increasing profits
through economies of scale. For tourism this has meant the packaging
of tourists into tour groups that can be moved in, out and about the is-
lands with ease (Kent, 1983). Along with the packaging of the tourists
came the packaging of entertainment (Hawaiian music and dance, sup-
plemented by other Polynesian music and dance) into shows pre-
booked by tour agents back home or by local agents in hotel lobbies.
These big tourist shows, starring such name-entertainers as Don Ho,
Al Harrington, and Ed Kinney, or the Polynesian revues of Tahiti,
operate under long-term contracts ("Tying a Ribbon on the 'Strip
Packet'," 1974; "Entertaining the Masses," 1981). These shows sell
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tourist~ a corrupted (and corrupting) version of Polynesian music and
entertamme.nt (a little bit of Hawaiian hula and singing along with
S~m?an k111~e and slap. dances,. ~ahitian shimmies, Maori tongue-
stIckmg routmes and pOI-ball tWirling, and Fijian fire dancing) while
between nU~bers, t?e emcee tells "visitor" jokes, announces the birth:
days and an111versanes of t~ose pre,~ent, and tells where the tour groups
are from. These sho~s, which are offered" almost nightly throughout
the ye~r, cost approximately $35 for the dinner package or $20 for the
cocktaIl packa.ge ("Tihati's Drums' Is a Passport to Polynesia," 1984).
M?re than IS true of the recording industry or performances of music
outs~de of Waikiki, commercial forces and motivations dominate the
musIc. of Waikiki. One of the ironies of the Hawaiian music scene is
that with a few exceptions (for instance, Alfred Apaka in the 1950s) the
best ?! the H~waiian musicians - those respected by local lovers of
Hawallan musIc - are the ones least likely to "make it" in Waikiki.
When they are performing in Waikiki it is often in less commercial
ven.ues, such as small lounges, or as background music for dining, or
durmg the. day when hotels, such as the Halekulani and the Hyatt
Reg~ncy, hIre son:e very good "old time" Hawaiian musical groups to
provide. an Hawallan atmosphere. The value of music in Waikiki is
based either on its ~bi~ity to sell itself directly to tourists (what they will
pay to go to) or, mdlrectly, to provide the tourist experience with a
semblance of contact with authentic Hawaiian culture.
Although th~ ~elationship of tourism and music was characterized
abov~ as symbIOtic, the powel~ with~n the relationship is almost totally
one-sided. The unequal relatIOnship that exists between those who
own and manage the hotels in Waikiki and the local musicians who
w~rk t~e~e is a function of the social and economic relationships that
eXist wlthm the industry.
~ro~ the early days of tourism to the present, the hotel jobs that the
maJonty of local people get have been menial, poorly paid and seasonal
(Kent, 1983). While the jobs of local musicians may be less menial
they. are also poo~ly compensated and even more insecure. With the ex:
c~ptlOn of the big-name entertainers, it is impossible for most musi-
cla':ls t? make e??ugh money to adequately support a family in Hawaii.
l!1110~IZe? mUSIcians see themselves in a no-win situation: if the musi-
cians. U1110n pu.sh~s salary scales higher than the hotels are willing to
pay, Jobs are elimmated or performances are cut back with the result
that more musicians join the ranks of the unemployed or
underemployed. Because entertainment cut-back and start-up costs for
the hotels are minimal, entertainers have little bargaining leverage. In
other words, the demands of the tourist industry are elastic (based on
the. health of the tourist industry and the musical tastes of tourists)
while the supply of Hawaiian musicians is relatively inelastic. As <~
re~ult most local musicians depend on other jobs for their main source
ofmcome.
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"Fortunately, not all of live Hawaiian music is devoted to entertaining
tourists. The awakening of ethnic and political awareness among
Hawaiians in the 1970s was expressed, in part, in a resurgence of inter-
est in the traditional music of the islands and in contemporary musical
expressions of ethnic pride and political protest. Local musicians began
performing outside of Waikiki in small clubs and restaurants, in open-
air concerts, and at numerous protest rallies. Hawaiian music also
served as a symbol of protest for other groups disenchanted with the
status-quo and opposed to the dehumanizing development taking place
in Hawaii. In the mid-1980s we still see a relatively steady fare of
nontourist-oriented Hawaiian music at local clubs and restaurants, but
not at the same level of activity as during the 1970s, and the explicit
political nature of the music is less evident.
'IHE JRECOJRJDKNG INDlJS'fRY
Most of the music which the people that live in Hawaii listen to over
the radio or television, go to hear, or buy in record stores comes from
the mainland. Local retailers sell the latest popular music, radio stations
offer the same Top 40 formats and/or canned news and features as
mainland stations, the big rock acts come regularly to Honolulu, and
the classical music offerings - symphony, opera, ballet - are similar
to cities of comparable size on the mainland. Hawaiian music, even in
Hawaii, is a marginal music. The marginality of Hawaian music is evi-
dent in the fact that only one local radio station (KCCN) plays
Hawaiian music regularly, although, as one of 17 AM and nine FM
radio stations on Oahu, it generally manages to stay within the ten top
stations in terms of listenership. Hawaii, however, is different from the
rest of the U.S. in that it is the only state that has maintained a musical
tradition and style of its own, as well as a separate music industry
which, although heavily influenced by the mainland music industry, is
now relatively independent.
The history and development of the record industry in Hawaii can be
divided into two phases: the first period which was dominated by the
mainland music industry; and the second and current phase in which
the record industry has been locally owned and operated. The domi-
nance of the mainland record companies was virtually unchallenged
from the first decade of the 1900s until the middle of the 1940s. During
the 1950s a number of local recording companies were started which
coexisted with the mainland giants until the sixties, when the mainland
lost interest in "Hawaiian" music. Since then, except for occasional
distribution of a local hit, the local recording industry has been left to
the "homegrown" companies.
The relationships that existed between Hawaiian music and the main-
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land record industry during the early period fits the definition given
above of cultural imperialism: the transfer of money or resources from
the dominated culture to the dominating culture. Mainland record
companies used Hawaiian music (or music which seemed Hawaiian) to
make money, little of which came back to the original composers or to
the people whose culture was being marketed. Very similar processes
of exploitation and expropriation have taken place and are still going on
with regard to the music of Third World countries where the interna-
tional music industry extracts music (i.e., reggae) for the international
music market.
The recording industry in Hawaii goes back to the early 1900s when,
following annexation, Americans became interested in Hawaiian
music. According to Hopkins (1979), record-making started in Hawaii
in 1905 with the arrival of the Victor Talking Machine Company. In one
year Victor recorded and released 53 records. Five years later, Colum-
bia arrived and began to record - both companies recording at this
time primarily for the local market. When the Hawaiian music craze
swept the mainland (as well as much of Europe) as a result of the Broad-
way musical, Bird of Paradise, and the appearance of Hawaiian musi-
cians at the Panama-Pacific International Exhibition in 1915, the pace of
"Hawaiian music" production was intense as record companies tried to
capitalize on this huge market.
Composers and performers who had never even been to the islands
began writing, performing and recording "Hawaiian music" for the
large mainland market. Many of Hawaii's musicians also performed on
the mainland during this era. By 1917 Victor had released 50 Hawaiian
78-rpm records. After a peak of recording activity between 1926 and
1929, during which time Brunswick, a mainland-owned company, had
set up a local recording stUdio, the depression nearly ended the record
industry. However, production picked up again in the thirties, with
Decca the leading producer of Hawaiian music. 1939 catalogs showed
Victor with 189 Hawaiian records and Decca with 391. During the fifties
(following another break for the war) mainland record companies were
primarily producing new versions of earlier hapa-haole hits, such as
Andy Williams singing the "Hawaiian Wedding Song" and Billy Vaug-
han's "Hawaiian War Chant" (Hailono Mele, March 1979).
The first locally-owned recording company began in 1936 as part of
the operations ofKGU, the first local radio station which was owned by
the Honolulu Advertise,: At first the records were just transcriptions of
live radio programs for use by other NBC affiliates. In time, however,
Hawaiian Transcription Productions began to release singles for the
local market - residents and tourists. The first local record company to
dominate the local market was Bell Records which began in 1944. Bell
produced the first solo recordings of Alfred Apaka, Andy Cummings
and Gabby Pahinui. At the end of the 1940s Bill Fredlund, the owner of
Bell, claimed he was selling "tens of thousands of 78-rpm records each
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month, most of them in Hawaii" (Hopkins:328). When Bell sold out,
49th State Records, owned by George Ching, a Honolulu record store
owner, took over as the largest local record producer, putting out a tre-
mendous number of Hawaiian records, mostly hula music for the tour-
ist market. Most of the music of 49th State Records has been re-
recorded on long-playing discs and is still available.
In th~ 1950s several new local labels were started: Waikiki Records,
Tradewmd Records (which stressed authenticity and released albums
of ukulele and slack key guitar music), Hula Records (also with a more
traditional orientation), and Music of Polynesia, the company of Jack
de Iy,Iello which, n:ore than the other local record companies, geared its
musIC to the tounst market, producing a kind of Hawaiian muzac. The
1960s were years of inactivity for the Hawaiian music industry as rock
and roll dominated everything. By 1969 the interest of the U.S. record-
ing industry had declined to a point where Decca and Capitol the two
bigge~~ national producers of Hawaiian recordings, dro~ped the
Hawal1an category completely ("Music Seen as Potential," 1972). Even
the local record companies had little motivation to record since the
market for Hawaiian music seemed to be only tourists and oldtimers-
both groups happy with re-releases of already-recorded music.
However, with the political and cultural revitalization of Hawaii in
the 1970s the local recording industry took off. As the seventies prog-
ressed several new local companies started, such as Lehua, Makaha
Sounds of Hawaii, Poki Records, Pumehana, Mountain Apple, Seabird
Sound, Paradise Records, and Panini Productions. It was the latter
which "rediscovered" Gabby Pahinui, releasing a major album of
Gabby and the Sons of Hawaii in 1971. Just as on the mainland, many of
the local contemporary artists started their own labels in the seventies
so that they could have more control over the production oftheir music
and also receive more of the proceeds. However, with only a few nota-
ble exceptions (e.g., Peter Moon), the artist-controlled labels have not
been as successful as the larger record companies, primarily because
they lack the capital, but also because they do not have the
"know-how" and contacts necessary to produce and promote a record.
It is in the "failure" of many local singers/groups that one becomes
aware of the intricacies of the legal and financial systems that now con-
strain the production of music. For instance, if a musician wants to
enter the music market, it is almost a necessity to have an agent or
lawyer that can advise on matters of copyright and contracts with record
publishers; on legal problems having to do with things like "residuals"
"mechanicals," "performance royalties," and "synchronization"· ~n
relationships with recording studios in Honolulu and/or the mainland
(m~ny groups/singers use mainland studios for tne final "mixing" of
their albums, and Hawaii still does not have a record pressing plant)·
and on. the adver~ising en~ of the recording process ~ packaging:
promotmg and selling the artist as well as his or her musical product.
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It has been estimated that the minimum capital needed to produce a
record locally is $12,000, but this would not buy much in the way of
studio time or sophisticated recording backup. A more reasonable cost
range is between $20,000, what it cost to finance the 1983 Hoku-
winning album, Audy Kimura's "Looking for the Good Life," and
$45,000, what it cost to produce "Harbor Lights," the Peter Mo?n
Band's 1983 record ("Local Sound Battles Mainland MUSIC,
Economics," 1984). These costs are not high by mainland standards,
but such amounts are hard to come by for local artists, particularly for
unknown artists. For an artist-initiated record, the necessary capital can
be acquired in a number of ways-borrowed from friends and family,
advanced by a record company with an agreement that part of the sales
will cover the company's costs and also provide a profit, or a recording
studio might allow recording time in return for a percentage of sales.
(Hawaii Songwriters Conference, 1983).
During the mid-1970s, the production and sale of local recordings
was very strong, with some albums selling 50,000 to 100,000 units,
where previously 5,000, or even 3,000, was considered a successful
record sale. In 1978 an average of ten records a month were being
released, with an estimated total of 250,000 units sold, generating a
revenue of from one to six million dollars. Locally produced records ac-
counted for about 20 percent of total record sales in the seventies, with
about half bought by tourists (Hailon0 Me/e, January 1980;
"Multi-million Dollar Business," 1979). Today local recording activity
is down considerably from the 1970s. Whereas as many as ten albums a
month were released in 1978, in 1983 only 35 albums were issued for the
year. "Harbor Lights," Peter Moon's 1983 release, had sold only 15,000
copies, and Audy Kimura's prize-winning album had sold only 12,500
copies after nine months. Now locally produced records account for
only about 10 percent of the three to four million albums and cassettes
sold here in a year.
With the cooling off of the local recording industry, it appears that
commercial considerations are becoming stronger in the production
and selection of music. In order to compete with mainland music,
Hawaiian musicians must produce albums that are as good technically
as those coming from the mainland. To sell their albums they must also
offer a selection of music that will attract the widest possible market.
For instance, in his latest albums Peter Moon, one of the most success-
ful of the local artists and one who has managed to avoid Waikiki, tries
to offer a musical mix that will have a wide appeal. His 1983 "Harbor
Lights" album features a boogie-woogie number, some restylizations
of old favorites, a blues ballad, several slack-key pieces, reggae, rock,
and several new songs in Hawaiian and/or about Hawaiian themes by
local composers.
And to sell a record in the tighter market of the eighties, exposure is
vital. According to Wayne Harada, the popular music critic of the Hono-
The Hawaii Music Industry 149
lulu Advertiser, this requires having an act: "You can't just plop four
guys in a lounge, who have no concepts of doing a performance, and
expect clubs or audiences to tolerate it" ("Local Sound," 1984). It also
means joining the Hawaii Academy of Recording Arts which makes an
album eligible for a Na Hoku Hanohano Award. If a
singer/composer/group is really serious it means getting a manager
who can get club dates, TV commercials, radio interviews, items in the
gossip columns, etc.
If the local resident market continues to decline, there is the danger
that tourists, as record buyers or as a tempting live entertainment
market, may become an even more important influence on local music.
The Brothers Cazimero are an illustration of the successful commer-
cialization of an act that prides itself on its traditional Hawaiian roots.
However, they have circumvented the promotional merry-go-round
that most local musicians are on only by selling large Christmas and
May Day concerts (through intense media promotions) and with a long-
running engagement in the Royal Hawaiian Hotel's Monarch Room.
According to their manager, Jon de Mello, "To make a living at
entertaining, you can't turn your back on Waikiki. Waikiki is a very
strong market; it has a lot of visitors... .If you're only a local drawing
act, you can't go down to Waikiki and expect it to happen" ("Local
Sounds," 1984).
CONCJLUSJION
In the introduction we said that Hawaiian music in an intertext of
many different texts, and that the codes, formulae and structure of the
capitalist music industries operating in Hawaii have been important
texts within Hawaiian music. We also said that, while a dominant cul-
tural system most often incorporates residual and emergent cultures
into the dominant system so tnat they too become part of the definition
of the dominant culture, there may be marginal cultures that coexist
with the dominant culture, managing to maintain some degree of separ-
ate identity. Although it is evident that much of the Hawaiian music
text represents a residual culture that has been incorporated within the
dominant culture, there is still a part of Hawaiian music that is marginal
and, to some extent, part of a residual/emergent culture that is trying
to be at least an alternative culture, if not an oppositional culture. This
Hawaiian marginal/residual/emergent culture is under constant
tension, however, in its strain toward separateness and cultural autono-
my vis-a-vis the dominant capitalist culture.
As a symbol of Hawaiian culture, many young musicians respect the
music of earlier eras and continue to use it in their performances or in
their own albums, sometimes with minor style modifications, some-
times with radical modifications. Because many local people do recog-
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nize the cultural importance of Hawaiian music, participants in the in-
dustry - composers, singers, musicians, procucers - are aware, or at
least are soon made aware, that what they produce or perform is subject
to the criticism of other participants (including many involved
listeners) - quite a few of whom are trying to protect and preserve the
Hawaiian language and the integrity of Hawaiian music as an expression
of Hawaiian culture.
At a 1983 conference of Hawaiian songwriters and performers, the
future of Hawaiian music was discussed and debated by participants
that included scholars of Hawaiian music and culture; composers
and/or entertainers active during the last forty years or so; media repre-
sentatives including staff from KCCN (one of the sponsors of the
conference); record producers; as well as people who just listen to and
enjoy Hawaiian music enough to give up one or two days from their
weekend. Several issues were raised throughout the course of the
conference. One had to do with the perennial debate as to what is
Hawaiian music. Another, related issue, had to do with the importance
of the Hawaiian language to Hawaiian music. Many of the young
composers expressed a feeling of frustration that they could not com-
pose in what should be their mother tongue, that if they want to com-
pose an Hawaiian song, they must find someone who can capture the
feeling expressed in tne English words and put it into Hawaiian; while
kupunas (oldtimers) in the audience voiced their distress in hearing
Hawaiian words used inappropriately or mispronounced, and expressed
their willingness to help young composers and singers.
Concerns were also raised about the business of Hawaiian music and
the future prospects of the local music industry in light of rising costs
and a decreasing market, or about the possibility of contemporary local
music and performers breaking into the mainland music market.
However, some also wondered about the more fundamental problem
of the effects of the market system on the integrity of Hawaiian music,
particularly in a tight music market. Will the music continue to express
the uniqueness of Hawaiian culture and continue to playa role in the
political and ethnic consciousness of the Hawaiians?
In some ways Hawaii's local recording industry is an example of what
Third World countries would like to achieve, - a locally owned indus-
try that serves as an outlet for the traditional music of the past and that
offers contemporary musicians a system within which to produce their
own music. However, the music industry of Hawaii also illustrates the
danger that any capitalist mode of music production holds for tradition-
al cultures when they must operate within the context of the larger in-
ternational and national culture industries. Such a system, by its very
nature, exerts a centralizing pull on marginal cultures. It remains to be
seen if Hawaiian music, as a symbol of ethnic pride for Hawaiians and
of an alternative culture for others, can survive as an active and creative
force within Hawaii.
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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HAWAII
AND WORKING CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS
Edward D. Beechert
In recent years there has been increasing interest in analyzing the de-
velopment of Hawaiian society and its political economy. Differing
from the traditional political elite-player type of historical analysis,
some have tried to apply a Marxist scheme of analysis to the direction
and character of Hawaiian historical development. Clearly, the anecdo-
tal elite history leaves much to be desired. One knows a great deal
about a handful of individuals, and very little about the mass of people
who have made up Hawaiian society and who have been the chief
producers of the modern economy.l
Two recent interpretations deserve special examination. Noel
Kent's, Hawaii: Islands Under the Inf7uence (1983), and Robert H.
Stauffer's The Tragic Maturing of Hawaii's Economy (1984). Each of
these finds the development of modern Hawaii's political economy to
be retrograde and one which has exploited and, to varying degrees,
degraded the condition of Hawaii's working class. Such developments
as the transition from an industrial type plantation agriculture to a
service-type economy, featuring a low wage tourist industry at one pole
and government employment at the other, are vividly described in the
two works.
Several important problems are raised by these conclusions about
Hawaii. Although Kent correctly describes and rejects Kuykendal's
documentary approach to the political history of Hawaii, the majority of
his analysis follows in that same tradition. The "movers and shakers"
make decisions and the faceless masses follow along. Only in his con-
clusion does Kent come to the question of the level of the conscious-
ness of the working class. Left unexamined are the many examples of
working class behavior which suggest the dialectical nature of Hawaiian
development. As is frequently the case in the use of the dependency
model of analysis, there is an unstated, but ever present, assumption
about a "different" historical experience which would have been
available, absent the described "influences." Favorable or unfavorable
judgements about investment patterns are made according to these
"influences". Something or someone would cause decisions to be
made which would have resulted in a more benign situation. Put anoth-
er way, dependency theory tends to decry the present as a distortion of
a past which would have been more benign, absent the "outside"
influences.
Stauffer's work explicitly uses this model in applying a version of
Latin American dependency theory to Hawaii's post-1959
development. By defining Hawaiian development as "colonial" rather
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than "true, local development" he finds the modern Hawaiian econo-
my to be "tragic." The model is similar to the one used by Kent, and is
based upon the ideas of Andre Gunder Frank (1967, 1969) and the
"dependency" thesis of international capitalism. To a lesser extent,
Paul Baran's (1957) thesis of "underdevelopment" is a model,2
In these studies the flow of capital from the metropolitan center to
exploit the labor and resources of the dependent area determines the
nature of economic development. Typically this is shown to be a type of
development which promotes further dependency and poverty among
the people of the dependent country and removes decision making to
the metropolitan center.
Both of these studies are curiously static in positing an unchanging,
dependent relationship and seem to rule out any possibility of change
short of a revolutionary situation. The current crisis of world capitalism
would seem to suggest that while strategies may be proposed and given
striking titles (e.g. Pacific Rim Strategy), many factors can and do inter-
vene to change those strategies or plans. Interestingly, the most pro-
gressive forces for change in the un- or under-developed world are
found squarely rooted in local history and traditions - not in ideologi-
cal abstractions. Witness the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the FMLN in EI
Salvador, and the struggles in the Philippines, to name only a few.
While these movements against capitalist exploitation are led by
"intellectuals" of varying persuasions, their wide-spread support is
drawn largely from peasant populations who have for several centuries
struggled against both local and foreign oppressors.
To reduce local history to a matter of the locus of capital is to fall into
a fatalistic economism. It also involves casting the local. "bourgeoisie"
into the role of benevolent capitalist, at best, or that of subservient
"lumpen-bourgeoisie" at worst (Frank, 1972). The evidence would
suggest that they are very likely neither. Holders of wealth usually
make an effort to multiply that wealth and may send their capital in vari-
ous directions. The scanty evidence available for Hawaii suggests that
the local bourgeoisie did invest heavily in the local sugar industry after
1875. They also invested heavily in "foreign" economic opportunities,
including the Philippine sugar industry, oil, manufacturing interests,
railroads, and other opportunities on the mainland. From an early point
(1859), the "missionary" families, Castle and Cooke, had New York
financial advisors to assist in the placement of their surplus capital.
Walkers' Manual of Far Western Corporations and Securities
(1911-1960) is filled with the names of Hawaiian investors in non-
Hawaiian activities, as well as non-Hawaiian investors in Hawaiian
sugar companies. Five of the large Hawaiian plantations were organized
as California corporations between 1882 and 1899, including Hawaiian
Commercial and Sugar.
Several important problems of definition and methodology need to
be examined. The method of historical materialism would seem to sug-
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gest that such conclusions, stated or unstated, are distinctly outside the
framework of a Marxian analysis. While the writers cited have located
the motive force for change in the productive forces of the society - in
fact, forces which determine civil society - they seem to have fallen by
the wayside in projecting " .. .later history as the goal of earlier
history....Thereby history receives its own special aims and becomes a
'person ranking with other persons'. In effect, such history becomes a
self-fulfilling prophecy" (Marx 1981:57-58).
The theme I want to explore here is best expressed in Marx' state-
ment of the problem:
This conception of history depends upon our ability to expound
the real process of production starting from the material produc-
tion of life itself, and to comprehend the form of intercourse
connected with this and created by this mode of production
[i.e., civil society in various stages], as the basis of all
history.... [At each stage of history1 there is found a material
result: a sum of productive forces, an historically created rela-
tion of individuals to nature and to one another, which is
handed down to each generation....It shows that circumstances
make men just as much as men make circumstances. (Marx
1981:59)
Consider for a moment the problem of defining the working class of
Hawaii. On a crude level, it is often assumed simply to be those who
work. From this simple fact, it is assumed that there is a consciousness
which translates into an awareness of the social relations of production.
More frequently, the evidence of militant behavior, particularly orga-
nized strikes, is assumed to be a measure of class consciousness. Al-
though class is clearly one of the most ambiguous of all Marxian terms,
the development of consciousness seems more clearly marked out than
most aspects of class analysis. The problem is whether or not the work-
ing class, "one among many competing interest groups," is constrained
by legal, systemic barriers, or is transformed into a consciousness
which acts as the agent of the workers in their struggle against
capitalism, free to direct its power toward obtaining control over work-
ing conditions, perhaps to be the revolutionary gravedigger of capital-
ism (Aronowitz 1974:420).
The problem is not easily resolved. It has been pointed out that the
worker frequently holds private views which contradict his organiza-
tional views. This is seen most often when workers accept the political
recommendations of a union even if they hold private views quite
different. " ... (T) he class political attitude of the workers.. .is not at all
the same as, and sometimes even contradicts, the sum totals of their
private views" (Harrington 1974:133).
Marx divided the approach to class into two segments. On the one
hand, there is the history of class struggle, as in the Manifesto. This has
been termed the "macro" level of class struggle. At the point of class
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consciousness, one is dealing with the "micro" level of analysis. Al-
though these two aspects are inseparable, it is important to distinguish
between the two. In the sense in which we are using it here, class comes
into existence at the point where classes begin to acquire a conscious-
ness of themselves as a class in relation to another class. 3
This is the point at which confusion and difficulty set in. The dynamic
relationship which defines class is too frequently frozen to facilitate
examination. The difficulty of using the concept, however, does not
preclude a careful examination.
In one of his early writings, Marx clearly posed the problem of deal-
ing with this dynamic relationship. "Private property", he said, "is
compelled to maintain itself, and thereby its opposite, the proletariat, in
existence" (Marx & Engels 1956:51). In effect, the condition of the
working class at any given point in history is a reciprocal of the ruling
class organization of the means of production. A measure, then, of the
state of society is to be found in the conditions of employment - the
social relations of production. These two aspects of the dynamics of
class must be considered simultaneously. Thus, to speak of the econo-
my only in terms of capital investment, and to discern in the source of
that capital significant conclusions as to the nature of the economy, is
to ignore the fact that the patterns of investment will create a dialectic
which will produce changes in the attitudes and responses of the work-
ing class. That the working class does not respond in an automatic
manner is only to admit that while "Men make their own history, they
do not make it just as they please," but are conditioned by all of the in-
herited circumstances and traditions (Marx 1883:13).
Marx described two levels of class consciousness. In one sense the
workers form a class in itself; and in a higher sense, a class for itself. In
this latter role, organization is the means by which class consciousness
expresses itself. It is through this means that the working class endeav-
ors to bring about the changes in the work relationships (the social rela-
tions of production) which will objectively alter the conditions requiring
change. As one examines the political economy of Hawaii over the
years, it becomes clear that the condition and consciousness of the
working class are responses to the conditions imposed by capital. At
each point of examination, we find the responses of the working class,
as they perceive the situation, are often incorrect. The problem of
"false consciousness" is one which recurs with a dismal frequency. 4
If one uses the technique of the dialectic to organize the meaning,
one cannot draw conclusions about "tragic maturing" or "falling
under" the influence of capitalism and the many other similies used to
identify and describe the Hawaiian political economy. The particular
level of development one perceives at any given time is already in the
process of change.
In the studies under review, there is the implication that the economy
has taken a turn for the worse, creating "menial jobs" instead of more
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fulfilling, ego-satisfying employment. To suggest that such a develop-
ment is the product of failed decisions of "leaders," is to ignore the his-
tory of capitalism (Kent 1983: 137, 153). A recent forum on tourism
was devoted largely to attacking the industry for its creation of menial-
type employment, without ever explaining what alternatives might
have been created in the way of employment. This static mode of analy-
sis obscures the important fact that the quality of employment under
capitalism is no more than the sum of (I) the efforts of the employer to
control wages in order to insure the maximum profit, and (2) the resis-
tance of workers to these efforts. If employment can ever be said to be
"menial," in itself a dubious proposition, then this is a commentary on
the relationship between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Employ-
ment per se cannot be menial or demeaning; the conditions attaching to
the work can be, and often are, demeaning. This was the condition of
the plantation workers until 1944.
The work of society can, and should, be carried on under conditions
which maintain the dignity of the individual. This is measured by the
level of remuneration and the relations prevailing in that employment.
If the working class has sufficient consciousness of its role and has
moved to express that role, the work required to be done will not be
demeaning, menial, or whatever perjorative term is employed. Atten-
tion should focus instead on the qualities which degrade the work
condition.
The description of work as demeaning or trivial echoes exactly the
complaint Marx launched against the Hegelian and early 19th century
critics of mass movements when there was a tendency among socialist
writers to decry the "spiritless masses". The answer Marx suggests to
this tendency is applicable here.
The Great appear great in our eyes
Only because we kneel.
Let us rise!
But to rise it is not enough to do so in thought and to leave
hanging over our real sensual head the real palpable yoke
that cannot be subtilized away with ideas (Marx, 1956: Ill).
In the following section, we will review briefly the major points of de-
velopment in the Hawaiian political economy from the beginning of the
sugar industry to the development of the modern service sector, with a
focus on the awareness and responses of the Hawaiian working class as
a result of these transformations.
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THE WORKERS RESPONSE TO HAWAHAN CAPI1rAUSM
Beginning, then, with the notion that:
History does nothing, it possesses no immense wealth, it wages
no battles. It is man, real living man, that does all that, that
possesses and fights; history is not a person apart, using man as
a means for its own particular aims; history is nothing but the ac-
tivity of man pursuing his aims, (Marx 1956:125)
we can examine the responses of the workers of Hawaii at each of sever-
al critical junctures in an effort to determine the level of working class
consciousness.
Westerners were struck by two important facts on arriving in early
nineteenth century Hawaii. The abundance of vacant land and the
benign climate suggested the great wealth which this combination had
produced elsewhere. In contrast with the poor soil and complex political
conditions surrounding the Caribbean sugar producing islands and the
Latin American plantation economies, the Hawaii situation seemed
positively outstanding.
Between 1826 and 1850, vigorous attempts were made to convert the
Hawaiian commoner into an appropriate, western-oriented labor force,
while efforts were made to convert the Hawaiian communal land
system 5 to a fee simple, private property status, suitable for capitalist
investment. Idleness was proclaimed a vice, and was an offense under
the rapidly evolving western-style political structure. The crumbling
Hawaiian political authority attempted to convert the traditional power
of the ruling chiefs, based upon a communal society, into one of wealth
accumulation, based upon the laboring class Hawaiian. The results
were indifferent, to say the least.
A survey conducted by the western-type government in 1846,
revealed the degree of the failure to convert commoners into compliant
wage-workers 6. Reports from all areas of the islands showed the
Hawaiians' refusal to work for low wages. They could only be attracted
into wage labor for varying periods of time when the offer was attractive
enough to persuade them to leave their subsistence activities. The
demanded wage levels were seen as further evidence of the unsuitable
"nature" of the Hawaiian, Clearly, an agricultural-export economy
could not survive on what was seen as exorbitant wage demands. 7
It was this refusal to submit to low wages which played a major role in
the enactment of an indentured labor system in 1850, duplicating the
previous experiences of other sugar producing areas of the world. The
Masters and Servants Act of 1850 provided for the signing oflabor con-
tracts which were to be enforced by penal sanctions. The act, almost
incidentally, provided for the importation of indentured workers. 8
The initial flurry of sugar planting, and the crude efforts to refine
sugar, slowly dwindled between 1836 and 1861 as the lack of capital and
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of an adequate market forced a majority of the planters out of the
business. Spurred by the sudden appearance of a market created by the
American Civil War, sugar production expanded rapidly after 1861;
from 572 tons in 1861 to 8,865 tons in 1864. This market continued
with the growth of the pacific coast population which became a virtual
monopoly market for Hawaiian sugar.
Planters had considerable difficulty in financing the development of
land and the mills. The semi-arid nature of much of the available land
dictated the building of expensive and massive irrigation systems to
ensure the expansion of production. Rapidly changing sugar refining
technology was also prohibitively expensive. Hawaiian sugar could not
meet the pacific coast market with the old, low grade cake-sugar of ear-
lier years. It was at this point that the Honolulu merchant community
entered the picture to finance the expansion of the plantations, in
company with loans from the Hawaiian government. 9
Up to 1875, labor demands in sugar had been met largely with
Hawaiian labor. At that point, some two-thirds of the sugar workers
were Hawaiian and only small numbers of Chinese had been imported.
Although there had been much discussion of the "labor question"
before 1875, it was mostly empty rhetoric induced by the Hawaiian's
demand for decent wages.
Financing was the greatest obstacle to expansion. With the signing of
the Reciprocity Treaty in 1875, the pattern changed dramatically. Ad-
mission duty free to the American market meant, in effect, a subsidy of
2 1/2 cents per pound of sugar, above the market price (Taylor
1935:16,62-65; McCllelan 1899:8).
The demand for capital changed the entire structure of the industry.
With ready capital available, the industry expanded furiously. Equally
great was the demand for labor. The declining Hawaiian population
could not supply much more than the numbers already engaged. The
Hawaiian aristocracy, fearing a loss of sovereignty, sought,
unsuccessfully, to replenish their numbers with "cognate"
populations. Rapid increases in the numbers of Chinese workers tem-
porarily met the need. Chinese, and later Japanese immigrants, were
seen as solutions to this labor shortage problem. As the number of for-
eign laborers grew, fears of "innudation" by the never ending flood of
single male Asians grew.
Objections to Chinese, from both Hawaiian and American political
interests led to efforts to "Europeanize" the work-force, principally
with Portuguese workers. The extreme cost of importing Portuguese
families, and their tendency to depart Hawaii for California almost
immediately, led to the search for Asian sources other than Chinese.
Indentured labor conditions had little appeal to European workers,
whose complaints about abuse tended to attract unfavorable attention
from the U.S and European press and public. The only available Asian
source of laborers was Japan, and eventually, in 1885, an agreement
-------~~:...::...::.::.:.===========~--------------
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was reached for the importation of Japanese workers under a three year
contract.
Under the Masters and Servants Act, a contract worker faced drastic
penal consequences for a refusal to work as ordered or for leaving the
employment before the specified term had been met. In theory, the law
also required the master to meet all of the conditions of the contract
and forbade the use of corporal punishment, debt peonage, or unilateral
extension of contract, reduction of wages or failure to provide housing
and/or food, if specified in the contract. Needless to say, in such a
system the worker was at a serious disadvantage. Workers brought to
the magistrate on charges of "refusing bound service" could be given
jail sentences and fines. Until such fines and the trial costs were met,
the worker was confined to prison. In theory, if not in practice, there
was no limit, other than life, to the length of such terms. In practice,
these penalties were confined to more modest levels. Workers in prison
produce no sugar.
Chinese workers quickly responded to the coercive conditions of in-
dentured labor. A majority remained as sugar workers beyond their ini-
tial term, largely as free workers. As free, day workers, they organized a
labor form which put them into a more advantageous position as
regards discipline and supervision, always a sore point in plantation
labor, and which allowed a more normal employee-employer relation-
ship than that assumed under the master-servant relationship (CJS,
1936 [56]:24). Forming themselves into labor companies, they con-
tracted with the planters through their self-appointed leader for the ser-
vice sought. The money thus earned was divided according to their own
rule. This system of labor contracting continued on into the annexation
period. Japanese workers formed similar groups (Hawaii Kingdom
Board ofImmigration, 1882-98).
A situation was thus created whereby three distinct labor forms could
be found at any given time: indentured labor under penal compulsion;
free day labor able to withdraw at any time for any reason - or dis-
charged without notice - and a self-organized gang labor system con-
tracting their services. This latter system closely resembled the
"padrone" system found among Italian workers in southern U.S. agri-
culture in the late nineteenth century. Such self-selected groups were
almost always ethnically distinct.
Given the pressure to expand production after 1875, labor was in
steady demand. This pressure limited the plantations in the degree of
authority they could exert, and certainly limited the extent of abuse
which might have otherwise been used. Worker responses to the condi-
tions on Hawaii plantations in this period were largely limited to indi-
vidual reactions to personal abuse or group abuse. The conditions of
work did not permit the possibility of organized resistance or defense.
The major concern of the planters was (and is) to maintain a firm
control over the cost of labor. Cultivating and harvesting accounted for
The Political Economy ofHawaii and Working Class Consciousness 163
approximately sixty per cent of the total labor costs of sugar
production. To prevent wages from rising, sugar plantations every-
where have relied upon a steady flow of replacement labor to maintain
a relatively low level of wages and to provide a regular exodus of
workers. The system of free workers, both individually and in gangs,
was an attractive option to the sugar planters because it meant they
could expand or limit production according to the price of sugar, with-
out the fixed cost of maintaining a large indentured labor force. Free
workers could be hired or laid off according to production needs. The
important proviso was the maintenance of an adequate flow of imported
surplus laborers who could be used to deflect wage increases. The scale
of expansion suggests that the planters had neither the choice nor the
luxury of shifting labor forces to suit notions of control. From a total of
20 plantations in 1870, the number had grown to 75 by 1890. The work
force increased from 3,260 to 37,760 in the same period. Clearly, the
magnitude of the change reflects a far reaching change in the social rela-
tions of production.
The introduction of Japanese workers, recruited by the Japanese
government under the Convention of 1885, also sharply affected the
conditions of labor relations. Indentured for three years, the Japanese
worker was under the nominal control of the Japanese government,
including an Inspector of Immigrants. The control was nominal because
such officials, of whatever race, tended to be exploiters of their country-
men rather than their protectors, as is suggested by their title. The
number of Japanese workers remaining in Hawaii, as well as the eager-
ness of those at home to be recruited, suggests that the conditions were
not intolerable or unfavorable for the majority of workers. The volume
of money sent back to Japan between 1885 and 1894 averaged approxi-
mately two million yen per year (Okahata, 1971 [2] :226).
There is little or no evidence of any sense of cohesion or group identi-
ty among the different groups and types of workers in this period of
free/unfree labor. Such evidence as exists suggests little more than
spontaneous protest, often in large ethnic groups.
The growing number of free workers led, by 1893, to attempts to
impose new controls over this body of laborers. Even before the over-
throw of the monarchy, efforts were made to impose an internal pass
system to control the movement of workers, under the guise of a na-
tional registration law for all adults. The move was vetoed by the
Queen.
Shortly after the overthrow of the monarchy, the constitution was
amended to permit the importation of what amounted to Chinese serfs,
bound to labor on the plantation on pain of arrest and instant
deportation. The presence of 18,000 free Japanese workers was seen as
a distinct threat to the maintenance of a low wage structure. There were
too many planters willing to offer higher wages to obtain skilled, expe-
rienced labor. That the workers were able to bargain for better condi-
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tions or higher wages is evidenced by the complaints of the raided plan-
tations (Beechert, 1981; forthcoming).
ANNJEXATXON AND NEW LABOR TJERMS
The annexation of Hawaii in 1900 and the abolition of the penal con-
tract brought drastic changes to Hawaii. Although supporters of annex-
ation played down the dramatic change in labor relations, arguing that
more than half of the workforce in 1900 was made up of free workers,
the planters had lost the one effective device for maintaining some
degree of control over the pressure on wages. Chinese workers were
completely cut off by the Exclusion Act and Japanese became the main-
stay of the labor force. There now were only the two possibilities of
gang contracting or day wage labor. The rising frequency of labor
disturbances, (there were several strikes by Japanese workers between
1900 and 1909), suggests the importance of that third, unfree element
in restraining labor actions.
It was at this juncture that the racism which pervaded labor relations
in Hawaii began to damage the situation. From the reluctance of the
Hawaiian to accept sub-standard conditions was derived the notion of
the "innate" indolence of the Hawaiian. Such ethnic stereotypes quick-
ly enter into the conventional wisdom of the community and are accept-
ed without question. Each group of workers in turn was hailed as the
"solution" to the need for an adequate, low-cost, docile labor supply.
Each in turn, from the Chinese to the Filipino, was to be deficient in
some respect - most often in failing to respect their employers' need
for low wages and more work. As a general rule of thumb, each group
moved from the position of saviours of the industry to that of devils, to
again "acceptable" when the latest group proved to be intractable. One
typical example of this progression is seen in the description by the
U.S. Commissioner of Labor in his Report on Labor in Hawaii, 1905:
The Chinaman was the more steady and reliable
but less energetic [than the Japanesel...The Japa-
nese represents the radical, the Chinaman the
conservative side of oriental civilization.. ;His
white employers consider him [the Japanese]
mercurial, superficial and untrustworthy in busi-
ness matters. (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
1905:34-35)
Within a few years, another U.S. official reporting to Congress added
a description of the last two groups to be imported to Hawaii: Puerto
Ricans and Filipinos. He said, "The Porto Rican [sic] was considered
very much inferior to all the others until the Filipino was brought in,
and it is conceded by all, that the latter is the poorest specimen of man
that was ever introduced into the Islands" (Hawaii Territory Board of
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Immigration, Labor and Statistics 1911:3-4). The circle was. now
completed - each ethnic group, without exception, whether ASlan or
European, had been tested and found seriously wanting. . .
Sugar plantations around the world have displayed remarka~ly Slml-
lar tendencies in their attitudes toward workers and techlllques of
control. In almost all cases, labor came from Asia or Africa, and to a
limited extent, from the Pacific Islands. In all cases, the labor force was
racially distinct from the managerial class. In turn, the managers were
either the ruling class or their direct representatives. Throughout the
nineteenth century, and in some cases until 1914, labor control was
based upon an indentured labor system, modeled after the British Mas-
ters and Servants relationship, varying in details and degrees of control
from place to place (Graves & Albert, 1984).
One of the more significant ideas of labor control in all plantation
economies was that of exploiting racial differences. A corollary was to
justify rigid control on the basis of racial inferiorities. At its optimum,
the exploitation of racial differences presumed the presence of a suffi-
cient number of surplus workers to enable the threat of substitution,
which acted as a coercive device for each of the groups represented.
Given Hawaii's restricted access to alternative labor sources, this
technique remained primarily a verbal, ideological proposition. Em-
ployed on an ascending scale in the strikes of 1909, 1920 and 1937,.the
technique proved costly and ineffective. There were never suffiCient
numbers of racially different skilled workers available to replace the
massive numbers involved in these strikes.
The global recitation of ethnic deficiencies was a part of the world-
wide psychological rationalization of labor exploitation. The eminent
sociologist Max Weber, in 1893, commented on the poor working con-
ditions of the Polish immigrant workers in the Prussian sugar beet
industry, explaining the demonstrably poor working conditions and
treatment as being due to the fact that the Poles came from areas of
lower standards of living (Low Kultur) than the workers of Prussia,
(High Kultur).
It is not possible for two nationalities with different bodily
constitutions stomachs of different construction, to quite freely
compete in o~e and the same areas. It not possible for our work-
ers to compete with the Poles.... (Weber 1893:75)
The substantively different situation after annexation is seen in the
Japanese strikes of 1909 and 1920. The first strike was organized
through the Young Buddhist Association groups, and was led by Hono-
lulu intellectuals associated with the Japanese language press. The Japa-
nese had given early signs of a quick adaptation to American labor
techniques. Strikes in 1903 and 1904 showed considerable ability to
organize and present grievances, and considerable discipline among the
workers. Although confined to single plantations, they were quite effec-
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tive in securing redress of many of the grievances. The Hawaiian Sugar
Planters' Association (HSPA), organized in 1894, did not have suffi-
cient control over the industry to effectively organize a uniform labor
policy. In part through this strike,and even more so in the case of the
1920 strike, the HSPA gained greater authority and uniformity of
policy. The strike of 1909, affecting only Oahu plantations, presented a
cogent, highly analytical statement of the grievances of the Japanese
workers. Most of these grievances were non-economic, dealing with
the quality of supervision, housing, camp conveniences, as well as
details of organization and wages (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
1910).
Although the strike was technically lost and the employers refused to
recognize the Japanese organization in any way, the workers made
their point and forced drastic changes in the handling of labor. The
employers resorted to a favorite mainland device - jailing the strike
leadership on a variety of criminal charges. The expectation was that
the workers would be unable to function without their leaders - a
firmly held but seldom realized expectation.
In ,addition to a pay raise, the strike focused attention on the poor
and chaotic housing situation of the plantation camps, a major grie-
vance of the workers. A program of camp improvements was initiated
by the HSPA, creating a new function for this employers' organization.
The rapid expansion of the industry after 1875 had forced the location
of camps in remote areas in order to get the workers reasonably near
the work site. By 1909, the cane field locomotive had made such isola-
tion unnecessary. The small, isolated camps were segregated by race,
not so much from any deliberate policy, but from the order of arrival
and the worker-felt need for ethnic homogeneity in these scattered
communities.
The total lack of adjacent communities forced the plantations to
create their own communities, and to supply these with the necessary
community services. With this necessity came an opportunity to exer-
cise control over the workers by controlling access to housing and es-
sential services. The worker had no alternative other than to leave the
plantation and migrate to the urban areas of Hawaii - few and far
between. Eviction from plantation housing became a device of labor
control after 1909, reaching a climax in the strike of 1920.
THE WORKER'S RESPONSE 1920 - 1937
The Japanese were organized this time into a federation of plantation
unions. Whereas the impetus for organization had come from urban in-
tellectuals in 1909, this time it came from unions organized on each
plantation, carefully excluding urban intellectuals, particularly newspa-
per editors. The Filipinos, imported as the principal labor force after
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the cutoff of Japanese labor in 1907, had formed a Filipino Federation
by 1920. Their organization, however, was of a different order than that
of the Japanese. Organized by a charismatic leader, there was little
formal organization and no clear means of rank and file participation.
The Filipino Labor Union more closely resembled a patriotic-religious
organization than a labor union.
Despite these differences, an amazing degree of cooperation between
the highly organized and financially strong Japanese union and the
disorganized, poorly financed Filipino union was effected. This cooper-
ation was in the face of a massive campaign of sabotage by employer
agents, language differences, cultural differences, and severe limita-
tions on finances (Beechert, forthcoming; Reinecke, 1979). Although
the racial pay scales and grossly inadequate pay levels resulting from
World War I inflation were important, the issues again were more than
wages. Issues of respect and decent housing were equally important.
The severity of the strike and the spectre of racial cooperation in the
labor force, once again dictated a massive reorganization of the labor
force and its deployment by the planters. A decision to switch over to
cultivating and harvesting contracts, and to reduce the use of day wage
labor to an absolute minimum, was implemented immediately at the
conclusion of the strike. The HSPA created an Industrial Welfare
Bureau to oversee the implementation of a sweeping program to con-
vert plantation camps into communities, focusing on housing, recrea-
tion and medical care. In other words, a full scale program of welfare
capitalism was implemented, based squarely upon a similar movement
on the mainland in large scale industrial organizations.
The combination of a shift to short and long term contracts for a
majority of the field workers and the new welfare program was effective
in several ways and a failure in others. The program achieved the short
term goal of reducing labor militancy and slowing the outflow of
workers. Within two years, the well organized and broadly based Japa-
nese plantation unions had vanished, never to reappear. The Japanese
increasingly moved off the plantations and into urban occupations. The
conversion of the remaining Japanese to mill work, skilled labor tasks,
independent cane growing and contracting work, accomplished the
HSPA's purpose with efficiency.
For the growing numbers of Filipinos in the work force, the out-
comes were somewhat different. Entering at the lowest skill levels, the
Filipinos were effectively concentrated in field work. Although the wel-
fare program produced a degree of HSPA control undreamed of in ear-
lier years, the Filipinos remained stubbornly nationalistic and
independent. Re-forming their union, the Filipinos began in 1923 to
prepare for a new round of struggle. The strike of 1924, one of the least
planned, most badly conducted strikes in Hawaii's history, has been
called by its principal historian, "The Filipino Piecemeal Sugar Strike".
The strike was, nonetheless, drastic in its consequences, tragic in its
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violence, and vivid evidence of the basic failure of the welfare capital-
ism program to achieve its basic goals (Reinecke, 1963; Brody,
1980:48-81).
"No other major strike [in Hawaii] was so haphazardly planned or
conducted or failed so completely," Reinecke concluded. Drawn out
over seven months, on four islands in turn, resulting in the death of
twenty people, (four police and sixteen strikers) the strike nonetheless
demonstrated conclusively that welfare policies and labor control tech-
niques based upon racial stereotypes were failed policies. Although the
strikers were seldom unified in their views, when the companies resort-
ed to instant eviction of men and families, even unsympathetic Fili-
pinos felt they could not abandon their fellow workers and moved out
with the strikers. This was, as it had been in 1909 and 1920, convincing
evidence of the nationalistic solidarity and ethnic cohesion among the
principal groups ofworkers.
It has been suggested by one recent writer that the 1920 strike was a
terminal point in the development of class consciousness of the sugar
workers, emphasizing two elements: the attempt at Filipino-Japanese
cooperation in 1920 and the evolution of "their own language," the
"creole" language often termed "pidgin" (Takaki 1983:174, 179). The
principal student of Hawaii's creole language has particularly cautioned
against this conclusion. He explained that:
... the makeshift language of the plantation environment of
Hawaii has been the perfect type of the species; that the
emigrants, like the East Indians indenture to the British Carib-
bean lands and Mauritius, came under condition approaching in
many ways those of free immigration.. .In such an
environment... they were, perhaps, more apt to retain their
language... [The conditionsJ...were favorable for the mainte-
nance of ethnic solidarity and morale among most of the groups
coming to Hawaii, and, hence, for the retention of their
language. (Reinecke 1963:111-113)
Reinecke's conclusion is borne out by the fact that the Japanese seg-
ment of the workforce formed no more labor organizations, and made
no overt gestures of support for the striking Filipinos in either 1924 or
1937. Nor had the Filipinos learned from their previous experiences in
1920 and 1924. The appearance of mainland labor organizers was a
harbinger of the changes which were to take place in Hawaii's labor
struggles. In 1937, mainland organizers, reflecting the modern, Con-
gress of Industrial Organizations (C.I.OJ tradition of non-
discrimination, urged the Filipinos to organize all sugar workers. This
suggestion was rejected summarily by the leadership. Neither manage-
ment nor the workers had learned much from the 1924 strike, and both
The Political Economy ofHawaii and Working Class Consciousness 169
attempted to replay the scenario (Beechert 1981:122-123).
From the Hawaiian's resistance to exploitation during the conversion
of the communal society to the 1937 strike, there is ample evidence of
the potential of the working class to move to a level of awareness of
their quality as a class for itself This is the point at which class con-
sciousness can be truly said to exist, and the point from which the
potential comes into being for an organization to express that
awareness.
This consciousness does not depend on subjective factors, but on ob-
jective factors. It is based, according to Marx, on the reality of the struc-
ture of property relations in society. The many responses of the workers
of Hawaii to the rapidly evolving political economy of the nineteenth
and twentieth century, represent their degrees of awareness of their po-
sition in relation to the bourgeoisie. At each point, however, the work-
ers essentially responded by retreating into their nationalistic-linguistic
camps for the protection and security to be found there.
The potential for class consciousness required the arrival of an or-
ganization which incorporated certain basic ideas in its organization.
Coming to Hawaii first as the representative of Hawaii's longshoremen,
the emergent C.I.O. brought to Hawaii the notion of the class for itself
- a long step forward from the ethnic militancy of earlier years. On the
urban level, the Communist Party arrived in 1937 to bring its ideas on
labor organizing to Hawaii, and to participate actively in the rapid pace
oflabor organizing which began at that point (Beechert, 1979).
The pre-world war 11 campaign in Hawaii was primarily initiated by
local workers. The longshoremen, moved by the Pacific Maritime
strikes of 1934 and 1936, organized themselves and applied for
charters. Between 1936 and 1940, they demonstrated a remarkably dif-
ferent level of class consciousness and working class cohesion than had
previously been the case.
The different attitude was evident in the inter-racial solidarity dis-
played at Port Allen-Ahukini in 1940. Striking longshoremen evicted
from their plantation homes, in keeping with the old employer policy of
paternalism, refused to be divided into the three basic groups -
Hawaiian, Japanese, and Filipino - and moved out in a body and re-
mained out over a protracted period (208 days). The significant element
this time, was the presence of a sophisticated labor organization, which
recognized racial and ethnic exploitation as one of the principal tools of
the employer (Zalburg 1979:48-50).
This movement spread to the plantation workers. The United
Cannery, Agricultural, Processing, and Allied Workers-C.I.O.
(UCAPAWA), began to sign up workers on Kauai. More significantly,
this effort attempted to organize the workers politically. Two Kauai
senators, members of the island aristocracy, were replaced in the Ter-
ritorial legislature with worker-endorsed candidates, a harbinger of
things to come.
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POST-WORLD WAR n
When organizing was resumed after the period of martial law in
1944, the modern labor period may be said to have emerged. The Inter-
national Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU)
campaign, carefully planned, was based upon two basic perceptions.
The first was that the employers of Hawaii - the so-called Big Five -
were the same employers the workers in California dealt with as
warehousemen, longshoremen, or sugar refiners. Frequently, even the
corporate name was the same. The second basic principle of the or-
ganizing was that ethnic or racial distinctions served only the employ-
ers' interests. Under no circumstances would the ILWU permit these
differences to intrude on the organizing drive. The union assumed,
from its experience with similar problems on the Pacific Coast, that the
union could and must focus on the social relations of production-the
conditions on the job - and not on superficial distinctions. These
ethnic or nationalistic considerations could be recognized and
acknowledged, but never permitted to become a basis for organizing
(Goldblatt, 1979).
The first fruit of the ILWU organizing was evident in the 1946
industry-wide sugar strike. The union effectively neutralized the tactic
of evicting striking workers from plantation housing with the announc-
ment that all of the 33,000 sugar workers would vacate their houses if
any were evicted, thereby creating a massive problem of social welfare.
Despite the use of the draconian Territorial riot and picketing statutes,
the strike was firm even though the union had not completed the or-
ganization of field hands. Ethnic solidarity worked to make the strike
successful in this initial test of industry wide bargaining. Despite the
victory, the union still faced formidable tasks of consolidating its units
and overcoming ethnic differences (Lelling, 1980).
The employers corroborated this analysis by the ILWU leadership.
Anticipating a resumption of organizing suspended during WW II, the
employers had organized the Hawaii Employers' Council in 1943. They
installed James Blaisdell, former Executive Director of the San Fran-
cisco Bay Area Warehouse Owners'Association, and provided him with
the necessary funds and organization to deal with the same ILWU he
had met so often since 1936.
Between 1944 and 1958, the ILWU conducted a steady, well-planned
campaign of winning for sugar, pineapple, and longshore workers, a re-
spectable share of the wealth these industries produced, and the mea-
sure of dignity heretofore lacking in Hawaii's labor relations.
Three strikes stand out as the evidence of their basic success. The
1949 longshore strike demonstrated the ability of the workers to sup-
port and maintain a six month long strike, to meet the combined power
of the Territorial government and business, and still win their basic
demand for an end to the "colonial" wage pattern. The point of this
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strike was to convince both the community and the workers that the
workers could and must make such objectives their goal. They did.
The second strike demonstrated the ability of the ILWU to success-
fully incorporate a nationalistic tendency into their strategy. In the dis-
astrous 1947 pineapple strike the union suffered a serious set back in
the form of humiliating contract conditions. The workers at Hawaiian
Pine on Lanai, all Filipino, sought and secured permission of the lea-
dership to reject the subsequent contract in 1951. As Louis Goldblatt of
the ILWU (1979) explained, "there were no traditional strike issues.
These guys were angry at the company because of their contemptuous
treatment over the years." For over 200 days, the Filipino workers held
out, inflicting a loss of over $25,000,000 on the company. When the
company asked for settlement, the ILWU used the occasion to restore
industry wide bargaining which had been lost in 1947, a wage increase,
and most of the social-commmunity demands of the Lanai strikers.
The third strike was perhaps the most decisive. For obscure reasons,
the employers - basically the Big Five - decided to force a showdown
with the ILWU over the 1958 sugar contract. The union had prepared
for just such an eventuality by building up a large strike defense fund.
"The Aloha Strike," so called for its good spirit and community
support, lasted for 179 days. The ILWU secured an impressive retire-
ment program, a housing policy which made available reasonable cost
housing for its members, a comprehensive medical coverage program,
which included families, and a meaningful wage increase. A sugar
worker at this point was almost literally a "white-collar" worker in
terms of benefits and job security. Mechanization had taken its toll of
the work force, but the workers, through their union, had secured a
greater portion of the returns from mechanization than in any other
industry.
Kent (1983) characterizes the ILWU as a union which "sold out" in
1952 by abandoning its Marxist principles, and dismisses them from
any further consideration. It is difficult to understand just what is
meant. Given the National Labor Relations Act which carefully con-
trols the scope of labor negotiations, Marxist principles are never on
the bargaining table. Maintaining a high level of worker participation in
a highly democratic organization, the ILWU would seem to be one of
the more successful unions in achieving the Marxist goal of raising
worker consciousness while building a strong organization.
THE QUESTION OF STATEHOOD AND THE MODERN POLITICAL
ECONOMY
Both Kent (1983) and Stauffer (1984) see in statehood a decisive
step in Hawaii's modern development - a step into the maws of world
capitalism and regressive development. The development of the tourist
172 SOCIAL PROCESS IN HAWAII, VOL. 31, 1984
industry is seen as the direct outcome of this manifestation. Stauffer
characterizes the situation by showing that, in 1950, local capitalists
had approximately $44 million more invested in "outside" corporations
than in "local" corporations, which created a positive balance for
Hawaii. By 1971, the situation was reversed, and "outside" capital ex-
ceeded local capital by $763 million, resulting in a corresponding out-
flow of payments. A further evidence of the decline of the Hawaiian sit-
uation is seen in the heavy spending for infrastructure such as roads,
airports, sewers and water systems. As Stauffer puts it, not only was the
private sector "sold off' but a heavy public debt was incurred as well.
Here one needs to step back and examine the national picture. State
and local capital outlays had risen dramatically in the last two decades.
Simply put, the expansion of population, the movement into the
suburbs, and the long neglect of the infrastructure occasioned by the
Depression and World War II, required massive outlays of funds. State
and local borrowings increased on the order of 339% and 236%,
respectively, in the period from 1950 to 1964. This was, in dollar terms,
from $2 billion in 1945 to 23.1 billion in 1971 for state borrowings
(O'Connor 1973:195).
In this context, Hawaii's rapid increase in bonded debt appears in
line with the national experience. In that same period, Hawaii reversed
a long term population decline, and began to rapidly increase its
population, which, without regard to tourism needs, would have re-
quired an expansion of infrastructure.
More important than the sources of the capital are such facts as the
development of the trans-ocean airplane which made feasible the trans-
portation of large numbers of new, relatively low income tourists, as
compared to the Lurline class of tourists. One has only to read of the
near bankruptcy of Matson in 1950 and the comical operation of the
Royal Hawaiian Hotel on the American Plan to realize the difference
between modern, mass market tourism and the older, elite, relaxed
tourism catering to the wealthy (Worden 1981: 123-124).
The impetus to develop Hawaii's tourist industry came initially from
local investors, anxious to reverse the losses incurred after World War
n and to increase the flow of profits from their investments in "local
concerns." Harold Rice badgered American Factors in 1955 into chang-
ing the Kaanapali Coast from a poor sugar growing area to a profitable
land development scheme. He was tired of seeing all the revenue from
Pioneer Mill going to American Factors, and he was especially incensed
that Pioneer Mill had paid no dividend since 1944. What bothered
many of the wealth-holders in Hawaii, was the relative failure of Hawaii
corporations to show the rapid appreciation in the price of securities as
compared to what their holdings in mainland corporations were
showing. This resulted in a demand for an end to the incestuous,
interlocking, now unprofitable corporate management and a summon-
ing of executive talent (Fuchs 1961:393-394).
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And what was the response of the workers to this rapidly changing
economy? In the service sector, i.e. the urban areas, the workers were
ready and more than willing to carve out their share of the proceeds.
The militancy evinced by the plantation had long since spilled over to
the urban Honolulu worker. In 1952, the Hotel and Restaurant
Workers, Local 5, served notice on the newly organized, profitable
Matson hotels that the workers were ready to receive their share of the
proceeds. The situation can be described by a quote from the Honolulu
Advertiser: "Led by an alien rabble rouser [Art Rutledge], some 800
workers walked out of the three Matson resorts here Thursday, leaving
1,500 guests of Hawaii in a state of confusion, frustration and
disgust..." (Reinecke 1970:22-23)
The conclusion of that strike was seen by the members of Local 5 as
having a significant meaning: "After two weeks, the strike was settled.
More important than actual gains was the respect that Local 5 won for
its strength and militancy..." (Worden, 1973:122). The workers and
their organization clearly understood the nature of the changes taking
place, and made a vigorous effort to establish their rights and position.
That the effort was not always successful is only a comment on the
resilience of capitalism and the ongoing struggle which confronts labor.
One cannot assume, as do Kent and StaUffer, that somehow local capital
or some alternative pattern of development was available.
One can use the core-periphery model to examine the situation con-
fronting workers in Hawaii, but not in terms of the world capitalism
model of dependency theory. On a national level, we are confronted
with a consolidation of large scale capital - truly an era of "monopoly
capitalism." This development has:
...produced two distinct types of business enterprise in the
United States. A few hundred corporations with extensive
market power at the center or core. Around them, in industries
or branches of industry that the big corporations have not yet
invaded, nearly 12 million small and medium sized firms - the
economy's periphery - continue to survive. (Edwards,
1979:72)
In this stage of capitalism, we find a considerable change in the condi-
tions confronting the Hawaiian working class. With plantation labor
converted into a stable, well paid class of skilled workers, the basic em-
ployment opportunity remaining in Hawaii is to be found in what has
been called the secondary market - the preserve of dead-end, low
paid, casual labor. It was to that arena that the ILWU turned in 1958,
recognizing that further organization of the working class could only
come in the service sector - the area of prospective growth.
The major unions in construction and the service industry have long
recognized that if the local people were to be able to remain in Hawaii,
there would have to be a considerable expansion of employment. Con-
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struction was the most promising way of creating high wage
employment. Their endorsement of the Democratic Party program of
development may have been short sighted, and may have produced an
inferior development. No reasonable alternatives for employment of
local people came forward.
The alternative to development in the decade since statehood was
emigration for employment, or poverty in Hawaii. From the perspective
of a young person seeking employment, carpentry or hotel work offered
a more attractive prospect than unstated alternatives. The realities of
the American economy cannot be overcome by structural analyses
which disguise the nature of the transformation of the national
economy. By 1979, 43 per cent of all Americans employed in the non-
agricultural economy worked in services or trades. Put another way,
since 1973, more than 70% of all new jobs in the private sector have
been in these two low paid, short time, dead end sectors of employment
(Rothschild 1980. Hawaii, like the rest of the United States, has been
moving toward a structure of employment ever more dominated by
jobs that are badly paid, unchanging, and unproductive. That the
unions have not been as successful in altering these conditions in the
tourist industry as they were in the basic industries of Hawaii suggests
only that the character of the opposition has changed.
Workers in the United States generally have not been successful in
coping with the rapid development of service sector, low wage, low
security employment.
The working class has been unable to challenge capitalist
hegemony because it is split into fractions. Each of these frac-
tions has different immediate interests and has pursued these
separate interests in the political arena. The result has been a
demise of 'class interests' and the rise of 'fraction' issues
(Edwards, 1979:203).
Here in Hawaii, as elsewhere, the worker has been isolated by the
shift of grievance procedures away from the work site. This loss of job
control has been accompanied by a corresponding tendency toward
formalistic, bureaucratic union administration (Brody, 1978:198-211).
Despite these setbacks, workers in Hawaii and their unions continue
to struggle. Organizing in the hostile environment of the National
Labor Relations Board, the union record here is about equal to that of
mainland unions - they win slightly less than half of the representation
elections entered. "No Union" is a frequent winner - evidence of the
massive anti-union campaign launched by the media and by
corporations, and now joined, ifnot led, by government.
Confronted with unemployment and decreasing welfare assistance,
workers are frequently forced to choose between a tourism develop-
ment or no job. One cannot assume that history has stopped or that the
basic struggle of class interests has ceased. " ...The old class lines of
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cleavage continue to exert their force, only now they do so within the
context of class fraction politics" (Edwards, 1978:200. In a capitalist
political economy, the workers do not dictate the terms of struggle. The
only point about which we can be certain is that the class struggle will
continue. There is no guarantee of short term victory. As one working
class leader put it: "A revolution is not a dinner party." Out of this situ-
ation can come a new level of struggle and working class unity. An es-
sential pre-condition is to recognize the problem, and not to blame the
victim for the crime.
NOTES
1. The classic example of this type of history is Ralph Kuykendal's,
The Hawaiian Kingdom, 3 vols (1958). Gavin Daws', A Shoal of
Time (1968) is a modern version of this type of history, heavily
dependent upon Kuykendal, but trying to develop a synthesis
from the mass of data. A somewhat different approach was tried
by Lawrence Fuchs in Hawaii Pono: A Social HistOlY (1961). A
most useful, but often flawed work, Hawaii Pono relies upon
mass-produced research which often creates careless stereotypes
and has a poor grasp of labor. A little noted book, probably the
best single effort at an analysis, is John Reinecke,Language and
Dialect in Hawaii (1969). Reinecke locates the development of
the Hawaiian creole language in the political economy of
Hawaiian development. See particularly Chapters 3 and 5.
2. The word metropole is the obsolete form of metropolis, the parent
state of a colony (See Frank, 1967;1969). For a comparison of
countries and their experiences, see Crockcroft et aI, 1975 and
Baran, 1957. Fagan (1983) gives a general comment on these
theories of development.
3. The most eloquent use of this concept is by E. P. Thompson in
The Making of the English Working Class (1963). See also Mes-
zaros (1970 and Hobsbawm (1970.
4. False consciousness is used here in the manner of Georg Lukacs,
" ...The basic categories of man's immediate attitude to the
world..." (Lukacs, 1971:89). See also Gabel (1975).
5. In pre-contact Hawaii, the chiefly system depended upon a distri-
bution of the land to subordinate chiefs, who in turn made it
available to commoners. The commmoner's principal attachment
was to his extended family and particular ohana. (Handy &
Handy, 1972).
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6. The survey found Hawaiians were "indolent and indifferent" to
attempts to engage them in wage labor, unless wages were
"high." In those situations, particularly in Lahaina and Honolulu,
there was no shortage of Hawaiian workers at adequate wages.
(Robert Wiley, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Annual Report, 1848,
"Answers to Questions...Addressed to all Missionaries in the
Hawaiian Islands, May, 1846").
7. Marx describes this tendency in a vivid passage: "The enemies of
progress outside the mass are precisely those products of selj~
debasement, self-rt;jection and selrestrangement of the mass which
have been endowed with independent being and a life of their
own. The mass, therefore, rises against its own deficiency when it
rises against the independently existing products of its self-
debasement, just as man, turning against the existence of God,
turns against his own religiousity. But as practical self-
estrangements of the mass exist in the real world in an outward
way, the mass must fight them in an outward way" (Marx,
1956:110-111, Emphasis in the original).
8. The Hawaii Penal Code of 1850, was unique among the indenture
acts employed in world sugar production in that it made no dis-
tinction between "native" workers and imported labor, save in
the permissible term of indenture - five years for local labor, and
up to ten years for imported labor when the contract was signed
abroad. This latter provision was never effective since political cir-
cumstances and international considerations dictated much short-
er periods. Basically, three years became the common period of
indenture after 1885, and five years prior to that time. For
example, the British authorities would not permit the signing of
contracts of Chinese workers abroad. When the worker arrived in
Hawaii, the five year rule could be applied. The Japanese govern-
ment dictated the three year term for Japanese immigrant
workers.
9. "Early expansion of the Islands' sugar industry was largely fi-
nanced by the mercantile houses of Honolulu. Pioneer planters
generally had few resources. After 1875, local private capital
resources became inadequate and the Hawaiian government had
to come to the rescue" (Mollett, 1961:61).
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COMMlENTARY
STRAWS liN THlE WliND
Noel Kent
Nowadays, the notion of Hawaii having a special leadership role in
the Pacific has about the same credibility as Ferdinand Marcos claiming
pristine innocence in the Aquino affair, or Ronald Reagan preaching
hard work and thrift to the unemployed steel workers of the Monon-
gahela Valley. Yet, wasn't it only seventeen or eighteen years ago that
the then Governor of Hawaii, John Burns, would seize every possible
occasion to wax grandiloquently upon Hawaii's destiny as "the hub of
the Pacific," while prominent bankers, economists and academics
spoke earnestly of the islands imminent arrival as "the Pacific
Geneva?" Located at the "crossroads" of Pacific commerce, Hawaii
was to become a spearhead of high technology and finance, throwing
lightning bolts of (capitalist) illumination into the dark recesses of the
southern and western Pacific. Here, went the popular wisdom, was the
model that delivered, the one Pacific peoples had long been awaiting.
We live in a less bullish (if not more honest) era now. Amid the
harsher light of the mid-eighties, Hawaii stands revealed as less a Pacific
Geneva than a Pacific Puerto Rico; its landscape dominated not so
much by corporate towers, stock exchanges and microchip research
facilities, as hi-rise hotels, condominiums and nuclear-laden military
bases. Few take Hawaii seriously any more as anything but a center of
escape and fantasy. From the east and west come an overlapping series
of invaders: dollars and yen (some of it laundered or in flight), tourists
seeking an ever elusive paradise and immigrants from the Illocos,
Samoa, Tonga, Hong Kong and Laos, seeking a piece of the Great
American Pie; land developers, money men and hotel managers out of
Toronto, Los Angeles and Tokyo. And as in Puerto Rico, a busily ac-
quisitive middle class exists side-by-side with an underclass of mar-
ginalized and frustrated locals. Class and ethnic cleavages sharpen
amidst a cultural division of labor that is not terribly different in charac-
ter from the old plantation days. With social mobility blocked (even for
much of the middle class), outmigration is the final vehicle of hope for
local youth. All in all, a familiar script for students of mis-development.
What remains historically constant is Hawaii's subservience to the
advanced centers of world capital. And if we may judge by two signifi-
cant happenings during the last year, this process of peripheralization
continues to intensify. The one most publicized, was the conclusion of
the epic seven year battle over the rezoning of Nukolii (that lovely strip
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of Kauai beachfront) for resort development, with victory finally going
to Hasegawa Komuten, the giant Japanese developer, and its local
allies.
Beaten in the November 1981 referendum on Nukolii by a decisive
two-to-one margin, Hasegawa Komuten, aided by the usual unholy
gaggle of local lawyers, politicos and businessmen that always appear
on the scene in such cases in Hawaii, struck back hard. Demanding a
second referendum on construction of its sprawling resort, the company
most generously offered to finance the cost of holding it. A (foreign)
corporation paying for a special public ballot; this was unprecedented
even in the sordid annals of Hawaii land politics. What followed was a
well-bankrolled public relations campaign to convince voters that with
sugar plantations closing down and work hard to come by, Nukolii rep-
resented a genuine option for future economic stability. This struck a
responsive chord with many. Moreover, the advocates of construction
at Nukolii were quite adept at using a substantial absentee vote to guar-
antee their victory. So on February 4, Hasegawa, now free of public
accountability, once more had Nukolii at its disposal.
Nukolii illustrates three points: First, the extent to which overseas
capital will go in utilizing local allies and in corrupting the local political
process to attain objectives regarded as major. In Nukolii, this extended
(with the connivance of the Kauai mayor, county council and judiciary)
to subverting even a semblance of democratic and constitutional
process.
Secondly, and the flip side of point one; the degree to which local
public officials and power brokers are prepared to collaborate with inter-
national capital in prying open untouched new areas of Hawaii to
tourism-land development. Nukolii indicates that the local power struc-
ture is more than willing to accomodate the demands by international
tourism developers for radical new subsidies in the form of cheap
money and tax holidays; demands sure to be raised in the future as the
increasingly aged Hawaiian tourism plant requires massive new capital
to compete with Acupuleo, Cancun, the Caribbean, etc. In return for
their usual commissions, Hawaili's elites will continue to maintain an
open public treasury and provide sanction to new projects. Witness the
strong support given to the Horita consortium's gigantic West Beach
project by Mayor Eileen Anderson's administration and her $90 million
"Waikiki 2000 Program" for renewal of the strip.
Indeed, government officials have been carefully chosen for their re-
sponsiveness to the powers-that-be. Amfac's Henry Walker, busily de-
veloping his "Islands of Elegance" (in conjunction with Hyatt,
Marriott, United, et. aU at Kaanapali, remarks gleefully, "1 find the
government officials much more sophisticated in business than they
were a few years ago; the government hears us and is doing things such
as appointing Kent Keith as head of the State Department of Planning
and Economic Development." With dependable servants such as Keith
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in the upper reaches of the state bureaucracy, Hawaii's role as a misde-
veloped tourism society is secure.
There is a third lesson to be drawn from Nukolii also. The day of pure
naysaying is over. Times are difficult and uncertain, people feel deeply
threatened on a number of levels, and the opponents of tourism-land
development must offer a program that will mobilize a real
constituency. There is reason to believe that had an alternative to the
Nukolii proposal been available - this means a viable program for the
economic development of Kauai replete with adequate jobs, public
revenues and local control - many of the construction and plantation
workers who voted pro-Nukolii would have voted "No." But in the ab-
sence of intelligent, believable alternatives which speak to deep-felt
needs, there will be more Nukoliis.
There has been one other noteworthy happening in the world of
Hawaiian political economy. Within the space of a single year, we have
witnessed both American Factors and Castle and Cooke, the two largest
Big Five corporations, transferring their headquarters to San Francisco,
while Dillingham Corporation, a farflung multinational with worldwide
interests in construction, transportation and minerals, was bought lock,
stock and barrel by mainland interests and its Hawaii headquarters
liquidated.
From the perspective of half a century ago when the Big Five-
Dillingham complex controlled Hawaii's agro-industry and the entire
apparatus of shipping, banking insurance, warehousing and marketing
around sugar and pineapple, this is a dramatic change indeed. At the
time of the Pearl Harbor attack, the Big Five exercised monopoly
economic and political power in the territory; drafting and approving
legislation in their company offices, using the legislature and courts as
their pawns, making the deals that counted in their own Pacific Club. If
Hawaii was dependent on the Mainland for its yearly sugar quota and a
host of imports, it was still a limited dependency because the island elite
had such potent local strength.
Once the old Kamaaina haole families who owned the Big Five decid-
ed to embark upon a massive program of diversification into other
areas and new fields, it was inevitable that this relationship change.
During the process of reorganizing the Big Five-Dileo corporate
bureaucracies along up-to-date mainland lines for the corporate expan-
sion of the fifties and sixties, the old families lost control to overseas
interests, who snapped up large blocks of new stock. Hawaiian capital
could not go international (i.e. Castle and Cooke to the Philippines,
Central America and Brazil, Dillingham to Australia, Asia and Saudi
Arabia, etc.) without the financial backing of international capitallocat-
ed in the world centers. By the seventies, Castle and Cooke and Amfac,
now billion dollar a year multinationals, were largely mainland owned;
C. Brewer had been bought up by the Philadelphia-based conglomerate
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Thus, the past year's movement of company headquarters to San
Francisco and Dillingham's closing hardly rate as shockers-it is merely
the latest act in the making of Hawaii completely and utterly dependent
upon overseas-decision making. The 210,000 prime acres of Hawaii
land owned by Amfac and Castle & Cooke become hostage to the deci-
sions of board members in San Francisco (a real Pacific center city, as
opposed to Honolulu, an imaginary one). The chairman of Amfac's
board, Henry Walker, admits: " it's only logical that the further away
you get from Hawaii, the smaller Hawaii's problems appear, particularly
in the context of the big multi-national picture."
So Nukolii's red-brown earth is assaulted and concretized by forces
from the west, and corporate headquarters move east. Two straws in
the wind. And an illwind it is.
BOOK REVIEWS
A REVIEW OF RONAJL][)ll'AKAKJI'S
PAUHANA: PLANTATIONLIFE
AND LABOR IN HAWAII
(Honolllllhn: UniveJrsity of Haw21iilPJress, 1983)
Dan Boylan
Hawaii has many stories to tell. It's seen the development and near
destruction of a Polynesian people. It's watched European and Ameri-
can adventurers, both officially-sanctioned and entrepreneurial, vie for
its possession. It's suffered sandalwooders and whalers, missionaries
and militarists. But undoubtedly none of Hawaii's tales matches in sig-
nificance the 19th century development of sugar as the islands' princi-
pal economy.
For sugar wrought drastic changes in Hawaii: Economic, political and
social. Sugar cultivation, with its attendant large capital investments,
demanded security of land tenure. Consequently caucasian sugar plan-
ters worked their will on the Hawaiian monarchy and on Hawaiian
landowners, seizing huge tracts of real property in which to plant their
crops. In less than a half-century sugar's endless demands for increased
acreage effectively alienated native Hawaiians from their lands.
In 1893 the majority control of Hawaii's sugar industry by Americans
also compelled the patently illegal (patent to all but the Reagan
administration) seizure of Hawaii as a Territory of the United States.
American planters wanted to insure themselves a stable market. To do
so they destroyed Hawaiian sovereignty.
In the wake of that seizure, Hawaii became a colony of the United
States, run, in fact, not by officials of the United States government,
but by major corporate leaders whose profits depended primarily on
sugar production. Their suzerainty would remain secure for nearly
sixty years.
Perhaps most important, sugar repopulated the islands. Nineteenth
century sugar cultivation was labor intensive. Its gargantuan demand
for workers matched its appetite for land. By 1875 Hawaiian sugar plan-
ters had engineered a reciprocity treaty with the United States, ensuring
them a mainland market. Concomitantly, the ravages of western dis-
ease had decimated the native Hawaiian population. Planters looked to
Asia, the South Pacific and Europe to fill their need for workers. A
seventy-year-Iong tide offoreign laborers remade Hawaii's society.
Finally, sugar industrialized Hawaii. To be sure, Hawaii was spared
industrialism's most visual evils. The air remained clear and the smo-
kestacks of the sugarmills appeared at great intervals along island
shores. Tradewinds and ocean tides carried away sugar's effluvients.
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Hawaii remained rural; only the port town of Honolulu knew to any
degree the congestion and overcrowding of the world's industrial cities.
Still, industrialism ruled Hawaii. Sugar's multi-ethnic work force fol-
lowed a daily schedule no less rigid than the steelworkers in Andrew
Carmegie's Pittsburgh mills. Island sugar planters manipulated labor,
land and capital with the same callousness as the mainland entrepre-
neurs of steel, coal and railroads. A paradisical climate and waving
fields of green cane may have softened the rigors of industrialism, but
only marginally.
Sugar dominated Hawaii for over a century. Plantation life molded an
entire generation of Hawaii's people, and memories of it, both good
and bad, still play an important role among contemporary Island
leaders.
In Pau Hana: Plantation Lile and Labor in Hawaii (University of
Hawaii Press, $14.95), University of California historian Ronald
Takaki offers a fine and balanced account of sugar's role in forming
Hawaii's people. Fortunately, Takaki recognized both the significance
and the inherent drama of the sugar plantation. Equally fortunate,
Takaki brings to his story-telling an acute sensitivity and considerable
writing skill.
Pau Hana is people's history. The economics of sugar and the politics
of Hawaii interest Takaki far less than the everyday lives and the strug-
gle for respect of the sugar workers. Takaki knows that profit statements
make poor reading. He leaves them to corporate historians. He deals in-
stead with the fabric of life for the mass of men and women: In the case
of the plantation, with lunch pails and wake-up sirens, with palaka cloth
shirts and the razor-sharp edge of a cane leaf, with bango numbers and
overcrowded housing.
Takaki also recognizes, however, the essential industrialization pro-
cess in which Hawaii's people labored. His first chapter deals with the
pioneering effort of a 26-year-old Bostonian named William Hooper to
establish a sugar plantation at Koloa, Kauai, in 1835. According to
Takaki, Hooper came to Kauai to do more than grow sugar. He and
Honlulu's Ladd and Company, for which he worked, launched a
revolution: "Hooper was there to remake Hawaii in an American
image: to advance the market civilization of the United States beyond
Indian lands and Mexican territory to a new Pacific frontier, undermin-
ing in the process native Hawaiian society and the people's traditional
relationship with their land."
Takaki's sympathies are obviously with the traditional culture, but
he treats Hooper's Koloa project with restraint and some admiration.
Ladd and Company held a fifty-year lease on 980 acres on the east side
of Waihohonu Stream. Hooper gathered his work force from the
Hawaiian population of the region. For $2 per month, Hooper's men
cleared the land and planted sugar. Hooper saw himself as for more
than a businessman: He brought progress and civilization. His planta-
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tion and wages would "eventually emancipate the natives from t?e mis-
erable system of 'chief labour' which ever has existed .a~ these Islands,
and which if not broken up, will be an effectual preventltlve to the prog-
ress of civilization industry, and national prosperity."
It undoubtedly ~ever occurred to Hooper that he emancipated native
Hawaiians from one form of slavery only to replace it with another.
Hooper transplanted Hawaiians from their traditional homes to planta-
tion housing. He weaned them from subsistence agriculture to depen-
dence upon a market system. More important, he trained them to re-
spond to industrialism's ultimate prerequisi~~, the rationalizaton ~f
time: "As plantation laborers, they [the Hawallan workers] found their
time controlled by unfamiliar workday sounds, schedules, ~nd
rhythms." From sunrise to sunset, day in and day out, the plantatIOn
ordered the worker's day.
Hawaiians did not take to the new slavery. They refused to transfer
their loyalty from alii to plantation manager, and they balked at the
demands of the plantation work day. Within three short years of the
inauguration of Koloa plantation, Hooper pro~laimed t?em hapless and
inefficient workers and called for the importatIOn ofChmese labor.
Mass importation of Chinese would wait until 1853, but Hooper's
demand for new labor foreshadowed the mass immigration which com-
menced in that year. Koloa Plantation succeeded, and suga: attract~d
needed capital. The Great Mahele of 1848 provided security In land tor
plantation development. Only sinew and muscle were in short supply
for the burgeoning industry. .
Thus began Hawaii's great migration. Laborers came from China,
Japan, Portugal, Korea, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Spain, Germany,
and Russia. Their motives varied. Some, like the Japanese and
Filipino sought the largesse of the plantation and eventual return to
their ho'melands. Others found either the political unrest or poverty of
their homelands sufficient reason to seek permanent residence in a new
and richer country. . .
Whatever their dreams, plantation management saw them pnnclpal!y
as factors of production: "Reduced to commodities, they were placed In
a labor market where planters inspected them and chose the ones they
wanted, and where sugar agencies made selections and filled 'orde:s'
for the plantations." Indeed, plantation managers placed orders With
the Honolulu agencies for "tobacco, portuguese laborers...20
men.. .Iumber, 7 ft. iron bar, wool mattress, olive oil."
And plantation management tried mightily to deter them from band-
ing together to assert their dignity and worth. Takaki thoroughly docu-
ments the planter's efforts to mix nationalities in order to lessen the
"danger of collusion among laborers." Labor was necessary to make
sugar profitable, but organized labor, from the outset of Hawaii's sugar
industry, was anathema to the planters.
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Plantation labor knew reasons for organizing. In the book's two most
effective chapters, "A New World of Labor: From Siren to Siren" and
"Plantation Camps: Community and Culture," Takaki constructs a por-
trait of plantation life which demonstrates the inevitability of the rise of
militant unionism. At 5 a.m. each morning, a siren rousted workers out
of their beds and into the fields. The work was extraordinarily hard.
"Planting, watering, hoeing, ploughing, cultivating, ditching, stripping
dead leaves from the cane stalks, cutting the cane, carting the cane or
loading the cane into small tram cars" consumed the worker's day. All
was done under a fierce Hawaiian sun and under the watchful eye of a
luna (supervisor). By day's end the rigor and numbing boredom of the
work left the men and women who did it exhausted.
Like the Hawaiians before them, the new immigrant laborers quickly
devised strategies of avoidance. Slacking became a plantation art, and
the managers acted to meet it. They fostered competition between
work gangs and ethnic groups. Extensive rules were devised for each
plantation, and a schedule of fines often imposed for a variety of
infractions.
Compulsion could be less benign. According to Takaki, "One of the
essential functions of the police in Hawaii was to maintain law and
order on the plantations." Prior to Hawaii's annexation to the United
States and the death of the contract labor system, Island police devoted
much of their time to chasing immigrant workers who broke their con-
tracts and deserted the plantations. Police were also employed to squel-
ch gambling among workers and to deal with frequent labor
disturbances. Strikes of short duration were frequent on the plantation
long before professional union organizers ever set foot on Hawaii's
shores. They erupted over working conditions or wages, or more often,
physical violence.
Takaki quotes the views of several planters on the beneficial effects
of whipping, and he quotes an equal number of laborers on the terror
induced by the mere sight of a mounted foreman carrying a coiled black
snake whip on his saddle. Hawaiian law banned corporal punishment of
plantation workers, but it was practiced and the threat of it intimidated
workers. Takaki admits that paternalism softened the rules, the work
and the low salaries of plantation life. Still, a workplace where a man
could be beaten like a dog needed far more than a soft-hearted manager.
There may have been boredom to the work and terror in the fields
but in the plantation camps arrich and variegated life evolved. Housin~
was often overcrowded. Sanitary conditions were poor. Medical care
was often rudimentary. But as Japanese workers brought their picture
brides from their homelands, the camps filled with wives and children.
Plantation workers and their families shared the food, the festivals, and
the religions of their various neighbors. Filipino Chinese Korean
Japanese, Hawaiian, and Portuguese young men' played t~gether i~
plantation-organized recreation programs. Each ethnic group borrowed
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from the languages of the others to create a new medium of
communication: Pidgin English.
Indeed, the community which developed in the plantation camps ex-
plains in large part the fond memories which many of Hawaii's old
timers, despite the low wages and poor living conditions, still harbor
for their life in the sugar fields. Plantation Hawaii was rural Hawaii. The
plantation villages did not abut an urban civilization. They were widely
separated, self-contained communities surrounded by sugar cane,
mountains, and the sea. Children and adults lived in a quiet, clean, if
poor community.
Without the distractions of urban life, plantation residents found
their entertainment and their society within their families and with
their neighbors. People knew one another. Children knew their
parents, not merely as disciplinarians but as co-workers during the
summer months when teen-age boys often joined them in the fields or
mill.
Plantation residents knew a rural society in which values were fixed.
They brought with them from Japan, China, Korea, the Philippines
and Portugal the mores of traditional societies. Confucianism dictated
rules for the Oriental, and Catholicism did the same for Filipino and
Portugese.
And the plantation communities were small. They were compre-
hensible units in which a person knew his place and the place of
everyone else. Mr. Takahashi met Mr. Ramelb in the fields, on the
baseball diamond, in the plantation store, and at the movie on Saturday
night.
Coupled with the social rigidity of the plantation, residents might
well find all this familiarity stultifying. Indeed, many did. They left the
plantations at the first opportunity for the towns, to make their way in
trade or small business. But many found as well a sense of place and
security that a 20th century urban Hawaii would deny them and their
descendants.
Ultimately, of course, the vicissitudes of hard work for little reward
would outweigh the ameliorating aspects of paternalism and small town
life. In his final two chapters, Takaki treats the "Patterns of Resistance"
laborers devised in the fields, and the development of class conscious-
ness among the plantation workers. He looks in detail at the establish-
ment of the Japanese Higher Wages Association and its 1909 strike.
The planters used every instrument in their command to break that
strike. They attempted to split the Japanese community. They had
strike leaders jailed. They evicted strikers from plantation housing.
And they hired strikebreakers at twice the regular pay rate. After four
months, the workers gave in.
The ethnic solidarity demonstrated by Japanese labor in 1909
spurred Hawaii's planters to consider means to blunt it. They looked to
the Philippines for an answer to their problems. The shift to Filipino
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immigration actually began in 1907, but it accelerated after the 1909
strike. The solution proved short-lived. By 1920, a Filipino labor move-
ment emerged, and in that year both Filipino and Japanese workers
struck the plantation. Again, after six months, the plaIiters successfully
broke the strike.
Takaki implies that in 1920, Hawaii's plantation labor learned the
weakness of ethnically-based unionism. In the future, Hawaii's workers
would organize on class rather than ethnic lines. Not so. Four years
later a Filipino union would strike on its own, leading to greater blood-
letting than the events of 1920.
In fact, Takaki ends with the 1920 strike because that's as far as he
wishes to go. The 1920 strike was a seminal point in Hawaii's labor
history, the first time workers cooperated across ethnic lines. But the
lessons of class unionism were not as clear to all as Takaki would have
us believe.
Takaki's decision to end his story of plantation life in Hawaii in 1920
is Pau Hana's greatest weakness. By doing so, he neglects a full half-
century of plantation experience that is, in some respects, it's most ex-
citing era. The 1930's in particular saw the re-energizing of the labor
movement in Hawaii and the first tentative steps of the International
Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union to organize island
workers. The ILWU's success in its post-World War II organizing
effort would completely change the face of plantation Hawaii. Paternal-
ism gave way to the more egalitarian meeting of labor and management
across a bargaining table.
The last fifty years saw another important change: Filipinos replaced
orientals as the largest element in the plantation work force. There are
at least two important stories to be told regarding that change. Despite
its governing principle of labor solidarity, tensions developed between
Filipinos and Japanese that threatened the unanimity of the labor
movement. In his A Spark is Struck: Jack Hall and the ILWU in Hawaii,
Sanford Zalburag has touched on these tensions, but they deserve fur-
ther study.
Filipinos also knew a decidedly different experience from the sugar
workers who had gone before. Many Filipinos never left the plantation.
A far greater proportion of Filipinos never knew the comfort of family
life in Hawaii. Their history lacks the Horatio Alger quality of move-
ment from sugar field to noodle shop to the professions. Few of their
children went from plantation village to lawyer's office in one
generation. It is a more depressing and heart-rending story, but one
that needs to be told if the full plantation experience is to be known. In
Sakada: Filipino Adaptation in Hawaii, Ruben Alcantara has dealt with
the Filipino experience on one Oahu plantation, but his approach is
more sociological than historical.
The last half century of Hawaii's plantation life also produced the
generation of men and women who have, over the last thirty years,
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changed Hawaii from an essentially feudal society to a democratic a~d
egalitarian one. Hawaii's legislators of the 1950s and the i 960s In
particular, were children of plantation life in the 1920s, '30s and '40s.
Through them the plantation experience has reverberated down to the
present. .
Finally, Takaki's people's history needs more people. ~Ike .most
historians, Takaki relies on the written record. He uses oral hlstones of
plantation workers, but the quiet eloquence of the worker could have
been more extensively employed.
All criticisms of Takaki's work are, in fact, back-handed
compliments. Pau Hana is unquestionably one of the half d?zer: finest
works ever written on aspects of Hawaii's history. Takaki wntes so
well, his research is so enlightening, that one only wishes for more. Let
us hope a sequel is in the offing.
NOTJES ON THJE COST OF JLIFJE IN MODJERN HAWAH:
A JRJEVKJEW OF NOJEJL J. KJENT'S
HAWAII: ISLANDS UNDER THE INFLUENCE
(New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1983)
Robed S. Cahin
Put most succinctly, this is a book about the transformation over the
past quarter-century of a society once based economically on plantation
agriculture into a "society of tourism," in which the resources of its
people are mobilized into the service of an all-consuming "visitor in-
dustry" which, although immensely profitable to investors based in
centers of economic decision-making far removed from that society
and to their most effective agents based in the society itself, visits upon
an increasing number of its people a burden of increasingly unbearable
weight.
As political analysis this vision of Hawaii's distant and recent past,
and of the futures that may be imminent in it, is unlikely to engage the
minds of the present generation of Hawaii's movers and shakers,
whether in government or the "private" sector. It is much more likely
to seem altogether alien to their practical concerns. Nor is it likely to
warm their hearts in its role as potential political myth inviting embrace
by the people of Hawaii. Instead, it is much more likely to outrage
them, if they do not find it merely irksome or boorish. How it will be re-
ceived by other constituents of Hawaii's body politic, who experience
themselves more nearly as moved and shaken, is a more open
question. And it is in the openness of this question that the primary sig-
nificance of the work is to be found - for the movers and shakers, for
the author himself, and for the moved and shaken whom both address.
The book should be evaluated in each of these aspects - as both
analysis and potential myth - first of all because any such serious at-
tempt to understand an ongoing political reality and then to share that
understanding with its makers and bearers should be seen in each of
these manifestations of the consciousness that authors it. To speak of
myth in this context is, of course, to refer not to some ancient or other-
wise alien "myth" which in our unfettered enlightenment we have ex-
posed as the enslaver of our ancestors or our contemporaries in more
benighted cultures, but to refer instead to effective myth, powerful
myth, myth which orders and accounts for the political experience of a
people and reveals its prospects for creating its own history. In this con-
text all serious political analyses of a society in process invite political
understanding, and given that understanding, invite political commit-
ment as well. This is true whether the vision articulated in the analysis
is "established," even if inherently liable to challenge and eclipse, or is
196 SOCIAL PROCESS IN HAWAII, VOL. 31,1984
instead antithetical to the established understandings and
commitments, and proposed in the hope of eclipsing the established
myth in the brighter light of its own dispensation.
The only political analyses which escape this dual fate are those
which are generated from a perspective wholly untouched by concern
with any human interests at all, or written in language so arcane as to
elude recognition by anyone at all as his or her own. Try as many politi-
cal scientists will to achieve this result, by way of gaining immunity
from the charge of failing to be properly "disinterested" or
"objective," few if any entirely succeed. So much the better for political
analysis, because the analysis that would entirely succeed by these stan-
dards would not be a political analysis at all, would be instead not
merely non-political but anti-political. And in this context, let it be said
loudly and clearly, Kent's work is unquestionably a political analysis,
and is therefore likewise a contender for mythic status in the hearts and
minds of the people of the society whose political life it would reveal to
view.
Beyond these general considerations, however, Kent's work should
be assessed as both analysis and myth for the very particular reason that
Kent himself would evaluate it from both of these perspectives and in-
vites his readers to do the same. His business in this work is not only to
see the political reality of Hawaii and then to show his readers what he
sees, but also quite explicitly to move them to embrace new prospects
and new commitments in the light of what he has seen and shown
them. He tells us straightforwardly enough that he wants his work to
serve as at least a "humble beginning" to the creation of the kind of
"political economy" that scholarship about Hawaii needs if it is ever to
provide "a comprehensive, incisive analysis of the dynamics of past
and contemporary social, political, and economic development" some-
thing that "can be used to critique existing scholarship" and f~r which
"the serious student of Hawaiian society [now] looks in vain." With
equal directness he tells us that he wants his work to serve "as a catalyst
to help ignite people to playa creative role in the great social dramas of
our time," and "as a means to empower them in their struggles." He
wants it to "open a door that has been closed too long" through which
to extend his metaphor, they can and will move in the light of the pros~
pects its opening puts before them in place of what may now seem a
bleak and impenetrable wall that is becoming bleaker and more impe-
netrable with each passing decade of modern Hawaii's political
development.
Certainly Kent would argue that there is historical truth in his
analysis. While he disavows any claim that his work is in any way
"definitive", or even that it can stand as a "genuine academic history
of Hawaii", he is confident "that the historical analysis at the core of
the study is both accurate and clearly argued." It is clear, of course, that
he regards his work as an interpretation of Hawaii's political and
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economic history, thereby acknowledging his role as mediator between
the reality he would understand and the symbols in terms of which he
would understand and have others understand it, and disavowing the
role of disinterested mirror, a role with which he believes some stu-
dents of Hawaii's history have too easily credited themselves, declining
as they have to recognize that "a variety of interpretations might
exist." So the truth of his analysis is presented as interpretative truth.
But this is not to reduce the stature of his work to that of mere opinion,
to use the idiom of modern journalism and its resolution of the problem
of knowledge into the distinction between "fact" and "opinion", a dis-
tinction which is itself regarded as fundamentally unproblematic. It is
instead political analysis: hard-won, anchored in a serious examination
of relevant documents and experience - for Kent is no less a citizen
then he is a student of Hawaii - and consistently self-conscious about
the role of the framework of concepts and values that both enables and
informs the resulting interpretation, making it possible in the first
place, and in the second place giving it the shape and texture which sets
it apart from the contending interpretations.
But beyond his confidence in the historical truth of the analysis he
presents, in the region where analysis and myth come together with
dynamic import, there is Kent's own characterization of this nexus in
his belief that the very validity of his work is to be found in its efficacy as
catalyst for igniting and empowering the people of Hawaii. Not perhaps
all the people: not the movers and shakers, not those already en-
trenched in power, already witnessing their own private interests embo-
died in public rhetoric and public policy, but instead the "ordinary
people," perhaps especially the "disenfranchised", with whom he
identifies and who now face the bleak wall in which he would open a
liberating door.
In this context the issue posed by his work is not merely whether or
not it contains historical truth - even though it surely does - but
whether or not or for whom, among the people of Hawaii, the vision in
which his analysis is embodied will be true enough: true enough for
them to embrace it as an image of the Real and the Good and therefore
as a source of new commitments to transformation both in themselves
and in the public world in which the meaning of their membership in
Hawaii's society makes itself known to them; true enough because it
gives them an account of their experience in and at the hands of that
society that they can recognize as their own, and in which their lives are
redeemed beyond any value the prevailing mythology can give them;
true enough, in short, to be embraced as myth, and therefore as the
matrix for a genuinely new politics for modern Hawaii.
* * *
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It is not difficult to understand why the movers and shakers of
modern Hawaii will not warm to the embrace of this potentially mythic
analysis of the political system whose command posts they now occupy,
but two reasons may loom large enough as occasions for outrage to
reduce all others to the status of petty annoyances. Assaulted in their
vitals by these dragons, all remaining insults may seem to them little
more than fleabites by comparison.
The first of these dragons is embodied in the fact that both in its intel-
lectual origins and in the primary themes and categories of analysis it
employs - and despite the truth in Kent's statement that it was "first
formulated in the 1960s to explain the widespread failure of develop-
ment strategies in the Third World" - the "dependency framework"
on which the analysis is built is patently rooted in the Marxist tradition.
To be sure, the argument makes no explicit appeal to "Marxism" as a
basis for either understanding or action, and the bugbear of
"revolution" in any ordinary sense of that term is nowhere to be found
in it. But this will probably count for little.
Hawaii, after all, is one of the fifty sovereign states of the most
powerful nation in the history of the planet, and it is hard to find an
issue of a daily newspaper that neglects to remind its readers of the
axiom that the nation is engaged in a just and vital struggle against -
not this or that people in this or that territory with this or that collection
of markets, resources, and political leaders - but against "Marxism"
and "Marxists" as such. In this context, particularly for those who hold
the lion's share of political and economic power, evidence in public
utterances of even the scantest indebtedness to the mind of Karl Marx
is warrant enough both for outrage and for preemptory repudiation of
any claim such utterances might make to have the power to illuminate
the experience of any of the nation's citizens or the problems which
they confront. Far from offering a basis for understanding or solving
such problems, "Marxism" is the problem. So that any analysis which
proceeds from "Marxist" premises or employs "Marxist" categories is
seen not only as failing to provide understanding and a valid basis for
political commitment, but indeed as being actively opposed to under-
standing and itself committed to misleading the unwary away from
their true inheritance of wealth and freedom and into a false inheritance
of bare "security" paid for in the currency of "slavery."
It is seen, in short, as demonic; and the only issue which might
remain somewhat open for the standard-bearers of the prevailing myth,
when confronted with proponents of such a demonic perspective, is the
question whether these are self-conscious demons intent on possessing
others or, instead, merely unsuspecting "dupes" themselves possessed
by demons. What this means in practice is that, from the standpoint of
the movers and shakers of private enterprise made public policy,
images of political reality which reveal any taint of the "Marxist" herit-
age may well be either wicked or foolish, evil or insane - but they may
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never be either wise or good. Grounds enough, surely, for the leading
spirits' of modern Hawaii, as representative and responsible Americans,
to be outraged by Kent's work, whether Kent be demon himself or
merely possessed.
Beyond its display of Marxist geneology, however, Kent's analysis
will bring scant pleasure to Hawaii's leading spirits, either to the cap-
tains of local industry and finance or to those whom Kent commends us
to see as their partners and agents in government, because it lays the
burden of blame for what he commends us to see as the disastrous reali-
ty of modern Hawaii squarely on their shoulders. Probably this would
be bad enough, but matters may be even worse. Modern Hawaii, after
all, has learned to live with its "oligarchic" plantation past, especially
now that it has been officially transcended and displaced by the "New
Hawaii" and the happy blend of pluralism and representative govern-
ment it officially brings with it.
The eclipse of the old oligarchs and the advent of the New Covenant
are embedded as axioms in public discourse, as well as documented
and codified in the scholarship of Fuchs' Hawaii Pono and Daws' Shoal
of Time. In this dispensation the "peaceful revolution" undid the domi-
nance of the few and released both government and the many it was
supposed to represent from their roles as instruments of the few and
their drive for public power and private wealth. More than a
commonplace, it is by now a requirement for Hawaii's political myth-
makers to acknowledge the blame that in retrospect is due to these
greedy and oppressive masters of Hawaii's past, while in the same
breath to cherish and celebrate release from their mastery. So that even
if at times the bearers of this blame have bridled under its burden - as
Fuchs for example was made aware when his own vision of Hawaii en-
tered the public dO~'lain and showed itself capable of producing its own
ration of outrage - on the whole it has been borne with discretion and
forbearance even if, one suspects, without relish.
But in this foundation myth for the "New Hawaii," the oligarchs,
even though surely enough blamed, are given the respect of being
blamed for being authentically autonomous and powerful - for master-
ing the politics and economics of Hawaii with skill and daring, but more
than that for master-minding the strategies for development to whose
realization they gave their energies. They are blamed, in short, for
dominating the people of Hawaii in the interests of policies which were
unambiguously their own. They may have done what was necessary to
conceal their private agendas from public view, but the agendas they
did their best to conceal were indisputably their own agendas. And
perhaps, in the nature of things, when the wolf is blamed by, or on
gehalf of, the sheep on which he has been feeding he may find ways of
bearing the burden with relative grace, for he is being blamed, after all,
only for being a wolf - and a wolf has his own dignity, his own pride,
his own nature and integrity.
,I
--~~
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But the blame that Kent now lays on the shoulders of the present
generation of Hawaii's captains of industry, finance and government af-
fords no such ~edeeming grace. For in Kent's analysis, even though
they are undemably powerful over the people of Hawaii and on behalf
of the developmental policies which shape Hawaii's economic and
political life, they have all but entirely lost their power to design and
implement their own agendas and instead are themselves by now all
but wholly "dependent" on the prior and more potent agendas of
others. While Hawaii remains the center of their own political and
economic activities and their own demands for emminence and wealth
in the topographies of the real movers and shakers of modern Hawaii
this center is but one of many spots on the "periphery" of the real
center of power which is entirely elsewhere: in the metropolitan head-
qu~rters of ~u1tinational corporations and investors' groups in the
mamland Umted States and Japan, whose directors can dispose of con-
centrations of capital far vaster than their local cohorts can even
imagine, and in whose agendas Hawaii has long since been scheduled
for development as a society consecrated to mass tourism as a way of
life.
In the context of this vision there is little prospect for even grudging
redemption in the blame Kent settles on the local men and women of
capital. Posted in a periphery made such by the designs of the owners
and controllers of truly immense concentrations of capital elsewhere in
the world, they, like the "ordinary people" of Hawaii are "under the
influence." Far from being cast as wolves they are' cast instead as
jackals, earning their keep as the lion's provider by going before him to
hunt up his prey, feeding on leftovers from the lion's share and on such
smaller species as they may themselves bring down along the way. Far
from taking Hawai! fr.om its. people and keeping it for themselves, they
have collaborated m Its deliverance to interests alien to Hawaii in ex-
change for the wealth and local emminence that still seem to come in
amounts sufficient to bind them to the enterprise. To the movers and
shakers of modern Hawaii, from whatever quarters it might have come
this cannot be a pretty image in which to be invited to see their ow~
reflections; and coming from the ominous regions of "Marxism" it
must be doubly unwanted or worse. '
* * *
Just what is this "dependency framework" by means of which Kent
develops his vision of Hawaii's economic and political evolution what
are its central concepts and problematics, the primary compon~nts of
the picture of Hawaii that reults from its application to the Hawaiian
case? And what is the nature of the disaster to which in the light of this
~nalysis, Hawaii might be seen to have been brought? On whom have
Its burdens most heavily fallen? And finally, what if any are their pros-
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pects for deliverance from these burdens and for setting themselves on
the way to a life that can be genuinely accounted good in Kent's
perspective, and perhaps in their own as well?
At the center of any adequate "political economy," according to
Kent, are two closely related domains of inquiry: "the ongoing dialectic
between global capitalist development and local development," and
"the special role of the state in relation to capital." As a vehicle for such
a political economy, he argues, the dependency framework is valuable
precisely because it attempts to work out a "coherent analysis of the
global economic structure" and then to use this analysis "to analyze de-
velopment in individual societies." So doing, it transcends traditional
perspectives in which national and international processes are parti-
tioned in splendid isolation from one another and focusses on
"assembling patterns of intersystemic and international linkages" by
means of which the "dynamics of social change and transformation"
are set in motion, and can be revealed in their movement by the "use
of history as an instrument" of disclosure.
Kent's design is to take this framework and apply it to Hawaii's
economic and political evolution from the moment of first contact with
the West to the moment of the completion of his own work. The central
thesis to which the analysis lends its weight is given clearly enough in
the preface, even if the text itself reveals the theme in significant varia-
tions over the course of Hawaii's history. From the moment of contact
Hawaii has been "under the influence":
Change in Hawaiian development has corresponded historically
to the development of the forces of production in the advanced
capitalist world, from a center radiating influence and change
out to this mid-Pacific periphery. In short, Hawaii's develop-
ment for the last two hundred years has been peripheral in
nature, a reflex of expansionist needs in some metropolitan
center.
With contact Hawaii ceased to be the center of its own political and
economic dynamics and began its transformation into its role as
peripheral dependent society subject to powerful forces based in and
spreading out from one or another center of capital accumulation and
disposition.
To be sure, the locus of the effective metropolitan center has itself
evolved over time as the global topography of capital accumulation has
shifted. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth century the center was
to be found in England and France, but before the nineteenth century
had run its course the center had moved to the United States where it
was to remain until well beyond the middle of the twentieth century. At
this point, as far as Hawaii is concerned, the United States finds itself
joining in this role with Japan in an uneasy mixture of cooperation and
competition aimed at implementing the "Pacific Rim Strategy," a
------------------------------------- ---------------------~~----~~~~=~~------
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strategy for the sharing out of power over, and proceeds from, the
material and human resources of the Pacific Basin. But for all this
movement of the mantle of centrality from metropole to metropole,
Hawaii's role as a dependent periphery has remained constant, even if
the precise nature and degree of its dependency has in time undergone
a metamorphosis of sufficient scope to merit emphasis in Kent's
analysis.
The significance of this metamorphosis in degree and nature of
dependency within the fundamental continuity of dependency as the
defining characteristic of post-contact Hawaii is reflected in the organi-
zation of the text itself. It is divided into two parts. The first of these,
"The Ties that Bind," deals with the period from contact to roughly the
advent of the "New Hawaii" not long after the close of World War II
and is intended to "establish a general model of the development of a
plantation society as it emerged during the first century of contact be-
tween the Islands and outsiders." Part Two, entitled "Building the
'New Hawaii' ," continues the analysis into the present and focusses on
Hawaii's role in the Pacific Rim Strategy, the incorporation of the is-
lands' political elite with old-line plantation companies into an
"enlarged establishment" under the direction of overseas interests,
and the ensuing development of Hawaii as a "tourism society."
This plan of organization symbolizes Kent's view that the advent of
the "New Hawaii" marks a significant shift in the scope and depth of
Hawaii's economic and political dependency, and the enclosure of the
image of the "New Hawaii" in quotation marks signals his contention
that the claims of this image to mirror the reality of Hawaii's economic
and political life must be regarded as problematic. Indeed he represents
Part Two as being an "attempt to answer the fundamental question: in
terms of power relationships, economic and political control, and mass
participation, how genuinely new is the 'New Hawaii'?" His answer,
which sets his work off strikingly from that of either Fuchs or Daws, is
loud and clear: if the "New Hawaii" is new at all, its newness consists
not in deliverance from the burdens of pre-War dependency and its as-
sociated ills, as embodied in the organization ofIsland life around plan-
tation sugar, but instead in its deliverance even more profoundly to
them, as embodied now in the "new plantation" - tourism. In this
context the relentless projection of the imagery of the "New Hawaii"
into the public discourse of the islands emerges as a symbolically
reassuring mask which conceals the ugly reality which the people of
Hawaii encounter in their daily experience. As mythic imagery this
"New Hawaii," declining to come honestly to terms with that reality,
deprives them of the wherewithal to come to grips with it, rendering
them powerless where Kent would have his work contribute to em-
powering them.
Part one tells the story of how the "ties that bind" Hawaii - bind it
globally to the purposes of world centers ofcapital accumulation and lo-
Notes on The Cost ofLife in Modern Hawaii 203
cally to the agenda of the capitalist elite of Hawaii - ar~ gradually ~as­
tened and drawn ever more tightly until finally, the islands havmg
become the unchallenged domain of King Sugar, no aspect of life can
exist unless it express deference and fealty to this commanding
presence and the fortunes of the islands' people are all but entirely re-
flexes of'the fortunes of the King. This part of Hawaii's history is old
ground of course, and Kent's mapping of this familiar terrain adds few
if any new "facts" to those that have already been detailed in serious
scholarship about Hawaii, from Kuykendall to Fuchs and Daws.
What is new is the application of the "dependency framework" to
this array of facts, and the resulting emphasis on the connections
("linkages") between transformations in the scope and organization of
world capitalism and tandem transformations in the way in which capital
is organized in Hawaii itself ("structures"). Indeed the "factual." mate-
rials for making these connections are themselves embedded m these
earlier works so that Kent's work provides no grounds for challenging
this scholarship from the standpoint of its facticity, any more than it in-
vites challenge from that scholarship on like grounds. Whatever chal-
lenges might in principle be exchanged are best regarded as challenges
of interpretation, and these in turn reduce to challenges of the frame-
works for analysis and interpretation which each brings to his task as
well as to the social values to which each is committed.
It matters little whether these other scholars have explicitly acknowl-
edged or even understood that what they were doing was interpreting
the past and not reproducing it symbolically in its full reality - as
Fuchs quite clearly did and Kuykendahl and Daws less clearly did not.
Aware or not, like it or not, each sifted and assessed the significance of
the "facts" in the light of his own frame of reference whose premises
embodied images both of what he took to be the primary mechanisms
of historical dynamics and of what he took to be the criteria by which
human beings might best measure their worth and the worth of their
actions: images of both the Real and the Good around which to organize
thought, action and communication - political images, in short.
Given the frameworks for interpretation which governed the work of
Kuykendall, Fuchs and Daws the factual content of their work is not
presented in such a way as to bring the connections which are so central
to Kent's own analysis into sharp relief and thus urge readers to deal
with them as grounds for accepting a deliberately constructed and speci-
fied model of the reality they symbolize.
Kent's contribution to this body of scholarship consists in doing pre-
cisely that. In this context we should not be surprised to learn that
Kent's critique of their contributions to the "dominant paradigm" in
scholarship about Hawaii consists largely in his sense of their "lack of
theoretical grounding" - of explicit testing of models of history
against the facts of history - and of their "lack of self-awareness of.the
kinds of values (always middle class, mid-twentieth century, Umted
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States oriented) that inform the paradigm." This is what Kent means
when he argues for the use of history "as an instrument to reveal the
dynamics of social change," and this is why he is at pains in his own
work to affirm his own value commitments. There is nothing cagey or
disingenuous in his identification of himself as "someone committed
to the idea that quite 'ordinary' men and women are capable of building
a social order that [he] would define as 'rational,' democratically
accountabl~, socially just, and as ecologically sound as possible; in
short, a society that answers real and universal human needs for dignity,
self-respect, and genuine solidarity with other people," and that re-
sponds to "the real interests and welfare of the great majority of [his]
fellow human beings." He makes it quite clear that he has no intention
of giving his energies to the service of the merely self-apparent interests
of that minority of human beings that is constituted by the American
middle class at mid-century, interests which realize themselves in an
"irrational" society in which ecological necessity, democratic accounta-
bility and social justice are too readily sacrificed on the altar of wealth
and domination for the few, whether these be the minions of global
national, or merely local capitalism. '
This said, it should also be said that Kent's work should be regarded
as a genuine contribution to our understanding of Hawaii's political and
economic history and its present prospects, even though there is little
reason to suppose that it will be regarded as such by all, least of all by
those very capitalists on whom he lays the responsibility for Hawaii's
dependency and subjection. No matter. It deserves this status in the
corpus of scholarship about Hawaii whether or not the focus it brings to
bear on that history yields a sufficient schematic for revealing its
"essence" and whether or not its images of the Good are our own. It
deserves it simply because it is unquestionably a serious deliberate
and transparently straightforward attempt to understand ~nd come t~
terms with a reality in which the needs and hopes of all the people of
Hawaii are at stake, and in whose future prospects they have nothing
short of vital interests.
To return to the analysis presented in part one, however, what is
most important to note is what Kent takes to be the legacy of dependen-
cy for Hawaii, and to note as well what specific form is taken by that
legacy in the period before the "New Hawaii" that sets it apart from the
form he believes it to have taken in the period since that time. The
"dependent society" which in Kent's analysis characterizes Hawaii
from contact to the present might be resolved into five features:
(1) virtually total consecration of the resources of the society - land,
water, human labor - to the production of a single commodity pro-
duced for, and dependent upon, a single market in a "metropolitan
center" whose managers see the producing society as "peripheral" to
the center and of interest solely for its capacity to respond to the fluc-
tuating economic and military needs of the metropole;
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(2) concentration oflocal control over the production process itself in
the hands of a small number of owners of the primary means of
production;
(3) concentration of local political control in these same hands, so
that the society's government becomes essentially an instrument of the
owners of the larger parcels of industrial and financial capital and the
vehicle for the translation of their private economic interests into the
substance of public policy and the object of public expenditures;
(4) mobilization of virtually all remaining elements of the population
- those not sharing significantly in capital ownership - into produc-
tive roles in the dominant industry, either as laborers selling their labor
directly to the industry's "producers" or as smaller combinations of
capital and labor providing ancillary services to the industry - the
boundary between capital and labor sharing rough correspondence with
that between different ethnic or cultural groups, and race itself symbol-
ized in public discourse as the primary basis of social differentiation;
(5) eradication not only of previously existing uses of the society's
resources and the social relations and cultural expressions associated
with them ("lifestyles") that is entailed by their mobilization on behalf
of the dominant industry, but also of any serious prospect for the con-
sideration of alternative models for development - fueled in part by
the systematic propagation of the myth that the welfare of the industry
and that of the society are one and the same, and that objections to its
continued dominance, or active proposals for change, constitute anti-
social behavior.
In Kent's analysis. these features combine to represent an apt descrip-
tion of Hawaii's political and economic reality both before and since the
arrival of the "New Hawaii." In the closing chapters of part one,
however, he makes plain his contention that Hawaii's dependency in
the earlier period has to be regarded as less than total and, more
concretely, less profound than has been characteristic of other
"plantation societies." It was, instead, a period of "limited
dependence," even if it was limited in only one important respect: that
"unlike other dependent plantation societies, the plantation elite in
Hawaii was able to maintain a certain political and economic authority
within the islands vis-a-vis the metropole." This limitation, it is impor-
tant to note, in no way suggests that the defining characteristics of
dependency given earlier carried less full force in the plantation era
than they do in the modern era of industrial tourism. All that is being
said is that in the plantation period, within the relationship between
large capital concentrations at the metropole and those at the
periphery, the local capitalists of Hawaii enjoyed more relative autono-
my than did their counterparts in other plantation economies the world
over. Compared to these they were less a mere "collaborationist class,"
less a class of functionaries of the purposes of the metropole. They
were able to hold this status precisely because of the strength and vitali-
ty of their control over local capital and local political life.
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During this period local capitalists managed "to retain financial con-
trol over the basic economic sectors" of Hawaii, which gave them "a
certain flexibility in dealing with metropolitan elites." They were able
as a class to "establish a real grip on the productive and financial
apparatus, and to maintain it until well after World War II." Despite de-
velopments in global capitalism that bound Hawaii into ever more solid
integration with the system as a whole" internally the elite managed not
only to maintain its economic control, but also to deepen and broaden
that control through monopoly over the Islands' basic industries and
related financial and service functions, and through the adept use of
political power and influence in Hawaii and the metropole." In other
words, while Hawaii as a whole was dependent upon and defined and
dominated by, the interests and decisions of local ca~italists, these en-
trepreneurs were themselves relatively more free in their dealings with
the metropole than were their counterparts in other plantation
societies, more nearly electing to commit Hawaii to dependency on
sugar than themselves depending for their own wealth and emminence
on the success with which they implemented the interests and decisions
of capitalist organizations outside of Hawaii.
In part two, however, even this exception to the otherwise universal
character of the plantation economy is decisively withdrawn from the
local capitalists of the "New Hawaii." In the new plantation of industrial
tourism, which has by now all but displaced the agricultural plantation
of old, the days of "limited dependency" are over. Local capitalists
have all but entirely lost their capacity to elect Hawaii's fate on their
own initiative, and have become little more than exceptionally well-
paid local agents for the interests and choices of American and Japanese
multinational corporations as these may apply in Hawaii. Even though
Hawaii's government is no less their instrument they are themselves
but instruments in the hands of others whose interest in Hawaii is in its
role as a field for investment in mass tourism and as a bastion for the
military support of their power to transform the Pacific Basin as a whole
into a means of profit for themselves. So that in Part Two of the text the
"New Hawaii" emerges as "the age of almost complete dependency"
for the islands, while tourism emerges "more than any other factor" as
the "root of this dependency," and Hawaii's leaders look on, apparently
"helpless on all fronts," but no less rich, and no less dominant over the
people of Hawaii for all that.
The key to this transformation as Kent sees it might be summarized
into the following set ofhistorical developments:
(1) the decision by Hawaii's major industrial, commercial and finan-
cial corporations that plantation agriculture could no longer be expected
to produce the profits it had in the past;
(2) ~~eir decision to seek other sources of profitability, both in
Hawall and abroad, thus to transform themselves into multinational
corporations, a step which required vast new inputs of capital which
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had to be paid for in the currency of forfeited local control over
economic policy to the investment priorities of the larger metropolitan
sources on which they depended for new capital;
(3) the resulting integration of these corporations into the organiza-
tion of metropolitan capital and the subordinization of their own invest-
ment strategies in Hawaii to those embodied in the Pacific Rim Strategy
in whose vision of the Pacific as a vast "division of labor" Hawaii was
scheduled for development as a tourist destination for the people of the
metropole;
(4) the direct penetration, with the help of formerly Hawaii-owned
corporations, of other mainland and Japanese-owned multinationals in
the form of massive investments in a radically expanded tourism plant;
(5) the collapse of the new "revolutionary" Democratic Party and of
the erstwhile radical LL.W.U. as sources of serious resolve to alter the
fundamental structures of economic and political power in Hawaii and
their effective merger with corporate leadership in an "age of con-
sensus" in support of this same narrowly circumscribed image of
Hawaii's economic destiny;
(6) the embrace by Hawaii's government - at first hesitant, express-
ing concern for the dangers of excessive dependence on tourism, but
finally unreservedly and unblushingly - of this same vision, its leaders
forfeiting whatever genuine autonomy they might have earned in the
wake of their successful challenge of the "Old Hawaii," providing land-
use decisions and massive public funding of infrastructural costs in ex-
change for sharing disproportionately in the proceeds that the unrelent-
ing elaboration of industrial tourism would bring to those who had
either economic or political capital to invest in it.
The resulting "tourism society", for all its enormous profitability for
its major investors in and out of government, extracts similarly enor-
mous costs from the ordinary people of Hawaii. These costs take a
variety of forms but in Kent's analysis they are seen as converging in
their effects. "Massive government subsidies" to the industry for the
creation of the necessary infrastructure make steadily increasing in-
roads on government support for programs serving other
constituencies. Governmental allocation of the basic resources of land
and water to tourism development systematically liquidate such pros-
pects for country living or small scale agriculture and community life as
have survived the era of plantation agriculture.
Earning opportunities for workers in the industry itself are minimal
- indeed this is a primary foundation of its attractiveness to investors.
Wages are generally exceptionally low, temporary and part-time em-
ployment an increasing tendency, and ceilings above which local em-
ployees are unable to rise are kept low by the importation of
management-level employees from metropolitan centers. No less bur-
densome is tourism's demand that its workers present themselves in
the role of smiling servant, "catering to people witn-whom [their] only
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tie is the cash nexus," a form of institutionalized humiliation which is
made no lighter by the ethnic lines that divide the industry's workers
from its clientele. And as if this were not enough Hawaiians and others
who identify with their concerns must witness the systematic debase-
ment of Hawaiian culture as it is increasingly reduced to the status of a
commodity for sale to anyone who is willing to pay for it.
These costs may be borne gracefully by some, resignedly by others,
but for a growing constituency of Hawaii's people, they are increasingly
experienced as feelings of resentment toward the industry and its
clientele. Unendingly admonished not to bite the hand that feeds them,
it would seem, increasingly they become aware that the premise of the
metaphor casts them in the role of caged or domesticated animals
whose lot is to be used for the gain or amusement of the industry and
those who compromise its market, but otherwise to forfeit any claims
to proprietorship over their own lives. And increasingly this resentment
makes itself known in the public domain either in sporadic outbursts of
spontaneous violence by individuals and small groups or in "organized
political struggle," centering on issues of access to land, water,
housing, and dignified labor, and the preservation of authentically
"local" lifestyles.
Given all this, the question to which Kent's analysis leads him - and
should lead anyone who owns to a serious interest in Hawaii's political
future - is this: what are the prospects for the continued growth of this
constituency of resentment, and specifically for its discovery of the
capacity to organize itself for effective political struggle on behalf ofre-
dress and of the redirection of Hawaii's development? Who among
Hawaii's people, and how many of them, will come to experience the
costs of the present development model as unbearably great, demand-
ing more than they can give in exchange for whatever benefits accrue
to them by continued deference to it? Who and how many will translate
this experience into a basis for undertaking new commitments to sus-
tained political action, along with the risks and costs which any such
commitments inevitably entail? Or, to put the question in broader his-
torical perspective, is the unrelenting elaboration of industrial tourism
at the hands of metropolitan and local capital, in partnership with
Hawaii's government, unwittingly but inescapably creating the condi-
tions for its own undoing?
In the concluding pages of his study Kent seems to find grounds, if
not for faith, at least for hope that indeed it is. In the multiplex public
expressions of resentment, organized and unorganized, a "common
thread" appears: "the awakening of an anti-developer, anti-tourism
consciousness, a desire to reassert local control and local integrity
among large numbers of people." He tells us "there is a basis being laid
for a new politics that repudiates the 'New Hawaii' developmental
model and seeks to mobilize its victims (and non-victims) for
economic, political and social change that will benefit all the people." A
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new constituency is emerging "for a break with Hawaii's role as a
dependent tourism society."
Kent ends his study by noting that "ultimately it is only the people of
Hawaii who can break the long chain of dependent development" and
build a society in which decisions are made by local peopl~, ?ased on
their contribution to the well-being and integrity of the maJonty of th.e
citizens." Having presented his vision of their situation his work her~ IS
done. There is no detailed analysis of the constituency from whIch
action on behalf of change might be anticipated, no breakdown of the
cross-hatch of sub-constituencies and potentially contradictory intere~ts
that might be expected to impinge on the scope and force of ItS
common concerns, no schedule of concrete organizational proposa.ls,
no manual of political strategy and tactics, no implied o~fer of exp.erttse
or leadership. Instead, Kent offers only the s~ggestlOn ;,hat If the
people thus constituted are to succeed then theY~lllhave to" formulate
a comprehensive political program and economIc strategy and do so
"with enough vision and good sense to attract the support of the gr?w-
ing number of disenfranchised." Then, "and not the least," he wntes
in his concluding sentence, having indicated the contours of suc~ a p.ro-
gram in only the sparest terms, they "will need to build an org~mzatlon
capable of implementing such a progra~.:' Re.aders w~o mlg~t find
themselves in the constituency whose ongms hIS analysIs explams, or
might be drawn into it in the light of that anal~sis, .and wh? mi~ht want
to be told "what to do about it all" are given lIttle mstructIon, m short.
What they are given instead is an invitation, to look through the ~oor­
way he has tried to open and, if so moved, to walk through It -
together.
* * *
Certainly Kent's work invites challenge as well. Readers who have
not been wholly convinced of the merit of his argument be~ore e?-
countering it in this text will have quarrels and questions to bnng to It.
No doubt these will be as various as the political interests and perspec-
tives that inform them. But a review, even one that is broadly sym-
pathetic - as this one surely is - might usefully suggest. what some of
these quarrels and questions might be, ~nd by. so .do.mg ex.tend t~
others, whatever their own broad sympathIes,. an mVltatIor: of ItS ow~.
to view the text critically, in the light of theIr own expenence, theIr
own knowledge, and their own need to know. .
To begin from the narrowest perspective of scholarshIp, for example,
a routine check of a sample of footnote citations discloses annoyances
of various kinds which,though in themselves are hardly telling agai~st
the overall responsibility of the author to the "facts," cannot but raIse
questions about scholarly care and fastidiousness. On Page 42, for
example, quoting from an 1867 message from Secretary of State
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Seward to his Minister to Hawaii, Kent cites Page 208 of the second
volume of Kuykendall's history as his source; but one looks there in
vain for any such message, finally resorting to Kuykendall's index in
order to find it - accurately quoted by Kent - on Page 222. A search
for the source of a letter from Secretary of State Webster to a repre-
sentative of the Hawaiian government, which Kent notes can be found
on Page 194 of Kuykendall's second volume presents similar problems,
although a little detective work turns it up on Page 194 of Kuykendall's
first volume.
A somewhat different kind of gremlin appears when on Page 44 of
Kent's text Kuykendall seems to be cited as authority for Kent's de-
scription of the Hawaiian government's use of public funds to subsidize
labor recruiters and create the infrastructure demanded by the planters,
and its use of coercion against workers on behalf of planters. Checking
out this citation one finds that on the cited page of Kuykendall the only
information supplied has to do with the inauguration of a mail service
in 1850. In the sentence which follows this citation in Kent's text one
finds h~m asserting that in 1854 the government spent $40,000 on
harbor improvements and $15,000 more on wharves, while spending
an additional $30,000 on harbors in 1855. Then, scanning the Kuyken-
dall chapter in which the mail service discussion appears and discover-
ing there a subsection dealing with "Harbor Improvements," one finds
Kuykendall telling his readers that only the $40,000 was spent in 1854,
while both the additional $30,000 and the $15,000 for wharves was
spent in 1855.
Still another kind of dropped stitch, unrelated to Kent's citation prac-
tices but raising similar questions about scholarly care, turns up on
page 62 of the text where Kent represents the constitution promulgated
by Queen Liliuokalani in 1893 in her bid to reassert the power of
Hawaiians in Hawaii's government as being "nothing less than a blunt
repudiation of the plantation bourgeoisie and the political institutions it
had established in the half century [italics supplied] since the Bayonet
Constitution" - certainly a surprising characterization of Hawaii's con-
stitutional history, given that earlier in the text Kent, like others before
him, has located the "Bayonet Constitution" securely in 1887, or ap-
proximately six years prior to the Queen's action. Certainly errors of
this kind do not detract significantly from the merit of Kent's argument
as such, but neither do they strengthen its claim on our attention.
Grounds for other kinds of dissatisfaction can also be found. Surely
some readers will be disappointed in the text not because they find its
characterization of Hawaii's political and economic evolution in any
serious way defective but instead because, finding it an apt portrayal of
the situation in which they find themselves, they will be frustrated pre-
cisely by the fact that Kent stops short of providing concrete guidelines
for appropriate political action. Seen in this light Kent's analysis begs
for extension and pragmatic application to the situation thus disclosed.
This should take the form both of detailed analysis of the likely compo-
sition of - and differentiation within - the constituency which is
emerging in response to the contradictions of tourism, and of concrete
proposals for personal and organizational strategy grounded in s~c.h
analysis. It is hard to imagine either that the need for such an analySIS IS
beyond Kent's appreciation or that its execution is beyond his
capacities. Even so, perhaps he can be forgiven this omission, given his
understanding of his purpose in writing this work - to use history to
reveal the dynamics of social change and to serve as a catalyst for the
enfranchisement of others. Perhaps, indeed, given his indentification
with and confidence in the "ordinary people" of Hawaii, there is both
wisdom and integrity in his decision to decline the role of strategist and
the pretentions to leadership that go with it.
Some readers might find grounds for quarrelling with Kent's charac-
terization of one or another of the array of organizations and institu-
tions that come under review in the book. Questions might be raised,
for example, about his explanation for the metamorphosis of the
I.L.W.U., since the advent of the "New Hawaii," from radical critic to
enthusiastic supporter of the dominant social order in partnership with
its former adversaries. Kent presents a picture of an organization which
is politically beaten into a posture of "friendly cooperation and collabo-
ration with the bourgeoisie" as the price of survival, vitally weakened
under the assault of post-War capitalist red-baiting and deprived of bar-
gaining power by corporate transfers of plantation operations from
Hawaii to Third World areas. But surely some case can be made for a
quite different account of the evolution of the I.L.W.u. into an organi-
zation which, "comfortably assimilated into the existing order...ceased
to think seriously of restructuring it." Such an account would present
an image grounded not so much in defeat and failure as instead in vic-
tory and success. Having finally established their right and ability to bar-
gain effectively, and therefore to share in the control of the indus~ry, in
the process become comfortable beyond anything they had preViOusly
imagined, a new found belief in th~ merit of the prevailin.g system, and
a settled complacency about the mterests of the workmg class as a
whole may not have been beyond them. If so, then their emergent role
as collaborators might be seen not so much as something foisted upon
them as, instead, something to whose embrace they freely gave
themselves. It is not, after all, as if there were no precedent for such
transformations of consciousness in the history of world socialism as it
has emerged over the past century or more.
Other kinds of quarrels might be brought to Kent's characterization
of the University of Hawaii and the role it has played in the elite's devel-
opment strategy for Hawaii. Kent paints a monochromatic picture of an
institution consecrated to the service of this strategy. It would not be
surprising if a good many readers were to find in this image but a pale
reflection of their own experience. They may grant Kent's point that
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the elite intended and still intends for the university to play such a role,
but may equally decline to grant his apparent conclusion that their in-
tentions have been wholly realized in university practice. These observ-
ers see the university instead as a fractured institution, some of whose
elements are undeniably bound into service to the priorities of the
dominant strategy, but others of which are quite clearly not so bound
and instead routinely engaged in activities whose immediate political
significance is to mount a challenge to it.
To name but one such countertrend, some of whose strongest pro-
tagonists are to be found in the university, one can point to the develop-
ment and persistence of the ecological critique of headlong tourist de-
velopment and its implications. But the university has also been a pri-
mary source and facilitator of broad ranging social criticism, much of
which must be understood as a challenge to the claims and interests of
the development elite. There are even those, believe it or not, who
would argue that much of the reason for the adversary quality of the
State government's relationship to the university, and particularly to its
faculty, which has become so pervasive in the past decade and a half, is
to be found precisely in the stubbornness with which these academics
define themselves as having legitimate grounds for public support even
when their work does not redound in any obvious fashion to the benefit
of the development strategy to which the leaders of government have
given themselves. If there is any truth in all this, as there surely is in
the subsidiary observation that Kent's very book has been immensely
facilitated by the resources of the university, then perhaps he might
want to reconsider his assessment. He might want to do so not only be-
cause his analysis of the university may be wanting in this respect, but
also because it may alert him to the general danger in political analysis,
as in political practice, of confusing intent with effect, and to that
extent attributing power where it is not due.
A more basic question has to do with the application of the dependen-
cy framework itself, and particularly with Kent's conclusion within this
framework that the elaboration of industrial tourism in modern Hawaii
well-nigh exclusively reflects Hawaii's dependence, including the
dependence of Hawaii's economic and political elite, on the initiatives
of outside sources of capital. The quarrel here is certainly not with the
notion that metropolitan capital has played a mighty role in determining
both the rapidity and the scope of tourism development in Hawaii, but
instead with the notion which seems to be carried in Kent's work that it
has all but unilaterally determined its direction as well. If this is Kent's
conclusion, then it would seem that he would be prepared to argue that
in the absence of outside capital and the control associated with it,
Hawaii's local capitalists and the political groups whose collaboration
they have been able to count on, would have invested their resources
in Hawaii in some developmental strategy other than mass tourism. To
some observers this might seem a difficult argument to sustain, simply
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on the grounds that major capitalists everywhere, whether in the me-
tropole or elsewhere, seem to be uniformly and unabashedly oriented
to the same fundamental objective: to invest their resources in enter-
prises which promise the very highest yields of sustained profit, and to
evaluate geographical areas in which they might invest exclusively in
terms ofwhat is likely to be their "highest and best" use.
In this context there seems little reason to believe that the capitalists
of Hawaii and those of the metropole would have made significantly dif-
ferent calculations with respect to the most profitable uses to which the
land, water and people of modern Hawaii might be put. If this is the
case then in the absence of metropolitan capital we might have expected
less rapid and, at any point in time, less extensive development of tour-
ism than has occurred in the wake of massive outside investment, but
we would have no reason to expect either that mass tourism would not
have been developed, or that it would not have been developed as
rapidly and extensively as the profits derived from it would allow. If so,
then the "dependency" of the local elite, which seems at times to
resemble captivity in Kent's analysis, might deserve a somewhat more
textured assessment. Perhaps, however, this is the kind of issue Kent
has in mind when in his Preface he acknowledges that critics of
dependency models have "rightly pointed out" that such models need
"more finesse," more refinement, more "attention to nuance and
subtlety, " especially with respect to the way in which "degrees of
dependency" are established and "what the distinctive forms that con-
stitute a dependency relationship are." If so, then perhaps he will want
to consider the questions raised here as he continues to craft the
"sensitivity and discernment" in the use of the dependency framework
which he believes can make it an "entirely viable way of investigating
the dynamics of past and contemporary Hawaiian development," even
in its relatively unrefined state.
Finally, whatever forms and degrees of dependency might obtain be-
tween periphery and metropole, underlying them all may be an even
profounder dependency, the rationale for which is to be found at the
very center of capitalist mythology, and of socialist mythology as well.
That dependency is symbolized in the belief that the "highest and best
use" of the resources of a society - its land, its water, such other capital
as it may have at its disposal, and the labor of its people - is that which
promises the maximum possible yield of material wealth.
Of course, in these contending mythologies, this belief is hardly an
admission of anything as pathological as "dependency." Instead it is
represented as an insight into the very nature of the human species. If
we believe it we do so because it seems to give a telling account of what
we are, and we are apt to have little patience with anyone who might
soft-headedly suggest that we are as we seem to be because we seem to
believe it. It is simply given in the nature of things, as an imperative of
our being, and we go against it in the construction of our personal lives
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or our social systems at the peril of each. We may engage in global dis-
putes about how properly to organize our responses to this imperative
how to arrange the production process itself and how to distribute th~
proceed~ from it among those who play a role in it; but underlying
these disputes, however virulent they may become, is a bedrock of
agreement that however we organize our response we must give it all
we have.
It is to be remembered, in this context, that the very most telling
argument for the continued expansion of industrial tourism is the
belief that from this means, and from this means alone we can wrest
from these islands the maximum amount of wealth th~t they can be
made to give up in our era. Given the central imperative which our
~ythology insists we accept as real, however much capital we as indi-
Viduals have at our disposal, and however much labor power we have to
sell to t~ose who have more capital than ourselves, this argument for
the contmued growth of tourism, and for the continued liquidation of
everything in the islands that does not enhance its claims on their
resources, or that in any way obstructs its growth, is all but overwhelm-
ingly persuasive.
. But in the constituency which Kent's analysis reveals to be growing
m response to the contradictions of tourist development, perhaps at its
very center, there are some who are not persuaded by the argument be-
ca~se they are unwilling to give themselves to its mythic premise.
Chief among these are those native Hawaiians who are coming to a new
awaren~ss of their own cultural underpinnings and embracing the
authentic personal and political responsibility that goes with it. In this
new awareness they find themselves embracing as well a cultural pre-
mise which in some sense they have always known to be true but
which for generations before them has been under systematic as'sault
by the culture wh!ch has dominated, even if it has not entirely displaced
them. That premise, understood to be no less real, no less imperative
to them than is the central premise of the dominant culture to those
who embrace it, is this: that the highest and best purpose to which the
r~sources that bless the islands should be consecrated is not the produc-
tiOn of ever-increasing wealth but, instead, the unending creation of
community itself. Given this premise, to be sure, there is no denying the
need for an economic calculus as an element in the public life of the
community or in the personal lives of its members; but equally there is
n~ denying that this economic calculus must defer to the higher and
pnor claims of the essentially spiritual calculus that redeems it and
gives it meaning in the first place.
!~e Hawaiians, however, are not alone in this constituency of the
spmt. For many others in Hawaii they hold out a tantalizing prospect
for re~ease from the cramped quarters of the dominant mythology.
Watchmg closely the Hawaiians in their midst these others sense their
truth and the power for making community that is in it and is so unlike
- L ~__~ ~ _
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the power for domination that sometimes seems to be everywhere else.
Sensing this, across chasms of ethnic and cultural alienation, they look
to the Hawaiians for insight into their own lives and into the public
reality in which they make their lives. If they do so it is because the
mythology which surrounds them, for all the demands it makes upon
them, fails in some important way to justify those demands and to give
an account of their existences in which they can recognize their own
experience, and by means of which they can share that experience with
others. And in all this there is no small prospect that for these others,
increasingly, looking is not enough. They want now to join with these
Hawaiians in whose powers of understanding they have found grounds
for trust and perhaps, as well, for commitment to an authentically new,
even ifalso authentically old, Hawaii.
If this is true then those who would make myths and offer them to
the people of Hawaii, whatever the form in which they would offer
them, would do well to look to those Hawaiians whose voices are finally
now making themselves heard. More importantly, they would do well
to listen to them, to hear what these past masters of the art of storytell-
ing have to tell them about the reality of the human condition and the
human spirit, and about conditions for the well-being of Hawaii. In his
effort to understand the tensions and contradictions, as well as the
promise, of modern Hawaii Kent's ear is better than most, but there
may still be much for him to hear and to incorporate into his own gift of
story to the "ordinary people" ofHawaii.
None of this, however, denies the real power of Kent's analysis or its
real prospects for capturing the imagination of the growing constituency
that finds itself awakening to the contradictions inherent in the one
slaught of tourist development in Hawaii. Increasingly this unrelenting
transformation of the natural and cultural topography of the islands cre-
ates a world in which nothing remains that can reasonably be called
"local." Increasingly Hawaii becomes more than anything else a mere
functional extension of the metropolitan society whose more affluent
inhabitants are themselves bent on using its land, its water, and both
the labor and the spirit of its people as a means of respite from their
own worlds and their own labors. Increasingly, and to increasingly
many of the people of Hawaii, it becomes clear that to survive at all is to
pay the price of forfeiting every last vestige of any way of life they can
call either Hawaiian or in any other sense their own. There is no
question, in short, but that the constituency of resentment is growing;
and while there is reason to expect that new members will continue to
find their way into it whether or not Kent's vision is projected before
them, there is reason as well to expect that many of its members will
embrace Kent's perspective, if not as a sufficient truth, then as a more
sufficient truth than is afforded them by the prevailing myth of the
"New Hawaii." The vision which Kent has undertaken to offer them,
in short, has the makings of a powerful myth which, by accounting for
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and giving credit to their experience of life in modern Hawaii, may
"open a door that has been closed too long" and reveal the prospect of
a future more nearly adapted to their needs because more clearly of
their own making.
- 1,-' ~ '___ _
